The Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force (UAPTF) was a United States Department of Defense (DoD) initiative created in August 2020, when the Pentagon renamed and resurrected the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP) as the UAP Task Force.1 It was established to develop standardised reporting requirements for Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP) encounters2 and to investigate objects once called unidentified flying objects (UFOs) and now officially termed UAP.3 The task force was led by the United States Department of the Navy under the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSDI).4 According to the DoD’s Report on the Historical Record of U.S. Government Involvement with Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP), Volume I, Deputy Secretary of Defense David L. Norquist approved the task force’s establishment,5 which the same report describes as intended to improve understanding of the nature and origins of UAP6 and to detect, analyse and catalogue UAP that could pose a threat to United States national security.7 Service members were encouraged to report strange aerial encounters to the task force.8
The New York Times Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP) article, 2017-12 was largely responsible for Congress’s creation of the task force,9 and Luis Elizondo’s public exposure of AATIP’s existence was a major factor in both the task force’s creation and the later creation of the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO).10 The interagency task force built by Jay Stratton went on to become the Pentagon’s UAP Task Force,11 and Elizondo then began working as a contractor for the United States Space Force to help build its UAP effort and support Stratton’s task force.12 After a couple of years of Stratton quietly building the effort, the Secretary of Defense announced the Pentagon’s UAP Task Force and named Stratton as its first director.13
From the moment the task force became official, the Legacy Program began quietly pushing back against Stratton and the task force, creating bureaucratic hurdles,14 and the Legacy Program and its associates managed to block funding that United States Congress had appropriated for the task force.15 Elizondo has said that the OUSDI was the same organisation that had previously underplayed and tried to kill AATIP and then the Pentagon’s UAP Task Force.16 According to Harold E. Puthoff, Stratton encountered gatekeepers who controlled access to the legacy program while leading the task force,17 and Puthoff has said Stratton involved around 16 different defence contractors and intelligence units in an effort to move UAP investigation forward beyond the legacy program, though the effort was not successful.18
David Charles Grusch served as the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)’s representative to the task force from 2019 to 2021,19 in a reservist capacity within the United States Air Force.20 He helped author the task force’s 2019 Security Classification Guide,21 and from late 2021 to July 2022 served as the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)’s co-lead for UAP analysis and its representative to the task force,22 reporting to the task force and eventually to AARO.23 Grusch spent four years while with the task force taking steps to corroborate the evidence given to him and to vet the individuals who shared it.24 In 2019, the task force’s director asked Grusch to identify all special access programs and controlled access programs needed to satisfy its congressionally mandated mission, reporting directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense,25 and Grusch sat on the task force as created by the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).26 Karl E. Nell, a recently retired Army colonel, served as the United States Army’s liaison to the task force from 2021 to 2022, working with Grusch there.27 The task force was refused access to a broader programme that had retrieved technical vehicles of non-human origin that had either landed or crashed.28
At the 2022-05-17 US Congress public hearing on UAPs, Mike Gallagher asked Ronald S. Moultrie and Scott W. Bray whether they were aware of any DoD or DoD-contract programs focused on UAP from a technological engineering perspective; both replied they were not aware of anything beyond the Navy UAP Task Force.29 In June 2021, the task force and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) issued the congressionally mandated Preliminary Assessment: Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (2021-06).30 According to the DoD Inspector General’s unclassified summary report, Senate Report 116-233, accompanying the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, had directed ODNI, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, to submit an intelligence assessment of the threat posed by UAP and to report on the task force’s progress in understanding that threat.31 In May 2022, Charles McCullough III filed a Disclosure of Urgent Concern(s); Complaint of Reprisal on Grusch’s behalf with the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, concerning information Grusch had gathered beginning in 2019 while working for the task force.32 At the House Hearing on Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (2023-07-26), Grusch testified, and according to the hearing record was identified as a former NRO representative to the task force.33
In November 2021, a memorandum directed the OUSDI to establish the Airborne Object Identification and Management Synchronization Group (AOIMSG) as the task force’s successor, synchronising efforts across the DoD and with other federal departments and agencies to detect, identify and characterise objects of interest in special use airspace.34 The task force was subsequently reorganised and expanded into AARO, extending its remit to include investigations of objects operating underwater.35 According to the DoD’s Report on the Historical Record of U.S. Government Involvement with UAP, Volume I, the task force helped standardise, destigmatise and increase the volume of UAP reporting,36 helped calibrate sensors to improve the quality of UAP data collected,37 and its methods and processes directly led to the identification of high-altitude balloons from the People’s Republic of China that traversed the continental United States.38 At one point, the earlier Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program (AAWSAP) employed 50 full-time investigators, more than Project Blue Book, the task force, or AARO.39