Brief
Harrison Schmitt
The claims the writer was given for Harrison Schmitt, in the order they were given.
1
Harrison Schmitt considers the Apollo 17 Flight Data File for both the Command and Service Module (CSM) and the Lunar Module (LM) to have been excellent, with very few possible improvements.
“Okay, flight data file, the CSM. Generally, I have nothing but praise for the flight data file of both vehicles. There was very, very few things that one could have asked for to improve that data file for Apollo 17 at any rate.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:00:16.3-00:00:33.3 opinion first hand
2
Harrison Schmitt considers splitting logging, medical and food logging pages in the Apollo 17 Flight Plan supplement to have been a mistake.
“One comment on the flight plan supplement, we had split pages for a number of the logging, medical and food logging, and that probably was a mistake.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:00:36.8-00:00:51.1 opinion first hand
3
Harrison Schmitt found that split pages in the Apollo 17 Flight Plan supplement were on paper too thin to maintain the split and tended to fall out of the book.
“And also the pages, if you had wanted them split, were too thin to maintain the split, and they tended to fall out of the book.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:01:02.8-00:01:10.4 observation first hand
4
Harrison Schmitt recommends either not splitting the logging pages or using heavier paper if the pages are to be split.
“I would recommend either not splitting or having heavier paper if you want them split.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:01:11.1-00:01:18.4 opinion first hand
5
Harrison Schmitt had an extra cue card built for panel 229 in the Lunar Module during Apollo 17.
“I had an extra cue card built for panel 229.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:01:32.7-00:01:36.6 observation first hand
6
Harrison Schmitt considers the extra cue card summarising circuit breaker functions on panels 229 and 8 to have been excellent.
“I think it was an excellent card that summarized the circuit breaker functions both on 229 and on panel 8.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:01:36.9-00:01:46.5 opinion first hand
7
The extra circuit breaker cue card built for panels 229 and 8 during Apollo 17 was not used in flight because there were no systems anomalies of significance relating to it.
“Because we had no systems anomalies of any significance that would relate to that card, it was not used.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:01:48.0-00:01:54.3 observation first hand
8
Harrison Schmitt recommends that the circuit breaker cue card for panels 229 and 8 remain available for training purposes, including during Endurance Sims.
“But I would strongly recommend its availability, if only for training. during the Endurance Sims.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:01:54.6-00:02:01.3 opinion first hand
9
Harrison Schmitt added pen and ink cues along the margins of the Apollo 17 Flight Plan for observational targets he wanted to look at, entered as a function of time, independent of any designated experiment.
“In the flight plan, I added some pen and ink cues along the margins for certain observational targets that I particularly wanted to look at. These were independent of any experiment, designated experiment, and I entered them as a function of time, and that seemed to work very well for me.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:02:21.2-00:02:52.8 observation first hand
10
Harrison Schmitt recommends that pen-and-ink notation is the easiest way to flight-plan personal observational targets during spare time, since it does not require involving a large number of people, whereas a designated experiment ought to be formally flight planned.
“I think it had that kind of thing as an individual preference item, And if you have experiment, it ought to be flight planned. If you're just planning to use your spare time for specific observational targets or types of observations, then I think the Penn & Inc. is maybe the easiest way to go, since it shouldn't concern any large number of people.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:02:54.0-00:03:19.7 opinion first hand
11
Gordon Fullerton fixed up a circular orbital cue card for Harrison Schmitt with craters designated as a function of time.
“We, Gordie Fullerton, fixed up the circular orbital cue card for me with a similar designation of craters as a function of time.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:03:23.4-00:03:40.2 observation first hand
12
Harrison Schmitt did not use the circular orbital cue card with crater designations because familiarity with the Moon, gained quickly after a couple of orbits, allowed him to recognise his position on the Moon easily by time in the revolution, time since sunset, or by looking out the window.
“I did not use that, not because it wasn't a good idea, but because of familiarity with the moon, which came very quickly after a couple orbits, and you could recognize your position on the moon fairly easily as a function of each rev, either the time in the rev, approximate time since sunset, or just because you could look out the window and tell where you were.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:03:41.4-00:04:08.1 observation first hand
13
Harrison Schmitt considers all the Apollo 17 Flight Data File items for the Lunar Module to have been excellent.
“In the LEM, we The same comments apply. I think all the flight data file items were excellent.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:04:12.5-00:04:22.0 opinion first hand
14
Harrison Schmitt did not use the data card book to the extent he believes it was used on Apollo 15 and possibly on Apollo 16.
“I did not use the data card book to the extent that I know it was used on 15 and maybe on 16.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:04:29.1-00:04:33.7 observation first hand
15
During Apollo 17, alignment data and comparable items were logged in the checklist at the point of collection rather than in the data book, without raising any difficulty.
“We logged most of our specific items such as alignment data and comparable kinds of things in the checklist at the point where they were collected rather than in the data book and had no this did not seem to raise any difficulty at any time.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:04:36.3-00:05:00.9 observation first hand
16
Harrison Schmitt thought the Apollo 17 Cuff Checklist was excellent.
“I thought the cuff checklist was excellent.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:05:13.7-00:05:15.0 opinion first hand
17
The Apollo 17 Cuff Checklist contained photo maps that were useful for reference regarding the crew's position at a given lunar surface station.
“We had the right kind of photo maps in there that were useful for reference where we were around a given station.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:05:16.7-00:05:31.9 observation first hand
18
Harrison Schmitt used the photo maps in the Apollo 17 Cuff Checklist less than he had anticipated, mainly because navigation was not a problem and the pre-flight selected points were already excellent for investigation.
“I don't think we used them as much as I had anticipated using them. mainly because navigation was no problem and the points that we had selected pre-flight were excellent points for investigation and there was no need to try to decide on alternative points to try to study in the vicinity of a given station.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:05:32.3-00:05:54.0 observation first hand
19
Harrison Schmitt found the list of items to be accomplished at each lunar surface station in the Apollo 17 Cuff Checklist served mainly as mind-joggers rather than being used as much as initially anticipated, because he had become very familiar with the items through having helped create the checklist.
