Brief
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSDI)
The claims the writer was given for Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSDI), in the order they were given.
1
The Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program was launched from the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and was managed by a career counterintelligence officer named Lue Elizondo.
“AATIP was launched from OUSDI, the office of the undersecretary for defense intelligence and was managed by a career counterintelligence officer named Lue Elizondo.”
Statement to Congress char:8712-8867 administrative first hand
2
Christopher Sherwood told Keith Kloor unequivocally that Luis Elizondo had no responsibilities regarding the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP) while he worked in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSDI).
“Sherwood, the Pentagon spokesperson who had told me unequivocally that Elizondo “had no responsibilities with regard to the AATIP program while he worked in OUSDI.””
The Media Loves This UFO Expert Who Says He Worked for an Obscure Pentagon Program. Did He? 2019-06-01 char:16378-16535 testimony first hand
3
Luis Elizondo was based in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSDI) from 2008 until his retirement in 2017.
“Sherwood how he knew that Elizondo hadn’t worked for AATIP during his time with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, where he was based from 2008 until his retirement in 2017.”
The Media Loves This UFO Expert Who Says He Worked for an Obscure Pentagon Program. Did He? 2019-06-01 char:16557-16753 administrative
4
Christopher Sherwood said he had spoken with Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSDI) leadership, including individuals still there from when Luis Elizondo started working in the office, in concluding Elizondo had not worked for the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP).
“Sherwood said he’d spoken with OUSDI leadership, including individuals who are “still there” from the time when Elizondo started working in the office.”
The Media Loves This UFO Expert Who Says He Worked for an Obscure Pentagon Program. Did He? 2019-06-01 char:16759-16903 testimony first hand
5
Luis Elizondo provided reporters, including Keith Kloor, with recent annual Defense Department performance evaluations and his 2017-10-04 resignation letter to then-Defense Secretary James Mattis, which bears the apparent seal of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense.
“The documents he has provided include recent annual Defense Department performance evaluations and his October 4, 2017 resignation letter to then-Defense Secretary James Mattis, which bears the apparent seal of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense.”
The Media Loves This UFO Expert Who Says He Worked for an Obscure Pentagon Program. Did He? 2019-06-01 char:17653-17901 administrative
6
Luis Elizondo retired as an official at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSDI).
“Elizondo retired as an official at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.”
The Media Loves This UFO Expert Who Says He Worked for an Obscure Pentagon Program. Did He? 2019-06-01 char:18464-18548 administrative
7
Luis Elizondo had no responsibilities with regard to the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP) while he worked in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSDI), up until he resigned effective 2017-10-04.
““Mr. Elizondo had no responsibilities with regard to the AATIP program while he worked in OUSDI [the Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence], up until the time he resigned effective 10/4/2017.””
The Media Loves This UFO Expert Who Says He Worked for an Obscure Pentagon Program. Did He? 2019-06-01 char:2310-2512 testimony first hand
8
Luis Elizondo had no assigned responsibilities for the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP) while he was in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)).
“Mr. Elizondo had no assigned responsibilities for AATIP while he was in OUSD(I) [the Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence].”
Pentagon Reinforces Mr. Luis Elizondo Had “No Responsibilities” on AATIP; Senator Harry Reid’s 2009 Memo Changes Nothing 2019-06-14 char:1261-1388 administrative second hand
9
On June 1, 2019, as reported by Keith Kloor, the Pentagon said Luis Elizondo had no responsibilities with regard to the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP) while he worked in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSDI), up until the time he resigned effective 2017-10-04.
“as reported by Mr. Keith Kloor, the Pentagon had also said, in part, “Mr. Elizondo had no responsibilities with regard to the AATIP program while he worked in OUSDI, up until the time he resigned effective 10/4/2017.””
Pentagon Reinforces Mr. Luis Elizondo Had “No Responsibilities” on AATIP; Senator Harry Reid’s 2009 Memo Changes Nothing 2019-06-14 char:1480-1691 administrative second hand
10
It is unclear how Hal Puthoff could have worked under Luis Elizondo's leadership given that AAWSAP/AATIP contracted work began in 2008 at the Defense Intelligence Agency while Elizondo's alleged leadership began in 2010 at OUSDI.
“It is unclear how Dr. Puthoff could have worked under Mr. Elizondo’s leadership, since AAWSAP/AATIP contracted work began in 2008 at DIA and Mr. Elizondo’s alleged leadership began in 2010 at OUSDI when the program was transferred.”
