Garry Reid was a US Department of Defense official who, within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSDI), ran security and law enforcement for the department1 and controlled security clearances across the United States Department of Defense (DoD), including that of Luis Elizondo2. He replaced Michael Higgins in the post, having been brought into OUSD(I) from the special operations community; he is not related to Senator Harry Reid3.
Elizondo was assigned to OUSDI from 2008-09-28 to 2017-10-044, initially as an action officer in Partner Engagement5 before becoming a branch chief managing classified information in support of the Office of Military Commissions6. Reid said that, to the best of his knowledge, Elizondo had no job responsibilities related to the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP)7, a programme that had been terminated in 20128, and said Elizondo, a former Department of Defense employee, aggrandised his role in it in public statements9. For his part, Elizondo had kept Reid out of the loop on anything pertaining to AATIP10.
On 2017-10-03, Elizondo submitted a resignation letter requesting immediate termination of his employment11, telling his direct supervisor, according to Reid, that he was resigning because a fleeting job opportunity required his immediate availability12. He completed all administrative and security out-processing, including formal debriefs for Special Access Programs and Sensitive Compartmented Information, within 24 hours of submitting the letter13, and was cleared out of OUSDI the following day14; Reid said Elizondo gave no reason for the sudden departure15. In a phone call three days later, on 2017-10-06, Elizondo told Reid the job had been too stressful on his family, according to Reid16, though Reid’s second memorandum on the matter states Elizondo gave three different explanations for the resignation17. By Elizondo’s account, John Garrity, his immediate supervisor on the Guantanamo Bay portfolio, telephoned him after his resignation to say Reid wanted to see him immediately18; Reid asked him what he was supposed to do with the resignation letter19, and told him that if he did not come in, Reid would have no option but to tell people he was acting crazy, warning it could affect his security clearance20.
A second resignation letter was delivered to the OUSDI Chief of Staff’s office on or about 2017-10-04, after Elizondo had already left21, hand-delivered by someone other than Elizondo himself22. It was inconsistent with Elizondo’s first resignation letter, which Elizondo had personally handed to his supervisor23, and was formatted as a Memorandum for Record despite using the salutation “Mr. Secretary”24; given its uncertain provenance, OUSDI retained a copy but did not forward it to the Secretary of Defense’s office25. On 2017-12-18, OUSDI located a classified email chain involving Reid’s office on video declassification, generated by Elizondo in August 2017, in which he had asked a Navy civilian employee for help declassifying one or more videos26; the video attached was the same footage later broadcast on national news on 2017-12-1727, though it had not been determined whether it was properly declassified, what process was followed, or how it reached the media28. On 2017-12-15, acting on information contained in a The New York Times inquiry, Reid notified the OUSDI Security Officer that Elizondo may have misused government systems and might intend to release government footage or information obtained during his employment29.
OUSDI referred the timing and circumstances of Elizondo’s resignation to the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) for immediate counterintelligence review30. After a YouTube video surfaced, Reid requested an informal review of Elizondo’s conduct by AFOSI31, an organisation responsible for providing investigative support to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including investigation of assigned personnel32. Reid was separately pursuing options to investigate Elizondo’s possible mishandling of sensitive information33, and on 2017-12-21 met with AFOSI agents to initiate a formal inquiry into the matter34; he also opened an inquiry through AFOSI into how the Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP) videos had been released35. Reid seized Elizondo’s computers and files from his office and questioned every one of his former employees after the resignation36, and Elizondo later received a call from an agent of the Defense Counterintelligence Security Agency (DCSA), an agency overseen by Reid, regarding allegations that he had improperly declassified the videos37.
Employees filed complaints about Reid’s conduct with the Department of Defense Inspector General38, and the DoD Office of Inspector General investigated Reid over a litany of issues after a complaint from a female department employee worked its way through official channels39. Elizondo said the investigation examined allegations including a sexual relationship with a subordinate employee, sexual harassment, and fostering a hostile work environment40, and concluded that Reid had violated Joint Ethics Regulations by creating the appearance of an inappropriate relationship or preferential treatment with a female subordinate, and by mishandling Controlled Unclassified Information41. Elizondo also said Reid had withheld his resignation from Secretary of Defense James Mattis, hoping he would never need to reveal it42. Reid was subsequently reassigned from OUSD(I)43 to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) as a “special advisor”44, after the inspector general investigation into the allegations against him had concluded45.