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Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report

A US Navy investigative report documenting the November 2004 detection, intercept, and reporting chain of Anomalous Aerial Vehicles encountered by the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group off the coast of California and Mexico.

Pdf · U.S. Navy · 2004-11-14

The Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report is a US Navy investigative account of the detection, intercept, and subsequent internal handling of Anomalous Aerial Vehicles (AAVs) encountered by Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) during pre-deployment training off the western coast of the United States. According to the report, the strike group operated in this area from approximately 2004-11-10 to 2004-11-16 in preparation for deployment to the Arabian Sea,1 with the events themselves taking place during November and December 2004 in the USA, California, SOCAL Operating Area off the coast of California and Baja California Mexico.2 The strike group comprised USS Nimitz (CVN-68), USS Princeton (CG-59), USS Chafee (DDG-90), USS Higgins (DDG-76), and USS Louisville (SSN-724).3 Nimitz was home to Carrier Air Wing 11 (CVW-11),4 which included Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 232 (VMFA-232), Strike Fighter Squadron 14 (VFA-14), Strike Fighter Squadron 41 (VFA-41), Strike Fighter Squadron 94 (VFA-94), Electronic Attack Squadron 135 (VAQ-135), Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron 117 (VAW-117), Helicopter Antisubmarine Squadron 6 (HS-6), and Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 30 Detachment 3 (VRC-30 Det 3).5 The report states that the only participants in the detection and intercept events were Princeton, VAW-117, VMFA-232, and VFA-41.6 Princeton, a Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser7 and the first of its class to carry the upgraded AN/SPY-1 radar,8 was completing a Tailored Ships Training Availability (TSTA) during this period as part of the deployment work-up.9

According to the report, Princeton detected multiple AAVs operating in and around the strike group’s vicinity on several occasions.2 A Senior Chief aboard Princeton described the AAVs descending from very high altitude into the AN/SPY-1 scan volume at high velocity,10 with the top of that scan volume placing the vehicles higher than approximately 18,000 metres.11 One AAV was reported to descend from around 18,000 metres to around 15 metres in a matter of seconds,3 hovering on radar for a short time before departing at high velocities and turn rates.4 The report states the SPY-1 radar was set to an Air Intercept mode configured for conventional aircraft, and as a result never obtained an accurate track of the AAVs, repeatedly dropping the contacts as clutter.12 Princeton’s Tactical Air Officer reportedly could not identify the contact and was perplexed by its speed and altitude.13 The AAV was detected by Princeton on three separate occasions during the week.14

On 2004-11-14, after again detecting an AAV, Princeton tasked two airborne F/A-18Fs for reconnaissance.15 According to the report, the E-2C Hawkeye Air Control Officer did not see the AAV on his own radar until Princeton directed the contact,16 and Princeton initially reported the target at approximately 4,600 to 6,100 metres mean sea level17 before taking control of the F/A-18s directly, after which the E-2C remained airborne but uninvolved in the contact.18 David Fravor, Commanding Officer of VFA-41, piloted the lead aircraft of the flight known as FastEagle 01,19 with Alex Dietrich piloting FastEagle 02.20 Fravor’s flight, reporting two captive training AIM-9M missiles as their only ordnance,21 was vectored by Princeton (callsign “Poison”) toward an unknown contact.22 Fravor’s crew first gained situational awareness via sporadic Link-16 tracks from an off-board sensor,23 and his F/A-18F was not carrying a forward-looking infrared (FLIR) pod during the intercept.24 Fravor’s first indication of the contact was a visual disturbance on the water below the object, after which he gained visual on the object itself,25 which he described as localised beneath the object rather than a trail or wake, resembling frothy waves and foam as if the water were boiling.26 Fravor detached Dietrich’s aircraft to hold at approximately 6,100 metres while his own F/A-18F descended to between approximately 3,700 and 4,900 metres,27 and he attempted an unsuccessful “helmet lock” using the Joint Helmet Mounted Cuing System, which cues aircraft sensors to a pilot’s line of sight and carries a recording capability28 that Fravor said was rarely used, so he did not think to activate it.29 Fravor said the object was “holding like a Harrier,” referencing the AV-8B Harrier’s hover and vertical/short takeoff and landing capability,30 and described its shape as an elongated egg or “Tic Tac” with a discernable midline horizontal axis,31 uniformly white across its entire body.32 Beginning a descent from about 3,000 metres and approximately 650 kilometres per hour with the intention of a close aboard pass to visually identify the object,33 Fravor assessed that the AAV appeared to recognise his aircraft, realigning its axis to point toward him.34 As his flight completed the manoeuvre, the object ascended quickly and pulled a lift vector on and aft of them at supersonic speed.35 Princeton subsequently reported that the AAV had flown to Fravor’s flight’s combat air patrol station, having climbed to approximately 7,300 metres,36 but the flight found nothing on the surface or subsurface, with no indication of the earlier water disturbance.37 A fellow F/A-18F pilot on the mission said all aircraft systems were functional throughout, with no interference and entry into the Link-16 network.38

