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2004 Nimitz UAP Incident

A series of encounters between US Navy personnel and unidentified aerial objects detected by the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group off the coast of California and Mexico during November 2004.

approximately 2004-11-10 to 2004-11-16 · Southern California (SOCAL) Operating Area, off the coast of California and Mexico · UAP encounter / military incident

The Nimitz UAP Incident, 2004 refers to a series of encounters between personnel of the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group and unidentified aerial objects detected off the coast of California and Mexico during approximately 2004-11-10 to 2004-11-16.1 The strike group was completing the Tailored Ships Training Availability in preparation for deployment to the Arabian Sea at the time of the encounters.1 The Nimitz Carrier Strike Group comprised USS Nimitz (CVN-68), USS Princeton (CG-59), USS Chafee (DDG-90), USS Higgins (DDG-76), and USS Louisville (SSN-724).5 The squadrons involved in the actual detection and intercept of the Anomalous Aerial Vehicle (AAV) were the USS Princeton, Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron 117 (VAW-117), Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 232 (VMFA-232), and Strike Fighter Squadron 41 (VFA-41).6

On multiple occasions during the week, the USS Princeton — the first Ticonderoga-class cruiser fitted with the upgraded AN/SPY-1B radar system7 — detected AAVs descending from above approximately 18,000 metres at high velocity.8 A senior fire control specialist aboard the Princeton, citing 17 years of experience on Aegis cruisers, assessed that the objects exhibited characteristics associated with ballistic missiles in terms of their appearance, velocity, and radar indications.9 Because the Princeton’s radar was configured for conventional aircraft intercept rather than ballistic missile tracking, it was never able to obtain an accurate track; the contacts were dropped by the radar as false targets to reduce clutter.10 The AAVs were detected on three separate occasions during the week.11 On 2004-11-14, after once again detecting an AAV, the Princeton tasked two airborne F/A-18F aircraft to conduct airborne reconnaissance of the contact.12

The first intercept on 2004-11-14 involved the commanding officer of VMFA-232, who launched from USS Nimitz at approximately 1030 local time in a single-seat F/A-18C on a functional check flight.13 As he descended through approximately 4,500 metres and approached within roughly 25 kilometres of the contact, he observed a circular water disturbance on the ocean surface, approximately 50 to 100 metres in diameter, with no visible object above, on, or below the surface.14 Following the initial intercept, David Fravor of VFA-41 briefed the second flight, led by Chad Underwood, in the paraloft and asked them to attempt to see and record what they could.15 Underwood was the weapons and sensors officer (WSO) aboard the second F/A-18F section and launched shortly after the FASTEAGLE flight.15

Chad Underwood made multiple attempts to transition his aircraft radar to Single Target Track mode on the AAV, but the radar was unable to establish a lock, with the sweep rastering around the return, building an initial aspect vector that never stabilised, and then dropping.16 Underwood noted there were no jamming cues — no strobe, champagne bubbles, or electronic attack indications — and that the radar simply appeared unable to receive sufficient information to create a target track file.17 The forward-looking infrared (FLIR) system showed the object appearing stationary, with closure attributable only to the aircraft’s own movement.18 The AAV eventually moved out of Underwood’s FLIR field of view; he made no attempt to slew the sensor and lost situational awareness of the contact.19 Underwood subsequently stated that he could not confirm the FLIR contact was the same object as described by the FASTEAGLE flight, as he never had visual contact with it.20 After landing, copies of Underwood’s FLIR tapes were made and a set was turned in to the intelligence section.21 The Anomalous Aerial Vehicle (AAV) Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) Recording 2004-11 is the footage associated with this event.