Pentagon Reinforces Mr. Luis Elizondo Had “No Responsibilities” on AATIP; Senator Harry Reid’s 2009 Memo Changes Nothing 2019-06-14 char:6717-7036 opinion
11
Luis Elizondo's alleged leadership of the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP) began in 2010 at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSDI), when the program was transferred there.
“Mr. Elizondo’s alleged leadership began in 2010 at OUSDI when the program was transferred.”
Pentagon Reinforces Mr. Luis Elizondo Had “No Responsibilities” on AATIP; Senator Harry Reid’s 2009 Memo Changes Nothing 2019-06-14 char:7001-7053 administrative
12
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence referred the timing and circumstances of Luis Elizondo's resignation to the Air Force Office of Special Investigations for immediate counterintelligence review.
“Yes. We referred the timing and circumstances of Mr. Elizondo's resignation to the AFOSI.”
FOIA Response 18-F-0324: AATIP and Luis Elizondo Documents 2022-08-17 char:19427-19510 administrative first hand
13
Luis Elizondo's second resignation letter was hand delivered to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSDI) Chief of Staff office by someone other than Luis Elizondo.
“The letter was hand delivered to the USDI Chief of Staff office by someone other than Mr. Elizondo.”
FOIA Response 18-F-0324: AATIP and Luis Elizondo Documents 2022-08-17 char:20167-20257 testimony first hand
14
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSDI) staff contacted the Navy civilian upon discovering the SIPRnet email sent to him by Luis Elizondo regarding declassification.
“USDI staff contacted him upon discovery of the SIPRnet email sent to him by Mr. Elizondo.”
FOIA Response 18-F-0324: AATIP and Luis Elizondo Documents 2022-08-17 char:20915-20995 testimony first hand
15
The Navy civilian contacted by Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSDI) staff told them that he had informed Luis Elizondo that he was not the declassification release authority.
“He informed us that he told Mr. Elizondo that he was not the declassification release authority, and took no further action.”
FOIA Response 18-F-0324: AATIP and Luis Elizondo Documents 2022-08-17 char:21005-21122 testimony second hand
16
The Navy civilian contacted by Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSDI) staff took no further action after telling Luis Elizondo he was not the declassification release authority.
“and took no further action.”
FOIA Response 18-F-0324: AATIP and Luis Elizondo Documents 2022-08-17 char:21102-21122 testimony second hand
17
Luis Elizondo was assigned to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence from 2008-09-28 to 2017-10-04.
“Mr. Elizondo was assigned to OUSDI from September 28, 2008 to October 4, 2017.”
FOIA Response 18-F-0324: AATIP and Luis Elizondo Documents 2022-08-17 char:4801-4874 administrative first hand
18
Luis Elizondo served as an action officer in Partner Engagement at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
“He served as an action officer in Partner Engagement, and subsequently as a branch chief managing classified information to support the Office of Military Commissions.”
FOIA Response 18-F-0324: AATIP and Luis Elizondo Documents 2022-08-17 char:4880-5035 administrative first hand
19
Luis Elizondo was cleared out of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence the day after submitting his first resignation letter.
“He was cleared out of USDI the next day.”
FOIA Response 18-F-0324: AATIP and Luis Elizondo Documents 2022-08-17 char:5357-5393 administrative first hand
20
On or about 2017-10-04, after Luis Elizondo had departed, a second resignation letter was delivered to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Chief of Staff office.
“On or about October 4, after Mr. Elizondo had departed the organization, a second resignation letter (Tab C) was delivered to the USDI Chief of Staff office.”
FOIA Response 18-F-0324: AATIP and Luis Elizondo Documents 2022-08-17 char:5466-5616 administrative first hand
21
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, a component of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, located eight pages determined responsive to parts one and two of John Greenewald's Freedom of Information Act request.
“The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence & Security, a component of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, conducted a search of their records systems and located eight pages determined to be responsive to parts one and two of your request.”
FOIA Response 18-F-0324: AATIP and Luis Elizondo Documents 2022-08-17 char:569-809 administrative first hand
22
Given the uncertain provenance of Luis Elizondo's second resignation letter, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence retained a copy but did not provide it to the Secretary of Defense's office.
“Given the uncertain provenance of the second letter, OUSDI retained a copy but did not provide it to the SecDef office.”