Separately, the Commanding Officer of VMFA-232, flying an unarmed single-seat F/A-18C on a Functional Check Flight,39 recalled being asked 30 minutes into his flight to investigate an unidentified contact, an unusual request,40 and being asked whether he had ordnance onboard, which he found odd.41 He gained radar contact of what he believed to be two F/A-18Fs approaching the AAV from the west at low altitude,42 and as he descended through approximately 4,600 metres about 28 kilometres from the contact, he observed a water disturbance approximately 50 to 100 metres in diameter and close to round.43 He never saw any object or vessel associated with the disturbance,44 nor did he make visual contact with the other fighters or the AAV itself.45 He recovered aboard Nimitz around 1200 local time46 and was later asked at the Carrier Intelligence Center (CVIC) whether he had seen the “supersonic Tic Tac."47

Fravor’s flight met with Chad Underwood’s flight in the paraloft aboard Nimitz and passed on what they had seen.48 Underwood, the Weapon System Operator of VFA-41’s second F/A-18F section airborne that day,49 was asked by Fravor’s crew to try to see and record what they could.50 Underwood said it was a clear day with no clouds and a discernible blue horizon during his flight’s FLIR tracking of the object,51 which occurred at approximately 15:00 local time,52 with initial radar tracks appearing approximately 55-74 kilometres to the south.53 He attempted multiple times to transition the radar to Single Target Track mode, but it could not obtain a lock,54 and he said there were no jamming cues or other normal electronic-attack indications present.55 Underwood estimated the object to be co-altitude with his aircraft or a few thousand feet below, between approximately 4,600 and 6,100 metres.56 The object appeared stationary on the FLIR display, with no discernible movement beyond closure from his own aircraft’s motion,57 and it was reported as solid white, smooth, with no edges, uniformly coloured with no nacelles, pylons, or wings.58 As Underwood watched, the object moved out of the FLIR field of view; he made no attempt to slew the sensor and lost situational awareness of it.59 He later said he could not confirm the object he tracked on FLIR was the same one described by Fravor’s flight, since he never had visual contact himself.60 Back aboard Nimitz, Underwood said CVIC personnel attempted to collect his tapes but he refused,61 though copies were made and a set turned into the intelligence section.62 He was not asked to sign any non-disclosure agreement and remained uncertain how far up the chain of command the reporting went.63

The report also addresses possible conventional explanations. A former submarine officer aboard USS Louisville said there were no unidentified sonar contacts in the vicinity of the aerial sightings,64 and on this basis the report assessed it highly unlikely that the AAV operated below the ocean surface, while noting it remained possible the AAV was “cloaked” or invisible to the human eye given pilot reports of water disturbance with no visible craft.65 Within the reporting chain, the Carrier Air Wing Intelligence Officer said that he and his colleagues initially did not take Fravor’s report seriously, but had no reason to question it given that it came from an experienced and well-respected squadron commanding officer.66 The report was passed to the Commander of CVW-11, a highly experienced aviator who also did not take it very seriously.67 An email-based mission report, including the FLIR video, was subsequently sent via secure system to Third Fleet Intelligence (N2),68 where the deputy N2 said it was read and acknowledged but not forwarded further up the chain of command.69 The strike group was commanded at the time by Rear Admiral D.C. Curtis, later a Vice Admiral commanding Naval Surface Forces,70 and the group’s Director of Operations (N3) confirmed that, aside from the mission report, no other official report or statement was produced by the CSG regarding the encounter.71 The events described form part of the broader 2004 USS Nimitz UAP encounter, and are separately documented in relation to the Anomalous Aerial Vehicle (AAV) more generally, alongside supporting systems such as the E-2C Hawkeye, AN/APS-145 Airborne Surveillance Radar, and United States Navy reporting procedures referenced throughout the report.

