The strike group comprised USS Nimitz, USS Princeton, USS Chafee, USS Higgins, and USS Louisville
“The CSG was comprised of the following ships and submarine: USS Nimitz (CVN-68), USS Princeton (CG-59), USS Chafee (DDG-90), USS Higgins (DDG-76), and the USS Louisville (SSN-724).”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 2
The strike group was operating off the western US coast in preparation for deployment to the Arabian Sea
“During the period of approximately 10-16 November 2004, the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG) was operating off the western coast of the United States in preparation for their deployment to the Arabian Sea.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 1, Executive Summary
USS Princeton was the first Ticonderoga-class cruiser to carry the upgraded AN/SPY-1B radar
“The Princeton was the first Ticonderoga-class cruiser to carry the upgraded AN/SPY-1B radar system.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 2, USS Princeton section
USS Princeton detected multiple AAVs operating in and around the carrier strike group on several occasions
“The USS Princeton on several occasions detected multiple Anomalous Aerial Vehicles (AAVs) operating in and around the vicinity of the CSG.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 1, Executive Summary
The AN/SPY-1 is a 4-megawatt phased-array radar capable of tracking over 100 targets, designed for long-range search, fire control, and Ballistic Missile Defense
“The AN/SPY-1 is an advanced, automatic detect and track, multifunctional phased-array radar. This high-powered (4 MW) radar is able to perform search, track and missile guidance functions simultaneously with a capability of over 100 targets.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 2-3, AN/SPY-1 section
AAVs were detected three separate times during the week
“They were detected three separate times during the week operating off the western coast of the United States and Mexico.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 3, AAV Detection section
A Senior Chief with 17 years Aegis experience assessed the AAV exhibited ballistic missile characteristics
“the AAV exhibited Ballistic Missile Characteristics in reference to its appearance, velocity, and indications on the radar. Since the radar was in the mode to handle Air Intercept of conventional aircraft it never obtained an accurate track”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 3, AAV Detection section
The AN/SPY-1 was in conventional aircraft intercept mode and dropped AAV contacts as false targets
“Since the radar was in the mode to handle Air Intercept of conventional aircraft it never obtained an accurate track of the AAVs and was quickly "dropped" by the radar meaning it was eliminated by the computer to reduce the amount of clutter on the radar, as any other false target is handled.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 3, AAV Detection section
If the AN/SPY-1 had been in ballistic missile tracking mode it likely could have tracked the AAV
“If the radar were set up in a mode for Ballistic Missile tracking they likely would have had the capability to track the AAV.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 3, AAV Detection section
USS Princeton was completing the Tailored Ships Training Availability during the detection period
“during the period of approximately 10-16 November 2004 while completing Tailored Ships Training Availability (TSTA) in preparation for their deployment to the Arabian Sea.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 3, AAV Detection section
The Fire Control Officer and his technician initially thought AAV contacts were part of the COMPTUX exercise
“The Fire Control Officer, {redacted} and his technician, FCSS {redacted} initially thought the contacts were part of the COMPTUX exercise.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 3, AAV Detection section
USS Nimitz was home to Carrier Air Wing 11 (CVW-11)
“The Nimitz was home to Carrier Air Wing 11 (CVW-11)”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 2
CVW-11 comprised VMFA-232, VFA-14, VFA-41, VFA-94, VAQ-135, VAW-117, HS-6, and VRC-30 Det 3
“CVW-11 comprised of VMFA-232 (USMC F/A-18C), VFA-14 (F/A-18E), VFA-41 (F/A-18F), VFA-94 (F/A-18C), VAQ-135 (EA-6B), VAW-117 (E-2C), HS-6 (H-60), and VRC-30 Det 3 (C-2A).”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 2
Only USS Princeton, VAW-117, VMFA-232, and VFA-41 participated in the AAV detection and intercept
“The only participants in the events surrounding the detection and intercept of the AAV are the USS Princeton, VAW-117, VMFA-232, and VFA-41.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 2
USS Princeton vectored two F/A-18Fs to intercept the AAV after again detecting it