“The list of items to be accomplished at each station are to Really, they were mind joggers to read at each station. Again, not used as much as I thought they would be initially, but I think that was mainly because we both, at least I, had become so familiar with the items that each station was in itself easy to recall as a result of having created the checklist.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:05:57.4-00:06:27.5 observation first hand
20
Harrison Schmitt considers that the Apollo 17 Cuff Checklist turned out to be more of a learning item than a reference item for use on the lunar surface.
“So the checklist turned out to be more of a learning item rather than a reference item. for use on the surface.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:06:28.2-00:06:36.2 opinion first hand
21
Harrison Schmitt particularly wants to compliment Chuck Lewis on the Apollo 17 Timeline Book.
“I particularly want to compliment the Chuck Lewis on the timeline book.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:06:48.3-00:06:54.9 opinion first hand
22
Harrison Schmitt considers the Apollo 17 Timeline Book to have been very well done.
“I really can't sing all that, but the timeline book was very, very well done and very”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:06:59.2-00:07:04.1 opinion first hand
23
There were no problems with the Apollo 17 Timeline Book at all.
“We had no problems with the timeline book at all.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:07:04.8-00:07:07.0 observation first hand
24
Harrison Schmitt does not recall any procedural errors in any of the checklist books used during Apollo 17.
“There were just no procedural errors that I recall in any of the books that we used.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:07:14.4-00:07:19.4 observation first hand
25
During Apollo 17 the crew did not have to use a malfunction book.
“Fortunately, we didn't have to use a malfunction book.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:07:21.6-00:07:25.8 observation first hand
26
Harrison Schmitt pulled out the Apollo 17 Systems Data Book only once during the mission to check on a systems problem, and could not recall what that problem was.
“Only once did I pull out the systems data book to check to check on a systems problem, and I right now can't remember what that was. I can't remember what it was. Well, I did use it once.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:07:27.3-00:07:46.3 observation first hand
27
Harrison Schmitt had an extra orbit monitor chart put on board the Command and Service Module during Apollo 17 so that it would not interfere with the Command Module Pilot's planned activities.
“I thought in the CSM that I would use the orbit monitor charts. I guess that's what they're called. And I had an extra one put on so it wouldn't interfere with the planned activities of the CMP.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:07:51.4-00:08:08.9 observation first hand
28
Harrison Schmitt did not use the extra orbit monitor chart on Apollo 17 very much.
“I did not use that very much.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:08:10.1-00:08:14.0 observation first hand
29
Harrison Schmitt sketched about five specific areas, labelled A through E, on the orbit monitor chart after trans-Earth injection, referenced in his crew notebook for specific observations.
“I eventually did some sketching on it post-TEI. I think there are about five specific points that I labeled as areas, A, B, C, D, maybe E. And these are referenced on my crew notebook in my crew notebook for specific observations.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:08:16.7-00:08:35.3 observation first hand
30
Harrison Schmitt did not put the orbit monitor chart to as much use as he expected during Apollo 17.
“But in general, I did not put that to as much use as I expected.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:08:37.4-00:08:40.7 observation first hand
31
Harrison Schmitt noted that his orbit monitor chart should have been identical to the Command Module Pilot's chart, and that some pen-and-ink changes, including photo exposure settings for certain targets, were left off it, causing some confusion.
“One item is that that chart should have been identical to the CMP's chart, and there were a few pen and ink changes left off of it that caused some confusion at one point, pen and ink exposure settings for certain photo targets.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:08:41.4-00:08:55.5 observation first hand
32
The Command and Service Module landmark maps added to the rear of a book by the Lunar Module Pilot were not used during Apollo 17.
“The CSM landmark maps that the LNP had added in the rear of that book, again, were not used.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:09:01.4-00:09:14.2 observation first hand
33
During Apollo 17, Harrison Schmitt observed a specific point or area target such as Gagarin on the Moon but became reluctant to take time to sketch on a photo while observing it.
“I really thought I would use those, but you became reluctant as you were observing a specific point or area target, say, such as Gagarin or something like that, to take time out to sketch on the photo.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:09:18.0-00:09:34.0 observation first hand
34
During the two- to three-minute observation window for a given lunar area, Harrison Schmitt tended to look and then take notes in his notebook at the first opportunity rather than sketching on the photograph.
“I tended for the two or three minutes that observation was possible of a given area, I tended to look and then at the first opportunity to take notes in the notebook rather than trying to sketch on the photograph.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:09:35.1-00:09:48.6 observation first hand
35
Harrison Schmitt suspects he looked for generalisations about lunar observation targets rather than checking specific individual features, so there seemed no need to make notes about specific points on photographs.
“And I suspect that this was because I tended to look for generalizations about the target that I was trying to observe rather than checking out specific individual features, and there really did not seem to be any need to make notes about specific points on the pictures, and as a result, I did not use them.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:09:50.4-00:10:14.2 opinion first hand
36
Harrison Schmitt considers that having selected and studied the landmark maps pre-flight was worthwhile even though flying them in-flight was not, and believes the necessity for having reviewed them exceeded the necessity for flying them.
“Again, though, I think having selected them and studied them pre-flight made it worth having them around. The necessity for flying them was probably less than the necessity for having reviewed them and studied them.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:10:16.8-00:10:29.6 opinion first hand
37
Harrison Schmitt would still want that kind of landmark map data available in the spacecraft on a future mission even though it was not used on Apollo 17.
“I think I still, if I had to do it again, I still would want to have that kind of data available in the spacecraft, even though on this particular mission it was not used.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:10:34.2-00:10:43.0 opinion first hand
38
Harrison Schmitt observed that the Command Module Pilot used his visual target maps considerably during Apollo 17.
“I do think, though, that the CMP used his visual target maps considerably,”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:10:45.1-00:10:49.9 observation first hand
39
Harrison Schmitt used some of the Command Module Pilot's visual target maps on a couple of occasions, mostly after trans-Earth injection, and made notes and sketches on some of those maps.
“and I did on a couple occasions, used some of the ones that he had, but for the most part that was post-TEI, and I made some notes and sketches on some of those maps.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:10:51.1-00:11:04.5 observation first hand
40
Harrison Schmitt attributes his post-trans-Earth-injection use of visual target maps to there being more time available to look at the Moon, sketch, and later revise the sketch, whereas in lunar orbit that time did not exist.
