Concepts

Anomalous Aerial Vehicle (AAV)

A designation used in US Navy incident reporting to describe an unidentified aerial object observed and tracked by the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group in November 2004.

US Navy UAP reporting terminology · Nimitz UAP Incident, 2004 · Concept

The term Anomalous Aerial Vehicle (AAV) is used in US Navy incident documentation to designate an unidentified aerial object encountered by the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group during the 2004 Nimitz UAP Incident. The designation appears most prominently in the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report, which records observations, sensor data, and assessments gathered from multiple platforms and personnel during a series of detections and one confirmed visual intercept. The objects were detected on at least three separate occasions during the week while the strike group was operating off the western coast of the United States and Mexico.¹⁴

Prior to the visual intercept on 2004-11-14, the USS Princeton had been tracking objects on its Aegis combat system for approximately two weeks.²⁶ According to David Fravor, the objects were observed descending from above approximately 24,000 metres rapidly to approximately 6,000 metres, remaining for hours, then ascending straight back up.²⁷ The AN/SPY-1 radar aboard USS Princeton detected the AAV descending from above approximately 18,000 metres at high velocity into its scan volume.¹⁵ Because the Princeton’s radar was configured for air intercept of conventional aircraft rather than ballistic missile tracking, it never obtained an accurate track; the contacts were dropped from the system as apparent false targets.¹⁶

On 2004-11-14, after again detecting an AAV, the USS Princeton tasked two F/A-18F aircraft from Strike Fighter Squadron 41 (VFA-41) that were airborne in the vicinity to conduct airborne reconnaissance. The intercept took place at approximately N31°20’ W117°10’, approximately 130 kilometres south of the US/Mexico border and approximately 55 kilometres off the Baja Mexico Coast.¹⁷ David Fravor led the initial intercept flight, designated FASTEAGLE. On approach, Fravor’s aircraft had no radar contacts and was carrying no forward-looking infrared (FLIR) pod.¹⁸ Fravor and all four aircrew across the two aircraft visually observed a small white object below them, with its longitudinal axis oriented north–south, moving abruptly over a localised disturbance on the ocean surface.¹⁹ The AAV was described consistently as shaped like an elongated egg or “Tic Tac”, approximately 14 metres in length, solid white, smooth, with no edges, nacelles, pylons, or wings, and exhibiting no rotors, rotor wash, or visible flight control surfaces.^19,28

When Fravor began a descent towards the AAV, the object appeared to reorient its axis in the direction of his aircraft, and the water disturbance ceased.²⁰ After Fravor manoeuvred approximately 90 degrees through a clockwise descending turn, the AAV climbed in a corresponding clockwise climbing turn, and when Fravor pulled his nose onto the object at approximately 460 metres’ distance, the AAV rapidly accelerated and disappeared from view.²⁰ Both Fravor’s aircraft and the wingman aircraft simultaneously lost visual contact.²¹ The USS Princeton subsequently reported via its AN/SPY-1 radar that the AAV had reappeared at the flight’s pre-assigned Combat Air Patrol (CAP) point approximately 97 kilometres to the east.²⁹ Fravor assessed that the object had covered that distance in less than one minute.³⁰ A second intercept flight led by Chad Underwood was dispatched following the FASTEAGLE debrief in the paraloft. Underwood tracked the AAV via FLIR but was unable to obtain a radar lock; his APG-73 Radar repeatedly failed to transition to Single Target Track mode without displaying any conventional electronic attack indicators.^22,23 The resulting approximately 90-second FLIR recording became the Navy F/A-18F Nimitz Encounter Video, which was released publicly in 2017. The targeting pod imagery showed that the AAV emitted no detectable infrared plume consistent with a conventional propulsion system.³¹

The CSG-11 AAV Incident Report recorded several key assessments. The AAV was assessed as no known aircraft or air vehicle in the inventory of the United States or any foreign nation.⁸ It exhibited advanced low-observable characteristics across multiple radar bands, rendering US radar-based engagement capabilities ineffective.⁹ No visible control surfaces or means of generating lift were observed.¹⁰ Its propulsion appeared capable of maintaining a stationary hover before transitioning to velocities far exceeding any known aerial vehicle with little to no visible signature.¹¹ The report additionally noted that the AAV possibly demonstrated a capability to cloak or become invisible to the human eye¹² and possibly demonstrated the ability to operate undersea undetected by advanced US sonar systems.¹³ However, based on the absence of any unidentified sonar contacts reported by the USS Louisville, a Los Angeles-class submarine operating as part of the strike group, the report assessed it as highly unlikely that the AAV had operated below the ocean surface.²⁴ The Carrier Strike Group Director of Operations stated that at no time did they consider the AAV a threat to the battle group, and that they had no advance knowledge of any weapons testing or experimental aircraft activity in the area.²⁵ All AAV activity was reported to D.C. Curtis by the commanding officers of USS Princeton and Strike Fighter Squadron 41 (VFA-41).²⁵ In testimony to the House Oversight Committee in 2023, Fravor stated that the AAV was far superior in performance to anything the United States had at the time, has today, or is projected to develop within the next ten or more years,³² and that the incident was never officially investigated, that no crew members were formally questioned, and that no tapes were collected.³³

