The Nimitz CSG was operating off the western coast of the United States from approximately 2004-11-10 to 2004-11-16 in preparation for deployment to the Arabian Sea.
“During the period of approximately 10-16 November 2004, the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG) was operating off the western coast of the United States in preparation for their deployment to the Arabian Sea.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 1, Executive Summary
The USS Princeton detected multiple AAVs on several occasions operating in and around the vicinity of the CSG.
“The USS Princeton on several occasions detected multiple Anomalous Aerial Vehicles (AAVs) operating in and around the vicinity of the CSG.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 1, Executive Summary
The AAVs would descend very rapidly from approximately 18,000 metres down to approximately 15 metres in a matter of seconds.
“The AAVs would descend "very rapidly" from approximately 60,000 feet down to approximately 50 feet in a matter of seconds.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 1, Executive Summary
The AAVs would hover or remain stationary on radar for a short time, then depart at high velocities and turn rates.
“They would then hover or stay stationary on the radar for a short time and depart at high velocities and turn rates.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 1, Executive Summary
The CSG comprised USS Nimitz, USS Princeton, USS Chafee, USS Higgins, and USS Louisville.
“The CSG was comprised of the following ships and submarine: USS Nimitz (CVN-68), USS Princeton (CG-59), USS Chafee (DDG-90), USS Higgins (DDG-76), and the USS Louisville (SSN-724).”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 2
The only participants in the AAV detection and intercept were the USS Princeton, VAW-117, VMFA-232, and VFA-41.
“The only participants in the events surrounding the detection and intercept of the AAV are the USS Princeton, VAW-117, VMFA-232, and VFA-41.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 2
The USS Princeton was the first Ticonderoga-class cruiser to carry the upgraded AN/SPY-1B radar system.
“The Princeton was the first Ticonderoga-class cruiser to carry the upgraded AN/SPY-1B radar system.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 2
The AN/SPY-1 radar detected the AAV descending from above approximately 18,000 metres at high velocity.
“According to Senior Chief {{redacted: ~1 word}} the AAVs would descend from a very high altitude into the scan volume of the AN/SPY-1 at a high velocity. The top of the scan volume would put the AAVs at higher than 60,000 feet.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 3
A USS Princeton Senior Chief with 17 years' experience stated the AAV exhibited ballistic missile characteristics.
“Senior Chief {{redacted: ~1 word}} added that based on his experience, which is 17 years as a Fire Control on Aegis cruisers, the AAV exhibited Ballistic Missile Characteristics in reference to its appearance, velocity, and indications on the radar.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 3
The Princeton's radar was in a mode for conventional aircraft intercept and never obtained an accurate track; the AAVs were dropped as false targets.
“Since the radar was in the mode to handle Air Intercept of conventional aircraft it never obtained an accurate track of the AAVs and was quickly "dropped" by the radar meaning it was eliminated by the computer to reduce the amount of clutter on the radar, as any other false target is handled.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 3
The AAVs were detected three separate times during the week operating off the western coast of the United States and Mexico.
“They were detected three separate times during the week operating off the western coast of the United States and Mexico.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 3
On 2004-11-14, after detecting an AAV again, the USS Princeton tasked two airborne F/A-18s for airborne reconnaissance.
“On 14 November 2004, after again detecting an AAV took the opportunity of two F/A-18s airborne in the vicinity to task them for airborne reconnaissance of the AAV.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 3
The VMFA-232 commanding officer was flying a single-seat F/A-18C launched from USS Nimitz at approximately 1030 local time.
“Lt. Col {{redacted: ~1 word}} Commanding Officer VMFA-232, was flying a single-seat F/A-18C that launched from the USS Nimitz at approximately 1030L to conduct a Functional Check Flight of an aircraft that had recently completed significant maintenance.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 6
The VMFA-232 commanding officer observed a water disturbance approximately 50 to 100 metres in diameter, with no visible object above, on, or below the surface.
“The disturbance appeared to be 50 to 100 meters in diameter and close to round. It was the only area and type of whitewater activity that could be seen and reminded him of images of something rapidly submerging from the surface like a submarine or ship sinking. It also looked like a possible area of shoal water where the swell was breaking over a barely submerged reef or island.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 6
Chad Underwood was the WSO in the second F/A-18F section airborne that day, launching after the FASTEAGLE flight.
“Lt Underwood was a member of VFA-41 and was the Weapons and Sensors Officer (WSO) flying with LT {{redacted: ~2 words}}. They were a part of the second F/A-18F section airborne that day from VFA-41. Their flight launched following the FASTEAGLE flight.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 9
Chad Underwood attempted multiple times to transition to Single Target Track mode but the radar could not take a lock.
“LT Underwood was controlling the radar and FLIR and attempted multiple times to transition the radar to Single Target Track (STT) mode on the object. The radar could not take a lock, the b-sweep would raster around the hit, build an initial aspect vector (which never stabilized) and then would drop and continue normal RWS b-sweep.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 9
Underwood stated there were no jamming cues; the radar appeared unable to receive enough information to create a single target track file.
“When asked, LT Underwood stated that there were no jamming cues (strobe, champagne bubbles, "any normal EA indications"). It "just appeared as if the radar couldn't hack it." The radar couldn't receive enough information to create a single target track file.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 9
The FLIR showed the AAV apparently stationary, with only closure resulting from the aircraft's own movement.