The USS Louisville, a Los Angeles-class nuclear fast attack submarine operating in the vicinity as part of the strike group,22 reported no unidentified sonar contacts in the vicinity of the aerial sightings at any time during operations off California.23 On this basis, the incident report assessed it as highly unlikely that any AAV operated below the ocean surface during the incident.24 Following the intercept, David Fravor reported to the Carrier Intelligence Center (CVIC) on 2004-11-14 to debrief; the Carrier Air Wing Intelligence Officer stated he was initially uncertain what to do with the report but had no reason to question it given Fravor’s experience and standing.25 An email-based Mission Report (MISREP), including the FLIR video, was submitted via a secure system to 3rd Fleet Intelligence.26 The 3rd Fleet Intelligence deputy confirmed the Carrier Strike Group 11 (CSG-11) Anomalous Aerial Vehicle (AAV) Mission Report (MISREP) 2004-11 was received on or about 2004-11-14 and was not forwarded further up the chain of command,27 with the deputy noting it was likely deleted at some point thereafter as no requirement existed to retain such reports.28

All AAV activity was reported to the commander of the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group, Rear Admiral D.C. Curtis, by the commanding officers of the USS Princeton and VFA-41.29 The strike group’s Director of Operations confirmed that the AAV was never considered a threat to the battle group, and that no advance knowledge of live-fire events, US weapons testing, or experimental aircraft in the area existed at the time.30 The AAV was formally assessed as no known aircraft or air vehicle currently in the inventory of the United States or any foreign nation,31 and was recorded as exhibiting advanced low-observable characteristics at multiple radar bands that rendered US radar-based engagement capabilities ineffective.32 The objects further demonstrated advanced aerodynamic performance with no visible control surfaces and no visible means of generating lift.33