References (33)

USS Princeton detected multiple AAVs operating in and around the Carrier Strike Group on several occasions
“The USS Princeton on several occasions detected multiple Anomalous Aerial Vehicles (AAVs) operating in and around the vicinity of the CSG.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 1, Executive Summary
AAVs descended rapidly from approximately 18,000 metres to approximately 15 metres in a matter of seconds
“The AAVs would descend "very rapidly" from approximately 60,000 feet down to approximately 50 feet in a matter of seconds.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 1, Executive Summary
AAVs would hover or remain stationary on radar for a short time then depart at high velocities and turn rates
“They would then hover or stay stationary on the radar for a short time and depart at high velocities and turn rates.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 1, Executive Summary
F/A-18F pilots visually described the AAV as elongated egg or 'Tic Tac' shape with a discernible midline horizontal axis
“leading to visual contact approximately one mile away from the AAV, which was reported to be "an elongated egg or a 'Tic Tac' shape with a discernable midline horizontal axis"”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 1, Executive Summary
The AAV was described as solid white, smooth, with no edges, approximately 14 metres in length
“It was "solid white, smooth, with no edges. It was approximately 46 feet in length.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 1, Executive Summary
The F/A-18F radar could not obtain a lock on the AAV; however it could be tracked while stationary using the FLIR system
“The F/A-18Fs radar could not obtain a 'lock' on the AAV; however it could be tracked while stationary and at slower speeds with the Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR).”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 1, Executive Summary
The AAV took evasive action upon intercept demonstrating advanced acceleration, aerodynamic, and propulsion capability
“The AAV did take evasive actions upon intercept by the F/A-18 demonstrating an advanced acceleration (G), aerodynamic, and propulsion capability.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 1, Executive Summary
The AAV was assessed as no known aircraft or air vehicle in the inventory of the United States or any foreign nation
“The Anomalous Aerial Vehicle (AAV) was no known aircraft or air vehicle currently in the inventory of the United States or any foreign nation.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 1, Key Assessments
The AAV exhibited advanced low-observable characteristics at multiple radar bands, rendering US radar-based engagement capabilities ineffective
“The AAV exhibited advanced low observable characteristics at multiple radar bands rendering US radar based engagement capabilities ineffective.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 1, Key Assessments
The AAV exhibited advanced aerodynamic performance with no visible control surfaces and no visible means to generate lift
“The AAV exhibited advanced aerodynamic performance with no visible control surfaces and no visible means to generate lift.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 1, Key Assessments
The AAV exhibited advanced propulsion capability, remaining stationary then transitioning to velocities far greater than any known aerial vehicle with little to no visible signature
“The AAV exhibited advanced propulsion capability by demonstrating the ability to remain stationary with little to no variation in altitude transitioning to horizontal and/or vertical velocities far greater than any known aerial vehicle with little to no visible signature.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 1, Key Assessments
The AAV possibly demonstrated the ability to cloak or become invisible to the human eye
“The AAV possibly demonstrated the ability to 'cloak' or become invisible to the human eye or human observation.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 1, Key Assessments
The AAV possibly demonstrated a highly advanced capability to operate undersea completely undetectable by the most advanced US sensors
“The AAV possibly demonstrated a highly advanced capability to operate undersea completely undetectable by our most advanced sensors.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 1, Key Assessments
AAVs were detected three separate times during the week operating off the western coast of the United States and Mexico
“They were detected three separate times during the week operating off the western coast of the United States and Mexico.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 3
The USS Princeton AN/SPY-1 detected the AAV descending from above approximately 18,000 metres at high velocity
“According to Senior Chief {{redacted: ~1 word}} the AAVs would descend from a very high altitude into the scan volume of the AN/SPY-1 at a high velocity. The top of the scan volume would put the AAVs at higher than 60,000 feet.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 3
The USS Princeton radar was operating in a mode for air intercept of conventional aircraft and never obtained an accurate track; AAVs were dropped as false targets
“Since the radar was in the mode to handle Air Intercept of conventional aircraft it never obtained an accurate track of the AAVs and was quickly "dropped" by the radar meaning it was eliminated by the computer to reduce the amount of clutter on the radar, as any other false target is handled.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 3
The intercept took place at approximately N31°20' W117°10', about 130 kilometres south of the US/Mexico border and approximately 55 kilometres off the Baja Mexico Coast
“This section provides the debrief of the F/A-18 pilots and weapon system operators (WSOs) from VFA-41 that were able to get both a visual and sensor contact with the AAV on 14 November 2004 at approximately N31 20' W117 10' about 70nm south of the U.S./Mexico Border 30 nm off the Baja Mexico Coast”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 5
A water disturbance was observed on the ocean surface below where the AAV was located; no object or vessel was seen above, on, or below the surface