“And I think that just a function that there was a lot of time to look at the moon and make a sketch and then look back and fix it up post-EEI, where in orbit the time just did not exist.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:11:08.2-00:11:17.3 opinion first hand
41
Dick Gordon said that once you start flying, the clock is relentless.
“As Dick Gordon said a couple years ago, once you start flying, the clock is relentless.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:11:22.7-00:11:28.5 opinion second hand
42
Harrison Schmitt was not very closely involved in the general flight planning for Apollo 17.
“I was not very closely involved in the flight planning.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:11:41.0-00:11:43.7 observation first hand
43
Ronald Evans carried the burden of general flight planning for Apollo 17 on behalf of Eugene Cernan and Harrison Schmitt.
“Ron sort of carried the burden of that for both Gene and myself.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:11:44.6-00:11:49.0 observation first hand
44
Harrison Schmitt considers the Apollo 17 Flight Plan to have been excellent, with no problems.
“The flight plan was excellent. We had no problems with it at all that I'm aware of.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:11:52.6-00:11:58.9 opinion first hand
45
Harrison Schmitt compliments Tommy Holloway and his people on the Apollo 17 Flight Plan.
“Tommy Holloway and his people are to be complimented on that.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:12:02.1-00:12:04.7 opinion first hand
46
Harrison Schmitt considers that the high number of different requirements and experiments integrated into the Apollo 17 Flight Plan was handled in an extremely competent and usable way.
“A number of different requirements and experiments and general operational items that were required to be integrated one with the other was very, very high, and it was done in an extremely competent and usable way.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:12:08.7-00:12:33.2 opinion first hand
47
Harrison Schmitt could not think of anything he would change about the way the Apollo 17 Flight Plan was written.
“And I can't think of anything that I would change in the way the flight plan was written.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:12:39.9-00:12:44.7 opinion first hand
48
Harrison Schmitt considers pre-flight support to have been excellent in the Apollo 17 Flight Data File area.
“Pre-flight support was excellent in the flight data file area.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:13:03.9-00:13:09.1 opinion first hand
49
Harrison Schmitt had two or three briefing sessions once the Apollo 17 Flight Plan was well established, covering attitudes, manoeuvres, and window availability for the portions of the lunar orbit flight plan he would spend in the Command and Service Module.
“I had two or three, I don't remember, two or three briefing sessions where in the portions of the lunar orbit flight plan that I was going to be during which I was going to be in the spacecraft, in the CSM, we went over in detail the attitudes and maneuvers and the window availability so that I was able to plan in a very short amount of time, with minimum effort on my part, my own personal observations of the lunar surface, which went very well as far as planning was concerned.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:13:23.2-00:14:06.5 observation first hand
50
Harrison Schmitt considers the extra briefing sessions on lunar orbit attitudes and manoeuvres to have been above and beyond the call of duty by the flight planners, and appreciated the time they took for him.
“That was extra above and beyond the call of duty on the part of the flight planners, and I appreciated their taking time out to do that for me.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:14:11.5-00:14:20.8 opinion first hand
51
A day-long session was held in which flight controllers, the crew, and flight planners reviewed the portions of the Apollo 17 Flight Plan that were not normally simulated.
“I think it was useful to have the, I think it was a day-long session where The flight controllers and the crew and the flight planners sat around in one room and went over those portions of the flight plan which were not normally simulated.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:14:27.4-00:14:49.7 observation first hand
52
Harrison Schmitt considers the Apollo 17 Flight Plan to have been so well done that no specific items needed changing at the day-long flight plan review session.
“It turned out that the flight plan had been so well done that I doubt if there were any specific items that came up that we needed to change or there seemed to be a lack of coordination on.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:14:52.4-00:15:04.4 opinion first hand
53
Harrison Schmitt considers that the Apollo 17 Flight Plan reached the peak of perfection, in contrast to previous flights where the crew and planners were still learning to integrate flight plan requirements.
“This was in contrast to previous flights where I think we were still learning, all of us were learning on how to put together flight plans and integrate requirements. Apollo 17 flight plan apparently reached the peak of perfection.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:15:05.5-00:15:23.9 opinion first hand
54
Harrison Schmitt was disappointed that some people eventually intimately involved in the Apollo 17 mission were not at the flight plan review, due to conflicts with other programmes at their centre.
“I was a little bit disappointed in that briefing in that some of the people who would be eventually intimately involved in the mission were not at the flight plan review, and I think this was because of conflicts with other programs which were the center it was carrying out at the time.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:15:26.1-00:15:46.5 opinion first hand
55
Harrison Schmitt experienced light flashes almost continuously throughout the Apollo 17 flight when dark-adapted.
“I don't know whether I recorded yet that although we had light flashes just about continuously during the whole flight when you were dark-adapted.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:17:01.8-00:17:12.9 observation first hand
56
Harrison Schmitt may have seen a light flash on the lunar surface during the first revolution of Apollo 17.
“And I may have even had one which I thought was a flash on the lunar surface during the first rev.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:17:14.9-00:17:21.1 observation first hand
57
During the period when the crew wore blindfolds for the ALPMET experiment on Apollo 17, there were no visible light flashes.
“That one period of time when we had the blindfolds on for the ALPMET experiment, there just were no visible flashes.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:17:25.6-00:17:31.7 observation first hand
58
Harrison Schmitt noticed the light flashes returning that evening before he went to sleep, after the ALPMET blindfold period on Apollo 17.
“Although that evening, that night, before I went to sleep, I noticed I was seeing the light flashes again.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:17:32.9-00:17:38.9 observation first hand
59
Harrison Schmitt observed that the light flash phenomena was not visible to himself or the other two crewmen during only that one interval around the ALPMET blindfold experiment.
“So it just seemed to be that one interval on either side of it where the light flash phenomena was not visible to myself or to the other two crewmen.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:17:39.7-00:17:50.3 observation first hand
60
There were periods of some difficulty pre-flight for Apollo 17, particularly regarding medical requirements and some last-minute scientific requirements on sample collection.