  1. The Nimitz CSG was operating off the western coast of the United States from approximately 2004-11-10 to 2004-11-16 in preparation for deployment to the Arabian Sea.
    “During the period of approximately 10-16 November 2004, the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG) was operating off the western coast of the United States in preparation for their deployment to the Arabian Sea.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 1, Executive Summary
  2. The USS Princeton detected multiple AAVs on several occasions operating in and around the vicinity of the CSG.
    “The USS Princeton on several occasions detected multiple Anomalous Aerial Vehicles (AAVs) operating in and around the vicinity of the CSG.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 1, Executive Summary
  3. The AAVs would descend very rapidly from approximately 18,000 metres down to approximately 15 metres in a matter of seconds.
    “The AAVs would descend "very rapidly" from approximately 60,000 feet down to approximately 50 feet in a matter of seconds.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 1, Executive Summary
  4. The AAVs would hover or remain stationary on radar for a short time, then depart at high velocities and turn rates.
    “They would then hover or stay stationary on the radar for a short time and depart at high velocities and turn rates.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 1, Executive Summary
  5. The CSG comprised USS Nimitz, USS Princeton, USS Chafee, USS Higgins, and USS Louisville.
    “The CSG was comprised of the following ships and submarine: USS Nimitz (CVN-68), USS Princeton (CG-59), USS Chafee (DDG-90), USS Higgins (DDG-76), and the USS Louisville (SSN-724).”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 2
  6. The only participants in the AAV detection and intercept were the USS Princeton, VAW-117, VMFA-232, and VFA-41.
    “The only participants in the events surrounding the detection and intercept of the AAV are the USS Princeton, VAW-117, VMFA-232, and VFA-41.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 2
  7. The USS Princeton was the first Ticonderoga-class cruiser to carry the upgraded AN/SPY-1B radar system.
    “The Princeton was the first Ticonderoga-class cruiser to carry the upgraded AN/SPY-1B radar system.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 2
  8. The AN/SPY-1 radar detected the AAV descending from above approximately 18,000 metres at high velocity.
    “According to Senior Chief {{redacted: ~1 word}} the AAVs would descend from a very high altitude into the scan volume of the AN/SPY-1 at a high velocity. The top of the scan volume would put the AAVs at higher than 60,000 feet.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 3
  9. A USS Princeton Senior Chief with 17 years' experience stated the AAV exhibited ballistic missile characteristics.
    “Senior Chief {{redacted: ~1 word}} added that based on his experience, which is 17 years as a Fire Control on Aegis cruisers, the AAV exhibited Ballistic Missile Characteristics in reference to its appearance, velocity, and indications on the radar.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 3
  10. The Princeton's radar was in a mode for conventional aircraft intercept and never obtained an accurate track; the AAVs were dropped as false targets.
    “Since the radar was in the mode to handle Air Intercept of conventional aircraft it never obtained an accurate track of the AAVs and was quickly "dropped" by the radar meaning it was eliminated by the computer to reduce the amount of clutter on the radar, as any other false target is handled.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 3
  11. The AAVs were detected three separate times during the week operating off the western coast of the United States and Mexico.
    “They were detected three separate times during the week operating off the western coast of the United States and Mexico.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 3
  12. On 2004-11-14, after detecting an AAV again, the USS Princeton tasked two airborne F/A-18s for airborne reconnaissance.
    “On 14 November 2004, after again detecting an AAV took the opportunity of two F/A-18s airborne in the vicinity to task them for airborne reconnaissance of the AAV.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 3
  13. The VMFA-232 commanding officer was flying a single-seat F/A-18C launched from USS Nimitz at approximately 1030 local time.
    “Lt. Col {{redacted: ~1 word}} Commanding Officer VMFA-232, was flying a single-seat F/A-18C that launched from the USS Nimitz at approximately 1030L to conduct a Functional Check Flight of an aircraft that had recently completed significant maintenance.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 6
  14. The VMFA-232 commanding officer observed a water disturbance approximately 50 to 100 metres in diameter, with no visible object above, on, or below the surface.
    “The disturbance appeared to be 50 to 100 meters in diameter and close to round. It was the only area and type of whitewater activity that could be seen and reminded him of images of something rapidly submerging from the surface like a submarine or ship sinking. It also looked like a possible area of shoal water where the swell was breaking over a barely submerged reef or island.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 6
  15. Chad Underwood was the WSO in the second F/A-18F section airborne that day, launching after the FASTEAGLE flight.
    “Lt Underwood was a member of VFA-41 and was the Weapons and Sensors Officer (WSO) flying with LT {{redacted: ~2 words}}. They were a part of the second F/A-18F section airborne that day from VFA-41. Their flight launched following the FASTEAGLE flight.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 9
  16. Chad Underwood attempted multiple times to transition to Single Target Track mode but the radar could not take a lock.
    “LT Underwood was controlling the radar and FLIR and attempted multiple times to transition the radar to Single Target Track (STT) mode on the object. The radar could not take a lock, the b-sweep would raster around the hit, build an initial aspect vector (which never stabilized) and then would drop and continue normal RWS b-sweep.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 9
  17. Underwood stated there were no jamming cues; the radar appeared unable to receive enough information to create a single target track file.
    “When asked, LT Underwood stated that there were no jamming cues (strobe, champagne bubbles, "any normal EA indications"). It "just appeared as if the radar couldn't hack it." The radar couldn't receive enough information to create a single target track file.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 9