“He overflew the disturbance and turned back to the northwest. As he was flying away he could see the disturbance clearing and could no longer identify the place where it occurred. He did not see any object or vessel associated with the disturbance either above the surface, on the surface, or below the surface. ... It is possible that the disturbance was being caused by an AAV but that the AAV was 'cloaked' or invisible to the human eye.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 6
David Fravor described the AAV as shaped like an elongated egg or 'Tic Tac', approximately 14 metres long, uniformly white
“According to CDR Fravor, the object's shape was like an elongated egg or a 'Tic Tac' and had a discernable midline horizontal axis. However, the object was uniformly white across the entire body. It was approximately 46 feet in length.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 8
The AAV ascended quickly and pulled lift vector on and aft of the F/A-18 at supersonic speed, then disappeared, subsequently reappearing at the CAP point
“As they completed this maneuver, the object ascended quickly and pulled lift vector on and aft of them at a supersonic speed. CDR Fravor commanded the radar through the Short Range radar set and asked for a picture from Poison. Poison initially reported that the "picture was clean" (no contact) but then stated "you're not going to believe this, its at your CAP" meaning that the AAV had flown to their training CAP, which was located in the southern end of the training area and had climbed to approximately 24,000 feet.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 8
Chad Underwood attempted multiple times to transition the radar to Single Target Track mode on the AAV but the radar could not take a lock
“LT Underwood was controlling the radar and FLIR and attempted multiple times to transition the radar to Single Target Track (STT) mode on the object. The radar could not take a lock, the b-sweep would raster around the hit, build an initial aspect vector (which never stabilized) and then would drop and continue normal RWS b-sweep.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 9
Chad Underwood stated there were no jamming cues and that the radar just appeared as if it couldn't hack it
“When asked, LT Underwood stated that there were no jamming cues (strobe, champagne bubbles, "any normal EA indications"). It "just appeared as if the radar couldn't hack it." The radar couldn't receive enough information to create a single target track file.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 9
Based on lack of detection of any unidentified sonar contacts, it was assessed as highly unlikely that an AAV operated below the surface of the ocean
“Based on the lack of detection of any unidentified sonar contacts it is highly unlikely that an AAV operated below the surface of the ocean”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 12
All AAV activity was reported to D.C. Curtis by the commanding officer of USS Princeton and the commanding officer of VFA-41
“All of the AAV activity was reported to VADM Curtis by the Commanding Officer, USS Princeton and Commanding Officer, VFA-41.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 13
The CSG-11 Director of Operations stated they had no advanced knowledge of live fire events, US weapons testing, or experimental aircraft in the area
“He also stated that at no time did they consider the AAV a threat to the battle group. Additionally they had no advanced knowledge of live fire events, US Weapons Testing or any other experimental aircraft operating in the area. Finally, they had never seen anything like this before and never again.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 13
The air controller on USS Princeton had been observing AAV objects on the Aegis combat system for the previous two weeks prior to 2004-11-14
“The air controller on the ship also had no idea but had been observing these objects on their Aegis combat system for the previous 2 weeks.”
David Fravor Statement for the House Oversight Committee page 1, paragraph 4
AAV objects were descending from above approximately 24,000 metres rapidly to approximately 6,000 metres, staying for hours, then going straight back up
“They had been descending from above 80,000ft and coming rapidly down to 20,000ft would stay for hours and then go straight back up.”
David Fravor Statement for the House Oversight Committee page 1, paragraph 4
The AAV had no rotors, no rotor wash, and no visible flight control surfaces such as wings
“There were no Rotors, No Rotor wash, or any visible flight control surfaces like wings.”
David Fravor Statement for the House Oversight Committee page 1, paragraph 5
After the AAV disappeared, USS Princeton informed Fravor it had reappeared on the AN/SPY-1 Aegis radar at the CAP point, approximately 97 kilometres to the east
“the air controller let us know that the object had reappeared on the Princeton's Aegis SPY 1 radar at our CAP point. This Tic Tac Object had just traveled 60 miles in a very short period of time”
David Fravor Statement for the House Oversight Committee page 2, paragraph 1
David Fravor assessed the AAV traveled approximately 97 kilometres in less than one minute
“This Tic Tac Object had just traveled 60 miles in a very short period of time (less than a minute)”
David Fravor Statement for the House Oversight Committee page 2, paragraph 1
The targeting pod video showed the AAV did not emit any infrared plume from a normal propulsion system
“we do see on the targeting pod video that the object does not emit any IR (infrared) plume from a normal propulsion system that we would expect.”
David Fravor Statement for the House Oversight Committee page 2, paragraph 2
The 2004-11 Nimitz incident was never officially investigated, none of Fravor's crew were ever questioned, and tapes were never taken
“What is shocking is that the incident was never investigated, none of my crew were ever questioned, tapes were never taken”
David Fravor Statement for the House Oversight Committee page 2, paragraph 3
David Fravor stated the AAV was far superior to anything the United States had at the time, has today, or is looking to develop in the next 10 or more years
“the Tic Tac Object that we engaged in Nov 2004 was far superior to anything that we had at the time, have today, or are looking to develop in the next 10+ years.”
David Fravor Statement for the House Oversight Committee page 3, paragraph 3

Anomalous Aerial Vehicle (AAV)

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