“On 14 November after again detecting the AAV, the USS Princeton took the opportunity of having a flight of two F/A-18Fs returning from a training mission to further investigate the AAV.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 1, Executive Summary
USS Princeton took control of the F/A-18s from the E-2C for the duration of the contact and intercept
“the USS Princeton took control of the F/A-18s and the E-2C remained Airborne but was no longer involved in the contact or control. The fighters were being controlled by the USS Princeton for the duration of the contact and intercept.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 5, AAV Detection E-2C section
The intercept took place at approximately 31°20'N, 117°10'W, approximately 130 kilometres south of the US/Mexico border and 55 kilometres off the Baja Mexico Coast
“on 14 November 2004 at approximately N31 20' W117 10' about 70nm south of the U.S./Mexico Border 30 nm off the Baja Mexico Coast”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 5, F/A-18 Airborne Reconnaissance section
David Fravor held the rank of Commander and was Commanding Officer of VFA-41
“CDR Fravor, Commanding Officer VFA-41, was the pilot of FastEagle 01.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 7, F/A-18F Intercept section
Alex Dietrich held the rank of Lieutenant and piloted FASTEAGLE 02
“FASTEAGLE 02: Pilot: LT Alex 'Cardiac' Dietrich, USN/WSO: LCDR {redacted}, USN”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 7, F/A-18F Intercept section
Fravor's F/A-18F had an APG-73 radar in Range While Search mode at 150-kilometre scale
“Their F/A-18F had an APG-73 radar and was set to the following parameters: Range While Search (RWS), Range Gated High, 80NM scale”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 7-8, F/A-18F Intercept section
Fravor's aircraft was not carrying a FLIR pod
“The flight descended to between 20-24,000 feet and proceeded to the contact. CDR Fravor did not recall any indications via on-board sensor of the object. Their aircraft was not carrying a Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) pod onboard.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 7, F/A-18F Intercept section
Situational awareness was initially received via sporadic Link-16 tracks assumed to be from USS Princeton's AN/SPY-1
“Situational awareness to the object was initially received via sporadic Link-16 tracks (Link-16 is a time division multiple access data-link) via an off-board sensor. Lt {redacted} assumed that the sensor providing the information was the USS Princeton's SPY-1 radar.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 7, F/A-18F Intercept section
Fravor's first visual indication was a water disturbance he described as localised frothy waves and foam almost as if the water was boiling
“According to CDR Fravor the first indication he had of the unknown contact was a visual of a disturbance on the water below the AAV... he stated that it was localized underneath the object, did not appear as a trail or wake, and looked like frothy waves and foam almost as if the water was boiling.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 7, F/A-18F Intercept section
Fravor described the AAV as shaped like an elongated egg or Tic Tac, approximately 14 metres in length, with a midline horizontal axis and uniformly white
“According to CDR Fravor, the object's shape was like an elongated egg or a 'Tic Tac' and had a discernable midline horizontal axis. However, the object was uniformly white across the entire body. It was approximately 46 feet in length.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 8, F/A-18F Intercept section
The FASTEAGLE 01 WSO described the AAV as solid white, smooth, with no edges, and no nacelles, pylons, or wings
“LT {redacted} described it as "solid white, smooth, with no edges. It was uniformly colored with no nacelles, pylons, or wings." When asked to describe the appearance... he said, "neither, it looked like it had a white candy-coated shell, almost like a white board."”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 8, F/A-18F Intercept section
Fravor attempted a helmet lock using the Joint Helmet Mounted Cuing System but was unsuccessful
“CDR Fravor attempted a "helmet lock" that was unsuccessful. It is important to note that CDR Fravor was using the Joint Helmet Mounted Cuing System”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 7, F/A-18F Intercept section
The AAV was moving north, south, east, and west while maintaining consistent altitude; Fravor noted the displacements were minor
“The object was pointed in a north/south orientation and was moving both north & south and east & west, while maintaining a consistent altitude. These displacements, according to CDR Fravor, were minor.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 8, F/A-18F Intercept section
