The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSDI) — later reconstituted as the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security — was a component of the Office of the Secretary of Defense within the United States Department of Defense (DoD).1 It acted as principal staff for the DoD on sensitive intelligence-related matters, overseeing a cluster of agencies including the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA).2 According to the U.S. Department of Defense Inspector General’s 2023 evaluation, DoD Instruction 5240.22 authorises the office, by then renamed OUSD(I&S), to establish policy for DoD counterintelligence support to counterterrorism and force protection.3
Luis Elizondo was assigned to OUSDI from 2008-09-28 to 2017-10-04.4 He was hired into the office in 2008 by James R. Clapper.2 Within OUSDI he served as an action officer in Partner Engagement,5 working on an information-sharing operation between the DoD, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and state, local, and tribal law enforcement authorities.6 He later accepted a position as Director of National Programs, Special Management Staff, within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.7
OUSDI’s connection to the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP) is disputed. A statement to Congress described AATIP as launched from OUSDI and managed by Elizondo, then a career counterintelligence officer.8 Pentagon spokesperson Christopher Sherwood told journalist Keith Kloor that Elizondo had no responsibilities regarding AATIP while working in OUSDI,9 a conclusion Sherwood said was based on conversations with OUSDI leadership, including individuals who had been in the office since Elizondo started there.10 Pentagon spokesperson Susan Gough likewise said that Elizondo had no assigned responsibilities for AATIP while in OUSD(I).11 Elizondo’s account holds that his alleged leadership of AATIP began in 2010 at OUSDI, when the programme was transferred there.12 The same report questioned how physicist Hal Puthoff could have worked under Elizondo’s leadership, since Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program (AAWSAP)/AATIP contracted work began in 2008 at the DIA, while Elizondo’s alleged leadership began only in 2010 at OUSDI.13
Elizondo’s first resignation letter, dated 2017-10-03, gave notice effective 2017-10-04 of his resignation as Director, National Programs Special Management Staff, and requested a deferred retirement.14 A copy addressed to then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis, later provided to reporters alongside his recent performance evaluations, bears the apparent seal of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense.15 He was cleared out of OUSDI the day after submitting the letter,16 and OUSDI referred the timing and circumstances of his resignation to the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) for immediate counterintelligence review;17 AFOSI is responsible for providing investigative support to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including investigation of assigned personnel.18 On or about 2017-10-04, after Elizondo had already left, a second resignation letter reached the OUSDI Chief of Staff’s office,19 hand-delivered by someone other than Elizondo himself;20 given its uncertain provenance, OUSDI retained a copy but did not forward it to the Secretary of Defense’s office.21 On 2017-12-15, acting on information from a New York Times inquiry, Garry Reid notified the OUSDI Security Officer that Elizondo may have misused government systems and might intend to release US government footage or information obtained during his employment.22 Three days later OUSDI located a classified email Elizondo had generated in August 2017 requesting help from a Navy civilian employee to declassify one or more videos (Garry Reid’s classified email chain on video declassification (2017-08));23 OUSDI staff then contacted the Navy civilian named in the email.24 According to Garry Reid, the civilian said he had told Elizondo he was not the declassification release authority,25 and took no further action after doing so.26 As of the memorandum’s writing, OUSDI had not determined whether the video had been properly declassified, what process had been followed, or how it had reached the national media.27
Elizondo’s memoir gives an account of internal dynamics at OUSD(I). James Clapper was Elizondo’s boss in the office.28 Garry Reid, who later held a senior position above Elizondo, replaced Michael Higgins and came to OUSD(I) from the special operations community, and is not related to Senator Harry Reid.29 Neill Tipton was, at the time, among the top three senior officials in OUSD(I), a rank equivalent to a three-star general.30 Elizondo gave Tipton a full briefing and a folder of hard-copy Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP) reports, along with access to the office’s classified share drive.31 Brad Byers was reportedly hesitant to brief Mattis until OUSD(I) had a permanent, Senate-confirmed appointee, since the position had been filled only by acting or temporary personnel.32 Jay Stratton and Elizondo submitted Operation Plan Interloper through an Alternative Compensatory Control Measure (ACCM) process directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, bypassing OUSD(I).33 Employees filed charges with the Department of Defense Inspector General about Reid’s conduct in the office,34 and Reid was later reassigned from OUSD(I).35 Elizondo has said that colleagues who remained at OUSD(I) told him Reid planned to launch a criminal inquiry with AFOSI,36 and that someone in the office authorised the deletion of all his electronic files, folders, and emails, on the grounds that they had no historic value, according to a Freedom of Information Act response from the Pentagon.37
Elizondo has characterised OUSD(I) — by then renamed OUSD(I&S) — as the same organisation that had previously underplayed and tried to kill AATIP, and later the Pentagon’s UAP Task Force.38 The Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force (UAPTF) was led by the United States Department of the Navy under OUSD(I&S).39 In a November 2021 memorandum, OUSD(I&S) was directed to establish the Airborne Object Identification and Management Synchronization Group (AOIMSG) as the successor to the UAPTF, to synchronise efforts across the DoD and with other federal departments and agencies.40 According to the Historical Record report on US government involvement with UAP, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, directed OUSD(I&S) to establish AOIMSG to succeed the United States Navy (USN)’s UAPTF,41 and later, in response to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, renamed AOIMSG as the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO) and expanded its scope, still under OUSD(I&S).42 According to the DoD Inspector General’s 2023 evaluation, the same Act also assigned AARO, under OUSD(I&S), responsibility for synchronising and standardising the collection, analysis, and identification of UAP incidents.43 The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security noted that the Inspector General’s findings largely predated AARO’s establishment on 2022-07-20.44 The Inspector General interviewed senior officials at OUSD(I&S), the Military Services, the Military Department Counterintelligence Organizations, and Defense agencies to learn how their organisations detect, report, and identify UAP incidents,45 and said it would close its Recommendation 1 once OUSD(I&S), in coordination with AARO, issued a DoD policy integrating UAP roles and procedures into existing intelligence and counterintelligence policy.46 The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, responding on behalf of OUSD(I&S) and the AARO Director, agreed with that recommendation.47