  1. CSG-11 operated off the western US coast from 2004-11-10 to 2004-11-16 preparing for deployment to the Arabian Sea
    “During the period of approximately 10-16 November 2004, the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG) was operating off the western coast of the United States in preparation for their deployment to the Arabian Sea.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:45-247
  2. USS Princeton detected multiple AAVs in and around the CSG on several occasions
    “The USS Princeton on several occasions detected multiple Anomalous Aerial Vehicles (AAVs) operating in and around the vicinity of the CSG.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:252-386
  3. an AAV descended rapidly from around 18,000 metres to around 15 metres in seconds
    “The AAVs would descend "very rapidly" from approximately 60,000 feet down to approximately 50 feet in a matter of seconds.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:391-505
  4. AAVs would hover on radar before departing at high velocities and turn rates
    “They would then hover or stay stationary on the radar for a short time and depart at high velocities and turn rates.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:514-624
  5. on 2004-11-14 Princeton used a returning flight of two F/A-18Fs to investigate the AAV
    “On 14 November after again detecting the AAV, the USS Princeton took the opportunity of having a flight of two F/A-18Fs returning from a training mission to further investigate the AAV.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:631-812
  6. Princeton took control from the E-2C Hawkeye and vectored the F/A-18Fs to visual contact about 1.6km from the AAV
    “The USS Princeton took over control of the F/A-18s from the E-2C Airborne Early Warning aircraft and vectored in the F/A-18s for intercept leading to visual contact approximately one mile away from the AAV”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:817-1019
  7. the AAV was reported as an elongated egg or 'Tic Tac' shape with a discernable midline horizontal axis
    “which was reported to be "an elongated egg or a 'Tic Tac' shape with a discernable midline horizontal axis"”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:1024-1126
  8. the AAV was solid white, smooth, and had no edges
    “It was "solid white, smooth, with no edges.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:1133-1170
  9. the AAV was approximately 14 metres in length
    “It was approximately 46 feet in length.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:1177-1209
  10. the F/A-18Fs' radar could not lock on but FLIR could track it while stationary or slow
    “The F/A-18Fs radar could not obtain a 'lock' on the AAV; however it could be tracked while stationary and at slower speeds with the Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR).”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:1217-1375
  11. the AAV took evasive action on intercept, showing advanced acceleration, aerodynamic and propulsion capability
    “The AAV did take evasive actions upon intercept by the F/A-18 demonstrating an advanced acceleration (G), aerodynamic, and propulsion capability.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:1382-1516
  12. the AAV was assessed as no known aircraft or air vehicle in any nation's inventory
    “The Anomalous Aerial Vehicle (AAV) was no known aircraft or air vehicle currently in the inventory of the United States or any foreign nation.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:1837-1972
  13. events took place during CSG-11 deployment preparation in November-December 2004 in the SOCAL Operating Area off California and Mexico
    “The following events took place during deployment preparation of the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG) during the months of November and December 2004 in the SOCAL Operating Area off the coast of California and Mexico.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:2839-3050
  14. CSG-11 comprised USS Nimitz, USS Princeton, USS Chafee, USS Higgins, and USS Louisville
    “The CSG was comprised of the following ships and submarine: USS Nimitz (CVN-68), USS Princeton (CG-59), USS Chafee (DDG-90), USS Higgins (DDG-76), and the USS Louisville (SSN-724).”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:3058-3233
  15. USS Nimitz was home to Carrier Air Wing 11
    “The Nimitz was home to Carrier Air Wing 11 (CVW-11)”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:3239-3287
  16. CVW-11 comprised VMFA-232, VFA-14, VFA-41, VFA-94, VAQ-135, VAW-117, HS-6, and VRC-30 Det 3
    “comprised of VMFA-232 (USMC F/A-18C), VFA-14 (F/A-18E), VFA-41 (F/A-18F), VFA-94 (F/A-18C), VAQ-135 (EA-6B), VAW-117 (E-2C), HS-6 (H-60), and VRC-30 Det 3 (C-2A).”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:3291-3449