Fravor stated the AAV appeared to recognise them, realigned its axis toward their aircraft, and the water disturbance ceased
“the object appeared, according to CDR Fravor: "to recognize us." He assessed this from the fact the object "pointed" (realigned it's axis) in the direction of their aircraft. At this time, according to CDR Fravor, the disturbance on the water ceased.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 8, F/A-18F Intercept section
The AAV ascended quickly at supersonic speed; USS Princeton then reported it at the flight's CAP point
“the object ascended quickly and pulled lift vector on and aft of them at a supersonic speed... Poison initially reported that the "picture was clean" (no contact) but then stated "you're not going to believe this, its at your CAP" meaning that the AAV had flown to their training CAP... and had climbed to approximately 24,000 feet.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 8, F/A-18F Intercept section
All aircraft systems were fully functional throughout the engagement with no malfunctions or communication interference
“all aircraft systems were functional. That there were no mission computer issues or avionics issues and that there was no radio or communication interference and that they had entry into the Link-16 network.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 9, F/A-18F Intercept section
Chad Underwood's crew spoke with FASTEAGLE flight in the paraloft and were briefed on what the earlier flight had seen
“The crews spoke with each other in the paraloft, discussed the object and that the flights were scheduled for the same working area. FASTEAGLE flight told LT Underwood's flight what they saw and to try to see and record what they could.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 9, F/A-18F FLIR Tracking section
Underwood's F/A-18F carried an ATFLIR Pod with FLIR in Lock and Slaved mode and APG-73 in Range While Search at 150-kilometre scale
“The radar was in a standard search mode (RWS/ 80NM/ 4bar/ intr) and the FLIR was in L+S slave (the FLIR would point in direction of an L+S track).”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 9, F/A-18F FLIR Tracking section
Initial radar tracks placed the AAV approximately 55 to 75 kilometres south of Underwood's aircraft
“According to the radar display, the initial tracks were at approximately 30-40 nm to the south of the aircraft.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 9, F/A-18F FLIR Tracking section
Underwood attempted multiple times to achieve APG-73 Single Target Track lock; the radar could not lock with no jamming cues
“LT Underwood was controlling the radar and FLIR and attempted multiple times to transition the radar to Single Target Track (STT) mode on the object. The radar could not take a lock... When asked, LT Underwood stated that there were no jamming cues (strobe, champagne bubbles, "any normal EA indications"). It "just appeared as if the radar couldn't hack it."”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 9-10, F/A-18F FLIR Tracking section
The AAV appeared stationary on the FLIR with no discernible movement other than closure from the aircraft's own movement
“The object, according to the FLIR, appeared stationary (Figure 3). There was no discernable movement from the object with the only closure being a result of the aircraft's movement.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 10, F/A-18F FLIR Tracking section
Underwood could not confirm the FLIR object was the same as that described by Fravor's flight; he never had a visual
“LT Underwood was clear in that he couldn't confirm that it was the same object as described by FASTEAGLE flight. He never had visual, only seeing the object via the FLIR.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 11, F/A-18F FLIR Tracking section
Underwood refused to surrender his tapes to CVIC; copies were made and a set turned in to intelligence
“LT Underwood said that the CIVC section attempted to collect his tapes but he refused. They proceeded to their ready room where they debriefed with CDR Fravor and his flight. Copies of the tapes were made with a set being turned into the intelligence section.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 11, F/A-18F FLIR Tracking section
The key assessment was that the AAV was no known aircraft in the inventory of the US or any foreign nation
“The Anomalous Aerial Vehicle (AAV) was no known aircraft or air vehicle currently in the inventory of the United States or any foreign nation.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 2, Key Assessments
The AAV exhibited advanced low observable characteristics at multiple radar bands rendering US radar engagement capabilities ineffective
“The AAV exhibited advanced low observable characteristics at multiple radar bands rendering US radar based engagement capabilities ineffective.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 2, Key Assessments