“although there were periods of some difficulty pre-flight, particularly in the area of medical requirements, and in some last-minute possible scientific requirements, particularly on the samples, everything seemed to get resolved, satisfactory, near as I could tell.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:18:59.5-00:19:23.3 observation first hand
61
During Apollo 17 pre-flight training, crew-related requirement issues were handled almost entirely by the support crew: Bob Parker in the science area, Gordon Fullerton, and Bob Obermeyer in the operational areas.
“And occasionally, when the crew had to be involved, that was handled almost entirely by the support crew, Bob Parker in the science area and Cordy Fullerton and Bob Obermeyer in the operational areas.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:19:38.9-00:19:53.5 observation first hand
62
There were no significant spacecraft changes during the Apollo 17 crew's training period.
“There were no significant spacecraft changes in the course of our training period.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:19:57.6-00:20:03.9 observation first hand
63
Ronald Evans dealt with the Lunar Sounder, which took the most training time of any single area for the Apollo 17 crew.
“Ron, I guess the biggest single area that took time was one that Ron had to deal with, and that was Lunar Sounder.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:20:05.7-00:20:12.1 observation first hand
64
Most changes to the Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments Package (ALSEP) for Apollo 17 were taken care of prior to crew training, with a few minor suggestions addressed early in the training cycle, resulting in an up-to-date ALSEP for training.
“Most of our ALSEP changes were all taken care of prior to our training, and we had a few minor suggestions that were taken care of early in the training cycle and we essentially had an up-to-date ALSEP to train with”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:20:14.5-00:20:35.6 observation first hand
65
All other Apollo 17 lunar surface gear was up-to-date for most of the final twelve months of the training period.
“and all other lunar surface gear was up-to-date for most of the 12-month training period, or the final 12 months of the training period.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:20:37.7-00:20:47.6 observation first hand
66
Mission rules and techniques for Apollo 17 were fairly well defined early on by Phil Schafer and his group in the techniques area, and by Jerry Griffin and others in mission rules.
“Mission rules and techniques, were fairly well defined very early by Phil Schafer and his crowd in the techniques area and the mission rules, certainly Jerry Griffin and people working on that.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:20:51.5-00:21:05.0 observation first hand
67
Harrison Schmitt considers that the only changes made to Apollo 17 mission rules were in the right direction, enhancing the probability of a successful landing and mission.
“No major changes, and the only changes were all, I felt, in the right direction in that they enhanced the probability of making a landing in a successful mission.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:21:06.2-00:21:16.5 opinion first hand
68
During Apollo 17, the crew never had to exercise the mission rules in an abnormal way.
“We really never had to exercise any significant—any of the mission rules in an abnormal way.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:21:29.6-00:21:38.0 observation first hand
69
A mission rule was a clearly controlling factor limiting the work at Station 4, Shorty Crater, where the crew were up against walkback constraints and terminated the work after only 35 minutes.
“A mission rule tended to be fairly clearly a controlling factor was in the limitation on the work at Station 4, Shorty Crater, where we were up against the walkback constraints and terminated that work after only 35 minutes,”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:21:45.0-00:22:04.3 observation first hand
70
Harrison Schmitt believes that another 30 minutes of work at Station 4, Shorty Crater, would have been extremely valuable.
“where another 30 minutes there I think would have been extremely valuable, although I hope that we got enough information that the phenomena exposed at that crater can be understood.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:22:05.6-00:22:21.7 opinion first hand
71
Harrison Schmitt considers the support from mission control during Apollo 17 to have been typically outstanding.
“Typically outstanding support for mission control.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:22:34.2-00:22:36.5 opinion first hand
72
Lunar Module personnel and CSM electrical/communications officers put in significant extracurricular hours with Harrison Schmitt on Saturdays and other times discussing systems, techniques, and mission rules, which helped him stay up to speed.
“I think this includes the number of extracurricular hours that the LIM people and the e-coms for the CSM in particular put in with me on Saturdays and other times, just generally talking over systems and techniques, mission rules, and that was a major factor in helping me understand and keep up to speed on those items.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:22:39.4-00:23:14.2 observation first hand
73
Mission control personnel designed the emergency cue cards used for the Apollo 17 Lunar Module, which Harrison Schmitt considers a major contribution.
“In fact, as they essentially did it, they did the design of the emergency cue cards that we did for Apollo 17 for the LEM was a major contribution.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:23:22.3-00:23:33.4 opinion first hand
74
The Apollo 17 crew did not end up using the emergency cue cards for the Lunar Module, but they still helped the crew understand systems problems quickly and solve them in simulations.
“Although, fortunately, we did not use them, they still made it possible to understand very quickly systems problems and to solve those problems in the simulations.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:23:34.7-00:23:47.8 observation first hand
75
Dick Thorson helped organise most of the Lunar Module sessions and some of the joint Command and Service Module/Lunar Module sessions for Apollo 17.
“I particularly want to point out the help that Dick Thorson gave in organizing most of the limb sessions and even some of the joint CSM limb sessions that we had.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:23:55.1-00:24:12.9 observation first hand
76
Dick Thorson was a major organiser of the creation and updating of the Apollo 17 Lunar Module emergency cue cards.
“and he also, Thorson also was a major organizer of the creation of and the updating of those emergency cue cards.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:24:21.1-00:24:32.9 observation first hand
77
Harrison Schmitt had hoped to receive a real-time summary of the ground science team's thinking during the Apollo 17 flight, based on data transmitted verbally and via television camera, but this was not possible due to real-time discussions in mission control.
“Post-flight, it's my understanding that some of the things I had hoped could be done during the flight were not possible because of real-time discussions in the mission control. Specifically, one of those things was to have some summary of the thinking of the science background given to me while in flight, and that would be the thinking based on the data that we had transmitted to them verbally and to, in a sense, visually through the television camera. I had hoped that I would have the benefit of their thinking, but apparently this was not possible to do.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:24:56.6-00:25:55.9 observation first hand
78
Harrison Schmitt would like future missions to use a team approach to science investigations in space, drawing on ground-based brain power, rather than relying solely on the crew's own observational and interpretive capability.