FOIA Response 18-F-0324: AATIP and Luis Elizondo Documents 2022-08-17 char:5824-5936 administrative first hand
23
Luis Elizondo told Garry Reid that nobody in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence was cleared for the secret program he described, and would not discuss it further.
“He said nobody in USDI was cleared for this program and would not discuss it further.”
FOIA Response 18-F-0324: AATIP and Luis Elizondo Documents 2022-08-17 char:6196-6273 testimony second hand
24
The Air Force Office of Special Investigations is responsible for providing investigative support to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including investigation of assigned personnel.
“which is responsible for providing investigative support to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), including investigation of assigned personnel.”
FOIA Response 18-F-0324: AATIP and Luis Elizondo Documents 2022-08-17 char:7143-7285 administrative first hand
25
On 2017-12-15, based on information contained in The New York Times inquiry, Garry Reid notified the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Security Officer that Luis Elizondo may have misused government systems and may intend to release US government footage or information he obtained during his employment with the office.
“On December 15, based on information contained in the NYT inquiry, I notified the OUSDI Security Officer that Mr. Elizondo may have misused government systems and may intend to release USG footage or information that he obtained during his employment with OUSD (I).”
FOIA Response 18-F-0324: AATIP and Luis Elizondo Documents 2022-08-17 char:7788-8050 administrative first hand
26
On 2017-12-18, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence located a classified email generated by Luis Elizondo in August 2017 in which he requested assistance from a Navy civilian employee to declassify one or more videos.
“On December 18, OUSDI located a classified email generated by Mr. Elizondo in August 2017, in which he requested assistance from a Navy civilian employee to declassify one or more videos.”
FOIA Response 18-F-0324: AATIP and Luis Elizondo Documents 2022-08-17 char:8432-8612 administrative first hand
27
As of the memorandum's writing, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence had not determined whether the video attached to Luis Elizondo's August 2017 email was properly declassified, what process was followed, or how it ended up with the national media.
“The email chain is incomplete, so we have yet to determine if the video was properly declassified, what process was followed, and how it ended up in the possession of the national media. We continue to research these email transactions.”
FOIA Response 18-F-0324: AATIP and Luis Elizondo Documents 2022-08-17 char:8715-8938 administrative first hand
28
In his first resignation letter dated 2017-10-03, Luis Elizondo submitted his resignation effective 2017-10-04 as Director, National Programs Special Management Staff, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and requested a deferred retirement.
“Effective 4 October 2017, I humbly submit my resignation as Director, National Programs Special Management Staff, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. In this regard, I understand I will no longer be an employee of the U.S. Government. I respectfully request I receive a "deferred retirement".”
FOIA Response 18-F-0324: AATIP and Luis Elizondo Documents 2022-08-17 char:9189-9492 testimony first hand
29
The Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force was led by the Department of the Navy under the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security.
“The task force was led by the Department of the Navy under the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security.”
Intelligence Officials Say U.S. Has Retrieved Craft of Non-Human Origin 2023-06-05 char:1723-1848 administrative
30
Luis Elizondo had been working for the Office of the Under-Secretary of Defence for Intelligence and Security (OUSDI).
“Elizondo had been working for the OUSDI, the Office of the Under-Secretary of Defence for Intelligence and Security.”
In Plain Sight 2023-11-17 ch21:11271-11378 administrative
31
In 2008, James Clapper personally hired Luis Elizondo into the Office of the Under-Secretary of Defence for Intelligence and Security, the office that acts as principal staff for the Department of Defense on sensitive intelligence-related matters, overseeing a cluster of three-letter DoD agencies including the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.
“recognised Elizondo's skills and, in 2008, had personally hired him into the office that acts as the principal staff for the Department of Defence on sensitive intelligence-related matters, overseeing a cluster of three-letter DoD agencies, including the Defence Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency”
In Plain Sight 2023-11-17 ch21:11763-12072 administrative
32
Luis Elizondo had recently worked out of the office of the Under Secretary for the US Defence Department with an extremely high security clearance.
“this was one hell of an admission from a former senior military intelligence official who had only recently worked out of the office of the Under Secretary for the US Defence Department with an extremely high security clearance”
In Plain Sight 2023-11-17 ch24:16596-16814 administrative
33
DoD Instruction 5240.22 authorises the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (OUSD(I&S)) to establish policy for, and oversee, United States Department of Defense (DoD) counterintelligence support to counterterrorism and force protection.
“DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5240.22 authorizes the OUSD(I&S) to establish policy for, and oversee, DoD counterintelligence support to counterterrorism and force protection.”
Unclassified Summary of Report No. DODIG-2023-109, "Evaluation of the DoD's Actions Regarding Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena," August 15, 2023 2024-01-24 char:10508-10664 administrative second hand
34
The Inspector General, U.S. Department of Defense interviewed senior officials at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (OUSD(I&S)), the Military Services, the Military Department Counterintelligence Organizations (MDCOs), and the Defense agencies to learn how their organisations detect, report, collect, analyse, and identify Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP) incidents.
“We interviewed senior officials at the OUSD(I&S), the Military Services, the MDCOs, and the Defense agencies to learn how their organizations detect, report, collect, analyze, and identify UAP incidents.”
Unclassified Summary of Report No. DODIG-2023-109, "Evaluation of the DoD's Actions Regarding Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena," August 15, 2023 2024-01-24 char:13598-13791 administrative first hand
35
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (FY 2022 NDAA) assigns the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO), under the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (OUSD(I&S)), responsibility for synchronising and standardising the collection, analysis, and identification of Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP) incidents.
“The FY 2022 NDAA assigns AARO, under the OUSD(I&S), responsibility for synchronizing and standardizing the collection, analysis, and identification of UAP incidents.”
Unclassified Summary of Report No. DODIG-2023-109, "Evaluation of the DoD's Actions Regarding Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena," August 15, 2023 2024-01-24 char:14696-14851 administrative second hand
36
The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, responding for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (OUSD(I&S)) and the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO) Director, agreed with the recommendation to issue a Department of Defense policy on Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP).
“The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, responding for the OUSD(I&S) and the AARO Director, agreed with the recommendation.”
Unclassified Summary of Report No. DODIG-2023-109, "Evaluation of the DoD's Actions Regarding Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena," August 15, 2023 2024-01-24 char:17493-17623 opinion first hand
37
The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security noted that the findings informing the recommendation appear to be based on observations that largely predate the establishment of the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO), organisationally aligned under the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (OUSD(I&S)), on 2022-07-20.
“The Under Secretary noted that the findings that inform the recommendation appear to be based on observations that largely predate the establishment of AARO [organizationally aligned under the OUSD(I&S)] on July 20, 2022.”
Unclassified Summary of Report No. DODIG-2023-109, "Evaluation of the DoD's Actions Regarding Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena," August 15, 2023 2024-01-24 char:17639-17855 opinion first hand
38
The Inspector General, U.S. Department of Defense will close Recommendation 1 when the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (OUSD(I&S)), in coordination with the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO), provides the Inspector General with the issued Department of Defense policy to integrate Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP) roles, responsibilities, requirements, and coordination procedures into existing intelligence, counterintelligence, and force protection policies and procedures.
“We will close the recommendation when the OUSD(I&S), in coordination with AARO, provides us with the issued DoD policy to integrate UAP roles, responsibilities, requirements, and coordination procedures into existing intelligence, counterintelligence, and force protection policies and procedures.”
Unclassified Summary of Report No. DODIG-2023-109, "Evaluation of the DoD's Actions Regarding Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena," August 15, 2023 2024-01-24 char:19290-19576 administrative first hand
39
The Inspector General, U.S. Department of Defense interviewed senior officials and requested unidentified anomalous phenomena-related data and organisational policies, procedures, and guidance from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office, the Military Services, the Military Service Intelligence Components, the Military Department Counterintelligence Organizations, and defense intelligence agencies.
“We interviewed senior officials and requested UAP-related data and organizational policies, procedures, and guidance from the following DoD organizations: OUSD(I&S), AARO, Military Services (Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force), Military Service Intelligence Components (Army G2, Navy N2, Air Force A2), MDCOs (Army Counterintelligence, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Office of Special Investigations), Defense intelligence agencies (Defense Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and National Security Agency)”
Unclassified Summary of Report No. DODIG-2023-109, "Evaluation of the DoD's Actions Regarding Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena," August 15, 2023 2024-01-24 char:26132-26714 administrative first hand
40
In Fiscal Years 2019 and 2020, the United States Congress required the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (OUSD(I&S)) and the intelligence community to establish an interagency task force and develop a plan to investigate and address unidentified and unexplained airborne activity in sensitive areas.