  17. the only participants in the detection and intercept events were Princeton, VAW-117, VMFA-232, and VFA-41
    “The only participants in the events surrounding the detection and intercept of the AAV are the USS Princeton, VAW-117, VMFA-232, and VFA-41.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:3454-3591
  18. USS Princeton is a Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser
    “USS Princeton (CG-59) is a Ticonderoga-class cruiser guided-missile cruiser serving in the United States Navy.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:3622-3727
  19. Princeton was the first Ticonderoga-class cruiser to carry the upgraded AN/SPY-1B radar
    “The Princeton was the first Ticonderoga-class cruiser to carry the upgraded AN/SPY-1B radar system.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:3975-4067
  20. Princeton was completing TSTA in preparation for deployment during 2004-11-10 to 2004-11-16
    “The USS Princeton was part of the Nimitz Carrier Battle Group, during the period of approximately 10-16 November 2004 while completing Tailored Ships Training Availability (TSTA) in preparation for their deployment to the Arabian Sea.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:5676-5906
  21. a Senior Chief aboard Princeton said the AAVs descended from very high altitude into the SPY-1 scan volume at high velocity
    “According to Senior Chief {{redacted: ~1 word}} the AAVs would descend from a very high altitude into the scan volume of the AN/SPY-1 at a high velocity.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:6336-6480
  22. the top of the AN/SPY-1 scan volume would put the AAVs higher than approximately 18,000 metres
    “The top of the scan volume would put the AAVs at higher than 60,000 feet.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:6490-6558
  23. the Princeton SPY-1 radar was set to a conventional Air Intercept mode and dropped the AAV contacts as clutter
    “Since the radar was in the mode to handle Air Intercept of conventional aircraft it never obtained an accurate track of the AAVs and was quickly "dropped" by the radar meaning it was eliminated by the computer to reduce the amount of clutter on the radar, as any other false target is handled.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:7079-7364
  24. the AAV was detected by Princeton three separate times during the week
    “They were detected three separate times during the week operating off the western coast of the United States and Mexico.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:7499-7612
  25. Princeton's Tactical Air Officer could not identify the contact and was perplexed by its speed and altitude
    “The Tactical Air Officer onboard the Princeton could not identify the radar contact and given the high speed and altitude was perplexed.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:7620-7746
  26. on 2004-11-14 Princeton tasked two airborne F/A-18s for reconnaissance of the AAV
    “On 14 November 2004, after again detecting an AAV took the opportunity of two F/A-18s airborne in the vicinity to task them for airborne reconnaissance of the AAV.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:7944-8103
  27. there was no recording of the encounter because it is not routine for the E-2C to record unless pre-coordinated
    “Unfortunately in the E-2C, it is not routine to have any kind of recording engaged unless it is pre coordinated which is typically only used during airborne testing of new capabilities, etc... There was no recording of this event.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:10579-10803
  28. the E-2C's Air Control Officer did not see the AAV until Princeton directed the contact
    “He did not see the object on his radar (raw video) until the USS Princeton directed the contact and gave the E-2 the general direction to steer its radar.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:11068-11216
  29. Princeton initially reported the AAV target at approximately 4,600 to 6,100 metres mean sea level
    “This was even more interesting because the USS Princeton initially reported the target to be at 15,000 - 20,000 feet MSL.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:11531-11648
  30. Princeton took control of the F/A-18s from the E-2C, which remained airborne but uninvolved
    “Although initially requested by the USS Princeton to attempt a track of the object, the USS Princeton took control of the F/A-18s and the E-2C remained Airborne but was no longer involved in the contact or control.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:11734-11940
  31. VFA-41 pilots and WSOs obtained visual and sensor contact on 2004-11-14 about 130km south of the US/Mexico border and 56km off the Baja coast