“I would like to think that in the future we can look at ways of using the team approach to science investigations in space rather than depending solely on the observational capability and the interpretive capability of the men who are performing the job. There's no reason that I can see to not use all the brain power that's available for any given task. Part of that brain power is on the ground.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:25:57.0-00:26:30.0 opinion first hand
79
During Apollo 17, discussion and organisation of the Pre-Flight Health Stabilization Control Program from the crew's point of view was borne mainly by the commander, with the Lunar Module Pilot going along with whatever was decided.
“The brunt of the discussions and organization from the crew point of view of the Pre-Flight Health Stabilization Control Program was borne by the commander, and the LMP just sort of went along with whatever was decided.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:26:49.1-00:27:07.6 observation first hand
80
Harrison Schmitt did not find any great difficulty adhering to the requirements of the Pre-Flight Health Stabilization Control Program.
“I personally did not find any great difficulty in working out adhering to the requirements of that program.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:27:13.3-00:27:23.7 observation first hand
81
Harrison Schmitt experienced a couple of sinus infections before Apollo 17 that reacted as they always had, and were cleared up over 10 days to two weeks.
“A couple sinus infections I had reacted just like they always had, and we were able over a period of 10 days or two weeks to get those cleared up.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:27:35.1-00:27:45.6 observation first hand
82
Harrison Schmitt was able to get a good workout about every other day during Apollo 17 pre-flight training, in addition to EVA training workouts.
“Time for exercise probably was less than it should have been, although I was able to get a good workout just about every other day, in addition to the workouts we got as a normal course of our EVA training.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:27:49.4-00:28:04.7 observation first hand
83
During Apollo 17 pre-flight training, technicians eventually scheduled exercise time in the late afternoon, which helped as a reminder and buffer to ensure exercise was obtained.
“Eventually, Techs started putting on the schedule time in the late afternoon for exercise, and that helped as a reminder. and buffer to see that that exercise was obtained.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:28:06.5-00:28:22.4 observation first hand
84
Harrison Schmitt considers it generally hard, in the lunar training programme, to get exercise periods in during the day, so exercise was often done at the Cape Kennedy gym at night.
“It is generally hard, at least in the lunar training program, to get exercise periods in during the day and quite frequently the exercise was done in the Cape Gym at night.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:28:26.6-00:28:38.4 opinion first hand
85
Harrison Schmitt made a particular effort to get as much rest as possible and avoid falling behind on rest, because his personal experience is that lack of rest leads to colds and sinus infections.
“I made a particular effort to always get as much as I possibly could and try never to get behind the power curve on rest because my personal experience is that that is when I tend to get colds and resulting sinus infections.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:28:45.6-00:29:02.2 opinion first hand
86
Harrison Schmitt considers the medical exams to have gone very well and to have been as expeditious as possible under the circumstances.
“The exams seemed to go very well in my estimation. They were as expeditious as possible under the circumstances.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:29:09.3-00:29:20.0 opinion first hand
87
Harrison Schmitt compliments the operational medical personnel, including those who carried out the post-flight exams on the USS Ticonderoga, for making the exams as painless and efficient as possible.
“And I think the operational medical personnel who carried out the exams are to be complimented in their efforts to see that the exam was as painless and as efficient as possible. and this should also include the post-flight exams on the Ticonderoga.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:29:23.2-00:29:47.7 opinion first hand
88
Harrison Schmitt experienced a decrease in appetite during the periods when eating in-flight food prior to launch.
“Eating habits and amount of food consumption were normal, except during those periods of time when we were on the in-flight food prior to launch, and those times there tended to be, in my case, a decrease of appetite”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:29:53.4-00:30:09.9 observation first hand
89
Harrison Schmitt was not able to eat the amount of food provided to him during the pre-flight in-flight food testing, even though the food was palatable.
“although the food was certainly palatable. My appetite did go down, and it certainly was not possible for me to eat the amount of food that was provided for me.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:30:14.8-00:30:26.5 observation first hand
90
Harrison Schmitt did not eat everything available to him in his food packages during Apollo 17 in-flight eating, and believes he needed to in order to avoid losing weight.
“Although I did not eat everything that was available to me in my food packages, I apparently needed to if I had wanted to avoid losing weight.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:30:39.5-00:30:50.3 observation first hand
91
Harrison Schmitt lost weight during Apollo 17 despite a low appetite, and at the time of this recording his weight had not returned to pre-flight levels.
“My appetite was down, but also apparently, for some reason, I had a loss of weight. And at the time of this recording, my weight is still down. It has not gone up to pre-flight levels, which may have been a little high, by the way.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:30:51.6-00:31:16.3 observation first hand
92
Harrison Schmitt's appetite was lower in-flight compared to two weeks pre-flight, except during pre-flight food testing when he also had a low appetite.
“the appetite in-flight versus two-weeks pre-flight was less, again, except for when we were testing the pre-flight food, when I also had a low appetite.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:31:25.6-00:31:34.6 observation first hand
93
Harrison Schmitt noticed no notable differences in the taste of food between pre-flight and in-flight; foods he liked pre-flight he liked in space, and foods he disliked pre-flight he also disliked in space.
“No notable differences in the taste of food. I think the things I liked pre-flight I liked in space and the things I didn't like I also didn't like. I didn't notice any differences.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:31:38.4-00:31:49.9 observation first hand
94
As the Apollo 17 flight progressed, Harrison Schmitt began to prefer eating wet-pack foods over other solid foods.
“Change in food preferences of flight progressed. I tended to start to prefer to eat the wet packs and would eat those in preference to any of the other solid foods.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:31:56.9-00:32:12.3 observation first hand
95
Harrison Schmitt recommends that wet-pack foods be used in preference to rehydratable foods, based on his personal experience, while noting other crewmen may have a different opinion.
“I would strongly recommend, from my personal point of view at any rate, that the wet packs be used in preference to the rehydratable. I think that probably you get a different opinion from the other crewmen.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:32:13.9-00:32:29.0 opinion first hand
96
Harrison Schmitt considered the juices provided during Apollo 17 to be good.
“The juices were good.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:32:35.8-00:32:36.6 opinion first hand
97
After one period of loose bowel movements during Apollo 17, Harrison Schmitt cut out potassium-indicated foods, and had no further loose bowel movements before the end of the flight.