“In FY 2019 and FY 2020, Congress noted its concern regarding unidentified and unexplained airborne activity in sensitive areas and required the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (OUSD[I&S]) and the intelligence community (IC) to establish an interagency task force and develop a plan to investigate and address the activity.”
Unclassified Summary of Report No. DODIG-2023-109, "Evaluation of the DoD's Actions Regarding Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena," August 15, 2023 2024-01-24 char:5234-5586 administrative
41
In a November 2021 memorandum, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (OUSD(I&S)) was directed to establish the Airborne Object Identification and Management Synchronization Group (AOIMSG) as the successor to the UAP Task Force (UAPTF) to synchronise efforts across the United States Department of Defense (DoD) and with other Federal departments and agencies to detect, identify, and characterise objects of interest in special use airspace.
“In a November 2021 memorandum, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the OUSD(I&S) to establish the Airborne Object Identification and Management Synchronization Group (AOIMSG) as the successor to the UAPTF to synchronize efforts across the DoD and with other Federal departments and agencies to detect, identify, and characterize objects of interest in special use airspace.”
Unclassified Summary of Report No. DODIG-2023-109, "Evaluation of the DoD's Actions Regarding Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena," August 15, 2023 2024-01-24 char:6946-7315 administrative
42
Under the cognisance of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)), the Department of the Navy was asked to lead the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force (UAPTF).
“Under the cognizance of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)), the Department of the Navy was asked to lead the task force.”
Report on the Historical Record of U.S. Government Involvement with Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP), Volume I 2024-02-01 char:64225-64390 administrative second hand
43
The Deputy Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, directed the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)) to establish the Airborne Object Identification and Management Synchronization Group (AOIMSG) to succeed the United States Navy's Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force (UAPTF).
“The Deputy Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), directed USD(I&S) to establish AOIMSG to succeed the USN's UAPTF.”
Report on the Historical Record of U.S. Government Involvement with Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP), Volume I 2024-02-01 char:66957-67115 administrative second hand
44
In response to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (NDAA FY22), the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, conveyed direction to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)) by renaming the Airborne Object Identification and Management Synchronization Group (AOIMSG) as the All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO), and expanded its scope and mission.
“In response to the NDAA for FY22, the Deputy Secretary of Defense in coordination with the DNI, conveyed direction to the USD(I&S) by renaming the AOIMSG as AARO, and expanded its scope and mission.”
Report on the Historical Record of U.S. Government Involvement with Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP), Volume I 2024-02-01 char:69434-69624 administrative second hand
45
James Clapper served as Lue Elizondo's boss at the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)).
“This all began when General James Clapper, my old boss at the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I))”
Imminent: Inside the Pentagon's Hunt for UFOs 2024-08-19 ch12:49102-49227 administrative first hand
46
Luis Elizondo accepted a new position as Director of National Programs, Special Management Staff, within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).
“I had recently accepted a new position as Director of National Programs, Special Management Staff, nestled within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).”
Imminent: Inside the Pentagon's Hunt for UFOs 2024-08-19 ch16:15874-16028 administrative first hand
47
Garry Reid replaced Michael Higgins and was brought to the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)) from the special operations community; he is not related to Senator Harry Reid.
“His replacement was a man whom I did not trust named Garry Reid (no relation to our congressional benefactor, Senator Harry Reid). He had been brought to the OUSD(I) from the special operations community.”
Imminent: Inside the Pentagon's Hunt for UFOs 2024-08-19 ch23:10702-10923 administrative first hand
48
Employees filed charges with the DoD Inspector General about Garry Reid's conduct at the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence.
“Employees would soon file charges with the DoD inspector general about some of his behavior.”
Imminent: Inside the Pentagon's Hunt for UFOs 2024-08-19 ch23:11288-11371 administrative first hand
49
Jay Stratton and Lue Elizondo submitted Operation Plan Interloper through an Alternative Compensatory Control Measure (ACCM) process directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, bypassing the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)).
“To move Interloper along, Jay and I circumvented the usual channels in favor of an ACCM process. That means the operation plan would be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We were hoping to get around the OUSD(I) because the entire organization had become infested with compromised individuals.”
Imminent: Inside the Pentagon's Hunt for UFOs 2024-08-19 ch23:12039-12325 administrative first hand
50
Brad Byers was hesitant to brief James Mattis until the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)) had a permanent, Senate-confirmed appointee, since the position had been filled only by acting or temporary personnel after Michael Vickers departed.