  18. The FLIR showed the AAV apparently stationary, with only closure resulting from the aircraft's own movement.
    “The FLIR showed an object at 0 ATA and approximately -5deg elevation (Figure 2). According to LT Underwood, "the target was best guess co-altitude or a few thousand feet below," estimating the object to be between 15-20 thousand feet. The object, according to the FLIR, appeared stationary (Figure 3). There was no discernable movement from the object with the only closure being a result of the aircraft's movement.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 9-10
  19. The AAV moved out of Underwood's FLIR field of view; he made no attempt to slew the FLIR and lost situational awareness.
    “As LT Underwood watched the object it began to move out of FLIR field of view to the left. LT Underwood made no attempt to slew the FLIR and subsequently lost situational awareness to the object. The Flight continued with training mission with no further contact with object.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 10
  20. Underwood was clear he could not confirm the FLIR object was the same as described by the FASTEAGLE flight; he never had visual contact.
    “LT Underwood was clear in that he couldn't confirm that it was the same object as described by FASTEAGLE flight. He never had visual, only seeing the object via the FLIR.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 11
  21. After landing, copies of Underwood's FLIR tapes were made and a set was turned into the intelligence section.
    “LT Underwood said that the CIVC section attempted to collect his tapes but he refused. They proceeded to their ready room where they debriefed with CDR Fravor and his flight. Copies of the tapes were made with a set being turned into the intelligence section.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 11
  22. The USS Louisville, a Los Angeles-class nuclear fast attack submarine, was operating in the vicinity as part of the CSG.
    “The USS Louisville USS Louisville (SSN-724) is a Los Angeles-class nuclear fast attack submarine. She was operating in the vicinity of the USS Nimitz as part of the CSG during the detection and intercept of the AAV.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 11
  23. A former submarine officer aboard USS Louisville stated there were no unidentified sonar contacts in the vicinity of the aerial sightings.
    “According to former LT {{redacted: ~3 words}} now a civilian working for the US Navy, who was a qualified Submarine Officer onboard the Louisville in November 2004 during the AAV activity there were no unidentified sonar contacts in the vicinity of the aerial sightings or at anytime during the operations off the coast of California.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 12
  24. Based on the lack of unidentified sonar contacts, it was assessed as highly unlikely that an AAV operated below the ocean surface.
    “Based on the lack of detection of any unidentified sonar contacts it is highly unlikely that an AAV operated below the surface of the ocean”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 12
  25. David Fravor reported to CVIC on 2004-11-14 to debrief; the Carrier Air Wing Intelligence Officer was initially unsure what to do.
    “On 14 November following the intercept of the AAV, CDR Fravor reported to CVIC to debrief with Intelligence. He discussed the entire mission and AAV contact with LCDR {{redacted: ~2 words}} the Carrier Air Wing Intelligence Officer.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 12
  26. The MISREP, including the FLIR video, was submitted via a secure email system to 3rd Fleet Intelligence.
    “LCDR {{redacted: ~1 word}} completed an email based MISREP. It was submitted via email because the F/A-18s were on a training mission. The email-based report including the FLIR video was sent via a secure system to CAPT {{redacted: ~2 words}} at 3rd Fleet Intelligence, their higher echelon command.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 12
  27. The 3rd Fleet N2 deputy confirmed the MISREP was received on or about 2004-11-14 and was not forwarded up the chain of command.
    “CAPT {{redacted}} confirmed that the MISREP was received via email on or about 14 November 2004. Since this MISREP was completed during training and preparation for deployment it was read and acknowledged by 3rd Fleet N2 but was not forwarded to anyone up the chain of command.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 13
  28. The MISREP was not archived and was likely deleted at some point as there was no requirement to retain such reports.
    “Additionally CAPT {{redacted}} stated that it was not likely archived but deleted at some point later as there is no requirement to keep these reports and it was likely in file folder with all of the other training MISREPS sent in by the CSG during deployment preparation.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 13
  29. All AAV activity was reported to Rear Admiral D.C. Curtis by the commanding officers of USS Princeton and VFA-41.
    “All of the AAV activity was reported to VADM Curtis by the Commanding Officer, USS Princeton and Commanding Officer, VFA-41.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 13
  30. The CSG Director of Operations confirmed the AAV was never considered a threat and that no knowledge of live-fire events, US weapons testing, or experimental aircraft in the area existed.
    “He also stated that at no time did they consider the AAV a threat to the battle group. Additionally they had no advanced knowledge of live fire events, US Weapons Testing or any other experimental aircraft operating in the area. Finally, they had never seen anything like this before and never again.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 13
  31. The AAV was assessed as no known aircraft or air vehicle currently in the inventory of the United States or any foreign nation.
    “The Anomalous Aerial Vehicle (AAV) was no known aircraft or air vehicle currently in the inventory of the United States or any foreign nation.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 1, Key Assessments
  32. The AAV exhibited advanced low-observable characteristics at multiple radar bands, rendering US radar-based engagement capabilities ineffective.
    “The AAV exhibited advanced low observable characteristics at multiple radar bands rendering US radar based engagement capabilities ineffective.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 1, Key Assessments
  33. The AAV exhibited advanced aerodynamic performance with no visible control surfaces and no visible means to generate lift.
    “The AAV exhibited advanced aerodynamic performance with no visible control surfaces and no visible means to generate lift.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 1, Key Assessments

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