“After the first period of one and only period of difficulty with loose bowel movements, I did cut out the potassium-indicated foods. Although I can't say whether that had any effect or not, but I did not have any other bowel movements and certainly no more loose ones before the end of the flight.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:32:38.2-00:33:03.2 observation first hand
98
Harrison Schmitt's first bowel movement after the Apollo 17 flight, aboard the USS Ticonderoga, was normal, the second was very loose, the third was normal, and the fourth and fifth were very loose.
“The first bow moment after flight on the Ticonderoga was normal. The second was very loose. The third was normal. And the fourth and fifth very loose.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:33:07.7-00:33:25.7 observation first hand
99
Harrison Schmitt's appetite was very low on the first day after the Apollo 17 flight and gradually increased over the next two or three days, remaining essentially constant after about the third day.
“my appetite was very low the first day and gradually increased over the next two or three days and remained essentially the same after about the third day.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:33:49.3-00:34:04.7 observation first hand
100
Harrison Schmitt considers the fruitcake provided during Apollo 17 to have been good, although it was possible to eat too much of it.
“The fruitcake I thought was good, although it was possible to eat too much or to get to a point wher”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:34:14.5-00:34:20.3 opinion first hand
101
Harrison Schmitt found the chocolate food item good.
“The chocolate was good.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:34:23.8-00:34:25.3 opinion first hand
102
Harrison Schmitt found the dry crackers, cookies, and graham crackers to be among the tastiest food items.
“I think of the dry crackers or cookies or graham crackers were probably the most tasty”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:34:29.1-00:34:40.1 opinion first hand
103
Harrison Schmitt found peanut butter and jelly sandwiches to be quite good.
“peanut butter and jelly sandwiches were quite good.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:34:45.0-00:34:47.4 opinion first hand
104
Food rehydration during Apollo 17 went nominally, with nominal gas present.
“Rehydration went, I think, nominally, and the nominal gas was present.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:35:10.6-00:35:18.4 observation first hand
105
Harrison Schmitt preferred foods that were warm or hot, and found the hot water quite adequate for warm foods.
“Food temperature is tended to prefer the foods that were warm or hot, and the hot water was quite adequate for warm foods.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:35:20.5-00:35:32.4 opinion first hand
106
Harrison Schmitt missed warm foods considerably during the period on the Lunar Module when hot water was not available.
“We actually, I think, missed the warm foods considerably in the limb where that hot water was not available.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:35:33.3-00:35:38.7 observation first hand
107
Harrison Schmitt did not notice an effect of water flavour and found the water reasonably tasty.
“I did not notice an effect of water flavor. Water was reasonably tasty.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:35:42.8-00:35:47.4 observation first hand
108
Harrison Schmitt never noticed a high chlorine taste in the water, although gas content made it somewhat uncomfortable to eat at times.
“I never noticed a high chlorine taste of any kind, although the gas content did make it a little bit uncomfortable to eat at times.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:35:49.6-00:35:58.4 observation first hand
109
Harrison Schmitt found the spoonbowl food packages worked well, though he cut off the water-insertion end of the finely divided ones to use them as a squeeze package.
“Spoonbowl packages worked pretty well, although those that were finely divided, I tended to cut off the other end of the package, the water insertion end. and use them as a squeeze package.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:36:02.8-00:36:14.7 observation first hand
110
Harrison Schmitt found the spoons perfectly adequate.
“Spoons work perfectly adequate.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:36:16.6-00:36:17.7 opinion first hand
111
Harrison Schmitt tended not to use the canned fruit because of the messiness of opening the cans.
“I tended not to use the fruit in the cans because of just the messiness of opening those”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:36:19.2-00:36:27.3 observation first hand
112
Ronald Evans developed a technique of opening canned fruit in or near his mouth, which Harrison Schmitt considered a good approach.
“the technique that Ron worked out of opening it in or near your mouth is a good one.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:36:28.8-00:36:37.5 opinion first hand
113
Harrison Schmitt found puddings very good.
“Puddings and this kind of thing were very good.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:36:42.1-00:36:43.6 opinion first hand
114
Harrison Schmitt tended to avoid canned fruits only because they were inconvenient to use, not because of taste.
“It was only the fruits, the canned fruits that I tended to avoid just because they were inconvenient to use.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:36:43.8-00:36:49.2 observation first hand
115
Harrison Schmitt considered food bars good to have during extravehicular activities (EVAs), although he never ate more than half of one.
“Food bars during EVAs I think were good to have, although I never ate more than half of one.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:36:57.9-00:37:04.7 observation first hand
116
Harrison Schmitt did not eat more of the food bars during EVAs not because they were untasty, but because of a lack of interest in eating and using the time during EVAs.
“It wasn't because it was untasty, it just because of maybe a lack of interest in eating and using that time during the EVAs.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:37:05.4-00:37:15.8 observation first hand
117
Harrison Schmitt ate well before and after EVAs and during periods on the Lunar Module.
“We, I think, after the EVA, before and after EVAs, and the limb ate very well.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:37:17.4-00:37:22.1 observation first hand
118
Harrison Schmitt avoided eating corn chowder after eating it once because it simulated a major bowel movement, though not a loose one.
“having cord and chowder once, and that's simulating a major bowel movement, although not a loose one, I did not eat corn chowder.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:37:31.1-00:37:37.6 observation first hand
119
Harrison Schmitt did not eat cocoa because he felt he got more gas and an aftertaste from it.
“I did not eat the cocoa because I tended to feel like I got a little more gas from cocoa and an aftertaste.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:37:38.2-00:37:45.0 observation first hand
120
Harrison Schmitt did not eat shrimp, seafood items, or lobster bisque because he had noticed pre-flight that they tended to have a long aftertaste.
“I did not eat the shrimp, the seafood items, shrimp and the lobster bisque and these sort of things because of pre-flight I had noticed that they tended to have a long aftertaste.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:37:45.8-00:38:03.5 observation first hand
121
Harrison Schmitt often did not eat potato-based foods because he found them very filling.
“many times I did not eat potato-based foods because of just, they were very filling.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:38:13.3-00:38:33.7 observation first hand
122
During Apollo 17, germicidal tablets were used in all the juice bags, food spoon bowl bags, and wet packs, but not in the tea and coffee.