“The FLIR showed an object at 0 ATA and approximately -5deg elevation (Figure 2). According to LT Underwood, "the target was best guess co-altitude or a few thousand feet below," estimating the object to be between 15-20 thousand feet. The object, according to the FLIR, appeared stationary (Figure 3). There was no discernable movement from the object with the only closure being a result of the aircraft's movement.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 9-10
The AAV moved out of Underwood's FLIR field of view; he made no attempt to slew the FLIR and lost situational awareness.
“As LT Underwood watched the object it began to move out of FLIR field of view to the left. LT Underwood made no attempt to slew the FLIR and subsequently lost situational awareness to the object. The Flight continued with training mission with no further contact with object.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 10
Underwood was clear he could not confirm the FLIR object was the same as described by the FASTEAGLE flight; he never had visual contact.
“LT Underwood was clear in that he couldn't confirm that it was the same object as described by FASTEAGLE flight. He never had visual, only seeing the object via the FLIR.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 11
After landing, copies of Underwood's FLIR tapes were made and a set was turned into the intelligence section.
“LT Underwood said that the CIVC section attempted to collect his tapes but he refused. They proceeded to their ready room where they debriefed with CDR Fravor and his flight. Copies of the tapes were made with a set being turned into the intelligence section.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 11
The USS Louisville, a Los Angeles-class nuclear fast attack submarine, was operating in the vicinity as part of the CSG.
“The USS Louisville USS Louisville (SSN-724) is a Los Angeles-class nuclear fast attack submarine. She was operating in the vicinity of the USS Nimitz as part of the CSG during the detection and intercept of the AAV.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 11
A former submarine officer aboard USS Louisville stated there were no unidentified sonar contacts in the vicinity of the aerial sightings.
“According to former LT {{redacted: ~3 words}} now a civilian working for the US Navy, who was a qualified Submarine Officer onboard the Louisville in November 2004 during the AAV activity there were no unidentified sonar contacts in the vicinity of the aerial sightings or at anytime during the operations off the coast of California.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 12
Based on the lack of unidentified sonar contacts, it was assessed as highly unlikely that an AAV operated below the ocean surface.
“Based on the lack of detection of any unidentified sonar contacts it is highly unlikely that an AAV operated below the surface of the ocean”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 12
David Fravor reported to CVIC on 2004-11-14 to debrief; the Carrier Air Wing Intelligence Officer was initially unsure what to do.
“On 14 November following the intercept of the AAV, CDR Fravor reported to CVIC to debrief with Intelligence. He discussed the entire mission and AAV contact with LCDR {{redacted: ~2 words}} the Carrier Air Wing Intelligence Officer.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 12
The MISREP, including the FLIR video, was submitted via a secure email system to 3rd Fleet Intelligence.
“LCDR {{redacted: ~1 word}} completed an email based MISREP. It was submitted via email because the F/A-18s were on a training mission. The email-based report including the FLIR video was sent via a secure system to CAPT {{redacted: ~2 words}} at 3rd Fleet Intelligence, their higher echelon command.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 12
The 3rd Fleet N2 deputy confirmed the MISREP was received on or about 2004-11-14 and was not forwarded up the chain of command.
“CAPT {{redacted}} confirmed that the MISREP was received via email on or about 14 November 2004. Since this MISREP was completed during training and preparation for deployment it was read and acknowledged by 3rd Fleet N2 but was not forwarded to anyone up the chain of command.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 13
The MISREP was not archived and was likely deleted at some point as there was no requirement to retain such reports.
“Additionally CAPT {{redacted}} stated that it was not likely archived but deleted at some point later as there is no requirement to keep these reports and it was likely in file folder with all of the other training MISREPS sent in by the CSG during deployment preparation.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 13
All AAV activity was reported to Rear Admiral D.C. Curtis by the commanding officers of USS Princeton and VFA-41.
“All of the AAV activity was reported to VADM Curtis by the Commanding Officer, USS Princeton and Commanding Officer, VFA-41.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 13
The CSG Director of Operations confirmed the AAV was never considered a threat and that no knowledge of live-fire events, US weapons testing, or experimental aircraft in the area existed.
“He also stated that at no time did they consider the AAV a threat to the battle group. Additionally they had no advanced knowledge of live fire events, US Weapons Testing or any other experimental aircraft operating in the area. Finally, they had never seen anything like this before and never again.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 13
The AAV was assessed as no known aircraft or air vehicle currently in the inventory of the United States or any foreign nation.
“The Anomalous Aerial Vehicle (AAV) was no known aircraft or air vehicle currently in the inventory of the United States or any foreign nation.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 1, Key Assessments
The AAV exhibited advanced low-observable characteristics at multiple radar bands, rendering US radar-based engagement capabilities ineffective.
“The AAV exhibited advanced low observable characteristics at multiple radar bands rendering US radar based engagement capabilities ineffective.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 1, Key Assessments
The AAV exhibited advanced aerodynamic performance with no visible control surfaces and no visible means to generate lift.
“The AAV exhibited advanced aerodynamic performance with no visible control surfaces and no visible means to generate lift.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 1, Key Assessments