The AAV exhibited advanced aerodynamic performance with no visible control surfaces and no visible means to generate lift
“The AAV exhibited advanced aerodynamic performance with no visible control surfaces and no visible means to generate lift.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 2, Key Assessments
The AAV remained stationary then transitioned to velocities far greater than any known aerial vehicle with little to no visible signature
“The AAV exhibited advanced propulsion capability by demonstrating the ability to remain stationary with little to no variation in altitude transitioning to horizontal and/or vertical velocities far greater than any known aerial vehicle with little to no visible signature.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 2, Key Assessments
The AAV possibly demonstrated the ability to cloak or become invisible to the human eye
“The AAV possibly demonstrated the ability to 'cloak' or become invisible to the human eye or human observation.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 2, Key Assessments
The AAV possibly demonstrated a highly advanced capability to operate undersea completely undetectable by US sensors
“The AAV possibly demonstrated a highly advanced capability to operate undersea completely undetectable by our most advanced sensors.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 2, Key Assessments
A submarine officer and the former commander of USS Louisville both confirmed no unidentified sonar contacts during operations off California
“According to former LT {redacted} now a civilian working for the US Navy, who was a qualified Submarine Officer onboard the Louisville in November 2004 during the AAV activity there were no unidentified sonar contacts in the vicinity of the aerial sightings or at anytime during the operations off the coast of California.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 12, USS Louisville section
Based on the absence of sonar contacts it was assessed as highly unlikely that an AAV operated below the ocean surface
“Based on the lack of detection of any unidentified sonar contacts it is highly unlikely that an AAV operated below the surface of the ocean”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 12, USS Louisville section
The AAV did not take any offensive action against the carrier strike group
“The AAV did not take any offensive action against the CSG”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 1, Executive Summary
The CSG-11 Director of Operations stated at no time did they consider the AAV a threat to the battle group
“He also stated that at no time did they consider the AAV a threat to the battle group.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 13, Commander Carrier Strike Group 11 section
Fravor debriefed with the Carrier Air Wing Intelligence Officer at CVIC after the intercept
“On 14 November following the intercept of the AAV, CDR Fravor reported to CVIC to debrief with Intelligence. He discussed the entire mission and AAV contact with LCDR {redacted} the Carrier Air Wing Intelligence Officer.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 12-13, Leadership and Reporting section
The Carrier Air Wing Intelligence Officer sent an email-based MISREP including the FLIR video to 3rd Fleet Intelligence via secure system
“LCDR {redacted} completed an email based MISREP. It was submitted via email because the F/A-18s were on a training mission. The email-based report including the FLIR video was sent via a secure system to CAPT {redacted} at 3rd Fleet Intelligence, their higher echelon command.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 13, Leadership and Reporting section
The MISREP was received and acknowledged by 3rd Fleet Intelligence but not forwarded further up the chain of command
“CAPT {redacted} confirmed that the MISREP was received via email on or about 14 November 2004. Since this MISREP was completed during training and preparation for deployment it was read and acknowledged by 3rd Fleet N2 but was not forwarded to anyone up the chain of command.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 13, 3rd Fleet Intelligence section
Rear Admiral D.C. Curtis commanded CSG-11 during the AAV intercept in November 2004
“The commander of the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group during the intercept was Rear Admiral D.C. Curtis”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 13, Commander Carrier Strike Group 11 section
Peter Daly assumed command of CSG-11 in January 2005 with no knowledge of or involvement in the incident
“Admiral Peter Daly assumed command of the CSG in January 2005 after the intercept and had no knowledge or involvement in this incident.”
Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report
page 13, Commander Carrier Strike Group 11 section