“We used the germicidal tablets. I did, at any rate, in all the juice bags and the food spoon bowl bags and the wet packs. I did not use them in the tea and coffee.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:39:12.0-00:39:22.9 observation first hand
123
Undesirable odours in the spacecraft cabin during Apollo 17 were at a minimum, occurring occasionally from passing gas by crewmen including Harrison Schmitt.
“Undesirable odors, really, except for the passing of gas occasionally, By the other crewmen and some occasionally by myself, undesirable odors were at a minimum.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:39:25.9-00:39:42.3 observation first hand
124
Harrison Schmitt did not find the cabin atmosphere unpleasant as a general rule during Apollo 17.
“I did not find that the atmosphere was unpleasant as a general rule.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:39:42.7-00:39:47.6 observation first hand
125
Harrison Schmitt experienced an almost continuous passage of gas, most of which was apparently without significant odour.
“I might say that I generally had a continuous, almost continuous passage of gas, most of which apparently was not with significant odor.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:39:53.0-00:40:03.8 observation first hand
126
Harrison Schmitt believed that most of his gas problem was caused by water gas, based on an increased desire to pass gas upon starting to eat and increased stomach pressure transmitted to the bowels.
“And I think most of that was the water gas. And the reason I think that is that upon eating, upon starting to eat, there would be an increased desire to pass gas. The increased pressure in my stomach apparently was transmitted almost immediately into the bowels.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:40:14.6-00:40:33.3 opinion first hand
127
After eating, Harrison Schmitt would pass gas for two to three hours, with the desire dissipating by the time of the next meal.
“And after eating, it would pass gas for a couple hours to three hours. And just before eating the next time, the desire would have pretty well dissipated, and then it would start again immediately upon eating, before any digestion was possible, I'm sure.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:40:35.2-00:40:54.0 observation first hand
128
Harrison Schmitt, as Lunar Module Pilot, suspected that water gas was the main cause of his gas problem, which he did not consider significant.
“So I suspect water gas was the main culprit in the LMP's gas problem, which were not significant.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:40:54.3-00:41:02.9 opinion first hand
129
During Apollo 17, the quantity of food eaten on the lunar surface was high, though probably no more than half of the food that was available.
“The quantity of food eaten on the lunar surface I think was high, although probably no more than half of that food that was available.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:41:07.9-00:41:14.8 observation first hand
130
During Apollo 17, a blue bag was used for defecation, which Harrison Schmitt described as not a bad method unless the stool was loose.
“We used a blue bag. The blue bag is not a bad way to to defecate unless the stool is loose.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:41:57.1-00:42:07.9 observation first hand
131
A loose stool is nearly impossible to manage using the blue bag defecation method.
“If it's loose, it's just about impossible to use.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:42:09.1-00:42:11.7 opinion first hand
132
Harrison Schmitt considers a loose stool one of the major hygiene, sanitary, and operational problems that can occur on a spaceflight.
“A loose stool is one of the major hygiene and sanitary and operational problems that you can have on a flight. I can't emphasize that more.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:42:41.5-00:42:56.2 opinion first hand
133
Harrison Schmitt estimated that a daily loose stool problem could eventually cut a crew member's efficiency by a significant percentage, possibly as much as 30 percent, depending on the magnitude of the problem.
“I think eventually cut the efficiency of the crew member with the problem by a significant percentage, possibly as much as 30%, depending on the magnitude of the problem.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:43:03.0-00:43:14.0 opinion first hand
134
On Apollo 17, the onset of a loose-stool problem was delayed until about the 11th or 12th day, unlike on Apollo 16.
“I think it's important to try to understand why Apollo 17 was different than 16, and at least in the delay of a problem with loose stools until about the 11th or 12th day.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:43:16.2-00:43:32.0 observation first hand
135
Eugene Cernan, as commander of Apollo 17, had no problem with loose stools during the mission.
“And in the case of the commander, no problem with loose tools.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:43:33.5-00:43:35.9 observation first hand
136
Harrison Schmitt's personal opinion, based on limited in-flight observation and consideration of electrolyte intake levels, was that the reduced electrolyte quantity compared to Apollo 16 meant electrolyte saturation was not reached until the 11th or 12th day for the Command Module Pilot and Lunar Module Pilot on Apollo 17.
“And my personal opinion at this point, based on very little information other than observation in flight and thinking about levels of electrolyte intake, is that with the electrolyte quantity down from that imposed on Apollo 16 that we did not reach an electrolyte saturation level until the 11th or 12th day, in terms of the CMP and the LMP”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:43:36.8-00:44:07.6 opinion first hand
137
Eugene Cernan, whose electrolyte intake was generally less, did not reach an electrolyte saturation level at all during Apollo 17, according to Harrison Schmitt.
“in terms of the commander, because his electrolyte intake was generally less, I think, and that can be documented, he did not reach a saturation level at all.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:44:08.6-00:44:17.0 opinion first hand
138
Harrison Schmitt suspected that once electrolyte saturation was reached, excess electrolytes were concentrated in the intestines and acted as a laxative, similar to an Epsom salt-type laxative, in the stool.
“I suspect that the electrolytes we were eating were dumped, in a sense, or concentrated in the intestines and tended to act pretty much as a laxity and as an Epsom salt type laxity, if you will, in concentrated water in the stool.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:44:23.7-00:44:39.8 opinion first hand
139
Harrison Schmitt recommended that for Skylab, electrolyte intake should be reduced so that saturation is never reached.
“I think it's important for Skylab that, first of all, we probably reduce the electrolytes intake so that saturation is never reached.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:44:40.1-00:44:55.0 opinion first hand
140
Harrison Schmitt recommended that if a loose stool problem develops on Skylab and appears to be an electrolyte-related issue, electrolyte intake should be decreased.
“secondly, that if a loose stool problem develops, it appears to be an electrolyte problem other than any other biological problem, that we decrease the intake of electrolytes.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:44:57.2-00:45:18.6 opinion first hand
141
Harrison Schmitt reduced his own electrolyte intake on his own initiative during Apollo 17.