“Brad was hesitant to brief Mattis until my office, OUSD(I), had a permanent appointment. Since Michael Vickers had left his position, the USD(I) was filled with either "acting" or temporary people. The position required a Senate-confirmed person and so the Pentagon was still searching for the right individual.”
Imminent: Inside the Pentagon's Hunt for UFOs 2024-08-19 ch28:1836-2136 testimony first hand
51
Neill Tipton was, at the time, among the top three senior officials in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)), a rank equivalent to a three-star general.
“He was now among the top three senior officials in the OUSD(I), the equivalent of a three-star general.”
Imminent: Inside the Pentagon's Hunt for UFOs 2024-08-19 ch28:5096-5191 testimony first hand
52
Luis Elizondo gave Neill Tipton a full briefing and a large folder several inches thick containing hard copies of Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP) reports, along with access to the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)) classified share drive.
“I returned to Neill's office, gave him the briefing, and handed over a large folder with hard copies of UAP reports. It was several inches thick. I also gave him access to our share folder on the OUSD(I) classified share drive.”
Imminent: Inside the Pentagon's Hunt for UFOs 2024-08-19 ch28:5474-5695 testimony first hand
53
James Clapper had been one of Luis Elizondo's upper-level supervisors during what Elizondo considered the golden era of the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)).
“Clapper had been one of my upper-level supervisors, in what I considered the golden era of OUSD(I), when people were happy and the mission was their focus.”
Imminent: Inside the Pentagon's Hunt for UFOs 2024-08-19 ch29:25357-25533 opinion first hand
54
Someone in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)) allegedly authorised the complete deletion of all Luis Elizondo's electronic files, folders, and emails, under the justification that they had no historic value, according to a Freedom of Information Act response from the Pentagon.
“Sometime shortly thereafter, someone in OUSD(I) allegedly authorized the complete deletion of all my electronic files, folders, and emails, under the justification that they had "no historic value." Or so claimed a Freedom of Information Act response from the Pentagon itself.”
Imminent: Inside the Pentagon's Hunt for UFOs 2024-08-19 ch29:27894-28163 hearsay second hand
55
Colleagues loyal to Luis Elizondo who remained at the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence told him that Garry Reid planned to launch a criminal inquiry with the Air Force Office of Special Investigations.
“Several people loyal to me who were still at OUSD(I) told me that Reid planned to launch a criminal inquiry with the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI).”
Imminent: Inside the Pentagon's Hunt for UFOs 2024-08-19 ch29:6566-6727 hearsay second hand
56
The Airborne Object Identification and Management Synchronization Group (AOIMSG) was placed under the auspices of the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)).
“The new office would be tucked into the auspices of the OUSD(I).”
Imminent: Inside the Pentagon's Hunt for UFOs 2024-08-19 ch31:27234-27295 administrative
57
The Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)) is the same organisation that had previously underplayed and tried to kill the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP) and then the Pentagon's UAP Task Force.
“My old office, the OUSD(I), was precisely the same organization that had underplayed and tried to kill AATIP and then the UAP Task Force.”
Imminent: Inside the Pentagon's Hunt for UFOs 2024-08-19 ch31:27632-27763 opinion first hand
58
Garry Reid was reassigned from the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)).
“they had reassigned Garry Reid from the OUSD(I)”
Imminent: Inside the Pentagon's Hunt for UFOs 2024-08-19 ch31:40978-41023 administrative first hand
59
James Clapper was Lue Elizondo's boss at the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)).
“With my old boss at the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)), Gen. James Clapper, at the CNN Newsroom in 2017”
Imminent: Inside the Pentagon's Hunt for UFOs 2024-08-19 ch37:1397-1532 administrative first hand
60
Luis Elizondo worked for the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)), focused on an information-sharing operation between the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, and state, local, and tribal law enforcement authorities.
“While in that assignment, I worked for the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)), focused on an information-sharing operation between the DoD, DHS, and state, local, and tribal law enforcement authorities.”
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Luis Elizondo worked within the United States Department of Defense (DoD), the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX), the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).
“I worked within the Department of Defense (DoD), the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX), the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).”
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Betty Sapp previously worked with James Clapper in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)).
“Sapp had previously worked with Clapper in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence or USD(I)”
Pressure Mounts on President Trump as UAP Disclosure Advocates Intensify Their Push 2026-08-19 char:7244-7356 administrative