USS Princeton

The USS Princeton (CG-59) is a Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser of the United States Navy, armed with naval guns and anti-air, anti-surface, and anti-submarine missiles.¹ Notably, the vessel was the first Ticonderoga-class cruiser to carry the upgraded AN/SPY-1B radar system.² During November 2004, the Princeton formed part of the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group, alongside USS Nimitz, USS Chafee, USS Higgins, and USS Louisville.³ The strike group was engaged in a Tailored Ships Training Availability (TSTA) from approximately 2004-11-10 to 2004-11-16, preparing for deployment to the Arabian Sea.⁴ David Fravor has noted that the Princeton is a cruiser, not a carrier, and is equipped with a helicopter pad; it carries an AN/SPY-1 phased-array radar system with four panels oriented in quadrants.^{5, 6}

The Princeton served as the primary radar platform and air-defence ship for the carrier group, providing 360-degree phased-array coverage capable of tracking hundreds of targets simultaneously.⁵ Beginning on or around 2004-11-10, radar specialist Kevin Day began tracking numerous unidentified aerial objects on the Princeton’s radar, clustering in groups of five to ten at altitudes far above normal commercial or military aviation traffic, with no transponder returns.⁷ Day verified these contacts using the Princeton’s Cooperative Engagement System, which merged radar inputs from every available source.⁸ Separately, Gary Voorhis checked the Princeton’s radar system for false returns, the system was recalibrated, and no technical faults were detected.⁹ Voorhis also physically confirmed the presence of objects by taking a bearing from the radar screen and scanning with binoculars, reporting something luminescent and hovering in the distance.¹⁰ For nearly two weeks prior to 2004-11-14, the Princeton’s radar operators had been regularly logging Anomalous Aerial Vehicle (AAV) activity, with no manned aircraft having been airborne during those earlier tracking periods.²³

The Princeton’s AN/SPY-1 detected the AAVs descending from altitudes above approximately 18,000 metres at high velocity.¹¹ Because the radar was operating in a mode configured for conventional air intercept rather than ballistic missile tracking, it never obtained an accurate track of the AAVs; the contacts were dropped as false targets to reduce clutter.¹² A senior Princeton Fire Control specialist, drawing on 17 years of experience on Aegis cruisers, assessed that the AAV exhibited ballistic missile characteristics in its appearance, velocity, and radar indications.¹⁴ An assessment in the incident report concluded that, had the radar been configured for ballistic missile tracking, it likely would have had the capability to track the objects.¹³ The Meteorological Officer aboard the Princeton offered an alternative explanation, briefing crew on a high-altitude weather phenomenon in which ice crystals can form and be detected by the AN/SPY-1, though this did not resolve all concerns about the contacts. The Tactical Air Officer, unable to identify the radar contact given its high speed and altitude, was described as perplexed.

On 2004-11-14, having again detected an AAV, the Princeton took the opportunity of two F/A-18F aircraft airborne in the vicinity — belonging to Strike Fighter Squadron 41 (VFA-41) — to task them for airborne reconnaissance of the contact.¹⁶ The Princeton (operating under the callsign “Poison”) assumed control of the aircraft from the E-2C Hawkeye controller and vectored them via Bearing Range Altitude Aspect (BRAA) towards the unknown contact.¹⁷ Commander David Fravor’s flight, designated “Blue Air” with hull classification CG-59 as their controller, was informed upon checking in that training was being suspended for real-world tasking.^{18, 19} The Princeton’s air controller advised Fravor that AAV objects had been observed on the Aegis combat system for the previous two weeks, descending from above approximately 24,000 metres rapidly down to approximately 6,000 metres, remaining for hours, then ascending again.²⁰ The Princeton asked Fravor’s weapons systems officer what ordnance was aboard before vectoring the flight towards the contact.¹⁷ During the intercept, five radar operators aboard the Princeton were each tracking the Tic Tac Sighting event in real time.²¹ After the AAV disappeared from the visual encounter, the Princeton reacquired the target approximately 97 kilometres away at Fravor’s prearranged Combat Air Patrol (CAP) point — a specific latitude and longitude that had not been transmitted on an open channel — and radioed Fravor accordingly.^{22, 23} The Princeton, USS Nimitz, and E-2C Hawkeye all tracked the AAV during the encounter, while the F/A-18 fire control radars did not acquire it.²⁴ All AAV activity was subsequently reported to D.C. Curtis by the Princeton’s commanding officer and the commanding officer of Strike Fighter Squadron 41 (VFA-41).²⁷

In the aftermath of the 2004 Nimitz UAP Encounter, personnel aboard the Princeton reported anomalies in the handling of records relating to the incident. The morning after the encounter, Kevin Day went to the Princeton’s communications room to retrieve radio communications for an after-action report, but found that all communications from the encounter had been wiped while date and time stamps remained intact.²⁵ Gary Voorhis was ordered to turn over data tapes from the Princeton’s Combat Engagement Centre and, contrary to normal procedure, was also ordered to erase everything including blank tapes.²⁶ Former Petty Officer Jason Turner separately claimed to have seen a fuller version of the Tic Tac video on a console monitor in the Princeton’s Signal Exploitation Space, showing manoeuvres not visible in the publicly released 76-second clip. Luis Elizondo later assessed that the USS Theodore Roosevelt UAP situation bore the hallmarks of the Nimitz and Princeton case from 2004, with pilots and radar operators reporting the same flight capabilities observed a decade earlier.