“This is what I did on my own.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:45:19.2-00:45:20.4 observation first hand
142
Whether reducing electrolyte intake worked to prevent further loose stools was hard to say because the Apollo 17 flight ended before any other stool problems occurred.
“whether or not it worked or not is hard to say because the flight was terminated before any other stools occurred.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:45:22.2-00:45:29.3 observation first hand
143
Chlorination odour was not apparent to Harrison Schmitt except during chlorination itself.
“Chlorientation odor was not apparent to me except during chlorination.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:45:43.1-00:45:47.2 observation first hand
144
An iodine odour was slightly apparent to Harrison Schmitt in the Lunar Module's water but was not of any significance to him.
“Iodentation odor is very slight apparent in the limb water but not of any significance to the LMP.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:45:49.0-00:45:59.5 observation first hand
145
Harrison Schmitt experienced no physical discomfort other than occasional tiredness, sore muscles from extravehicular activity (EVA) work, and bruises under his fingernails.
“Physical discomfort, no physical discomfort for the LMP other than tiredness on occasion and in the case of the EVA work, sore muscles and the bruises under the fingernails.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:46:02.0-00:46:20.6 observation first hand
146
The gas-water separator did not work very effectively during Apollo 17.
“Gas water separator didn't work very effectively, and I'm sure that's been discussed elsewhere.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:46:24.4-00:46:28.8 observation first hand
147
Harrison Schmitt was never extensively thirsty during the mission, even during extravehicular activities (EVAs), though he stopped to drink water occasionally and never drank all the water in the in-suit drink bag.
“Intensity of thirst during admission, never really thirsty, extensively thirsty, even during the EVAs, although I did stop to take a drink of water occasionally. But I never drank all the water in the in-flight drink bag, in-suit drink bag.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:46:30.9-00:46:49.2 observation first hand
148
Harrison Schmitt's difficulty in going to sleep was variable, and he generally had no difficulty going to sleep when Seconal was used.
“The difficulty in going to sleep was variable. and when sequinol was used generally no difficulty in going to sleep”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:47:20.0-00:47:28.7 observation first hand
149
On several nights, Harrison Schmitt would fall asleep and then wake up fairly soon after, taking up to an hour to fall back asleep the second time.
“there was a tendency on a couple on several nights to go to sleep and then wake up fairly soon after going to sleep within an hour and then the second time took a little bit maybe sometimes took up to an hour to go back to sleep.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:47:40.3-00:47:54.7 observation first hand
150
Harrison Schmitt believed the medical log reports for him were generally valid, showing an average of five and a half to six hours of sleep per night.
“I feel that the medical log reports for the LMP were generally valid, that probably an average five and a half to six hours of sleep per night was good, and I don't think except for maybe one night somewhere in there did I go much below that.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:47:58.8-00:48:16.6 opinion first hand
151
Harrison Schmitt's sleep was rarely, probably never, continuous for more than three hours without waking up.
“the sleep was rarely, probably never continuous for more than three hours without waking up.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:48:17.4-00:48:25.7 observation first hand
152
Harrison Schmitt considers six hours of sleep adequate for the kind of work performed during the mission.
“I feel that six hours is adequate sleep for the kind of work we were doing in space.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:48:30.5-00:48:35.2 opinion first hand
153
Harrison Schmitt considers an eight-hour scheduled sleep period necessary to obtain six hours of actual sleep, due to periods of wakefulness and the time needed to organise the cabin and get everyone to bed.
“However, the programming of eight hours is necessary in order to get six hours because of the periods of wakefulness during sleep periods, and for just the difficulty in getting the cabin organized and everybody to bed at the program time.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:48:36.3-00:48:54.1 opinion first hand
154
Harrison Schmitt considers maintaining an eight-hour sleep period mandatory to obtain the six hours he believes is required to perform the mission without getting tired or falling behind schedule.
“So maintaining an eight-hour sleep period is, I think, mandatory in order to obtain the six hours that is probably all that is required to perform the mission without getting tired or getting behind the power curve, as they say, with respect to sleep.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:48:55.9-00:49:15.0 opinion first hand
155
Harrison Schmitt wanted his head and limbs restrained in order to get a good sleep, although he did sleep at times without such restraint.
“I had the feeling that I wanted to have my head and limbs restrained in order to get a good sleep, although I did sleep at times without that restraint.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:49:25.2-00:49:38.2 observation first hand
156
Harrison Schmitt recommended that sleep restraints be made smaller with a somewhat more pronounced feeling of restraint, as he found them a little too large for use.
“If I were rebuilding the sleep restraints for my personal use, I would make them smaller with a somewhat more feeling of restraint. They're a little bit large, I would say, for use.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:49:40.2-00:49:51.8 opinion first hand
157
When Harrison Schmitt slept on the couch, he would put a shoulder strap over his head and cinch it down lightly to get a feeling of head restraint.
“When I slept on the couch, I tended to put a shoulder strap over my head and cinch it down very lightly so that I had that feeling of head restraint.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:50:00.4-00:50:07.8 observation first hand
158
Harrison Schmitt, as Lunar Module Pilot, experienced a loss of sensory perception of limb position in zero gravity when his limbs were static and in a rest position, which he considered one of the two biggest factors making sleep difficult.
“Probably the biggest two things that made sleep difficult when it was difficult was the loss of sensory perception of limb position in zero gravity. ... when they were just static and in a rest position, there tended to be, for the LNP at any rate, a loss of sensory perception of the position of the list.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:50:08.7-00:50:36.9 observation first hand
159
Harrison Schmitt found that sensory perception of limb position returned immediately upon moving the limbs.
“When they were not being moved, that perception came back immediately upon moving them.”
NASA-UAP-D029, Apollo 17 Crew Medical Debriefing (Continued), 1972 2026-07-11 00:50:23.4-00:50:27.3 observation first hand
160
Astronauts Edgar Mitchell and Harrison Schmitt attended the meetings Robert Bigelow describes.
“Astronauts. We had Edgar Mitchell and Jack Schmidt there.”
The Evolution of AAWSAP | Bigelow Podcast, Ep. 2 2026-08-11 00:05:33.1-00:05:37.7 testimony first hand