    “This section provides the debrief of the F/A-18 pilots and weapon system operators (WSOs) from VFA-41 that were able to get both a visual and sensor contact with the AAV on 14 November 2004 at approximately N31 20' W117 10' about 70nm south of the U.S./Mexico Border 30 nm off the Baja Mexico Coast (Figure 1).”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:12429-12736
  32. the VMFA-232 commanding officer also provided a statement regarding the encounter
    “Additionally the statement provided by the Commanding Officer (CO) of VMFA-232.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:12740-12815
  33. the VMFA-232 CO launched from Nimitz around 1030 local time in a single-seat F/A-18C for a Functional Check Flight
    “Lt. Col {{redacted: ~1 word}} Commanding Officer VMFA-232, was flying a single-seat F/A-18C that launched from the USS Nimitz at approximately 1030L to conduct a Functional Check Flight of an aircraft that had recently completed significant maintenance.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:13202-13443
  34. the VMFA-232 CO recalled blue skies, no clouds, and unlimited visibility
    “He noted the weather that day was blue skies, no clouds, and unlimited visibility.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:13456-13527
  35. 30 minutes into his flight the VMFA-232 CO was asked to investigate an unidentified contact, an unusual request
    “After 30 minutes into his flight he received a radio call from his air controller asking him to investigate an unidentified airborne contact. This was not a standard request.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:13539-13705
  36. the controller asked if he had ordnance onboard, which the pilot found odd
    “Additionally the controller asked if he had ordnance onboard, which was odd since no controller had ever asked that question during a situation of identifying an unknown contact over U.S. or International territory.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:13714-13919
  37. he had no ordnance onboard his F/A-18C
    “He responded that he had no ordnance onboard.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:13930-13967
  38. while en route he gained radar contact of what he believed were two F/A-18Fs approaching the AAV from the west at low altitude
    “While enroute at approximately 250 knots indicated/400 knots groundspeed at medium altitude (15-25,000 feet), he gained radar contact of what he believed to be two F/A-18Fs that were approaching the AAV from the west at low altitude (500-5,000 feet).”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:14101-14345
  39. as he approached about 28km from the AAV descending through about 4,600 metres, he saw a water disturbance
    “As he approached approximately 15nm from the AAV descending through approximately 15,000 feet, he could see a water disturbance in the ocean surface.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:14524-14665
  40. the water disturbance appeared approximately 50 to 100 metres in diameter and close to round
    “The disturbance appeared to be 50 to 100 meters in diameter and close to round.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:14937-15010
  41. he never saw any object or vessel associated with the water disturbance
    “He did not see any object or vessel associated with the disturbance either above the surface, on the surface, or below the surface.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:15499-15622
  42. he never made visual contact with the other fighters or the AAV itself
    “He also never made visual contact with the other fighter aircraft that were vectored to the location or the AAV.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:15631-15739
  43. he recovered aboard Nimitz at approximately 1200 local time
    “Lt Col {{redacted: ~1 word}} recovered aboard the Nimitz at approximately 1200L.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:15870-15944
  44. he reported to CVIC and was asked by his Intelligence Officer whether he had seen the 'supersonic Tic Tac'
    “He reported to the Carrier Intelligence Center (CVIC) and was asked by his Intelligence Officer, 1stLt {{redacted: ~2 words}} if he saw the "supersonic Tic Tac"?”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:15951-16107
  45. David Fravor was the pilot of FastEagle 01, one of two VFA-41 F/A-18Fs involved in the intercept
    “FASTEAGLE 01 Pilot: CDR David 'Sex' Fravor, USN/WSO: LT {{redacted: ~3 words}}, USN”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:16388-16470
  46. Alex Dietrich was the pilot of FastEagle 02
    “FASTEAGLE 02 Pilot: LT Alex 'Cardiac' Dietrich, USN/WSO: LCDR {{redacted: ~2 words}}, USN”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:16476-16564
  47. Fravor was Commanding Officer of VFA-41 and piloted the lead F/A-18F of FastEagle 01
    “CDR Fravor, Commanding Officer VFA-41, was the pilot of FastEagle 01.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:16569-16635
  48. after training, the E-2C controller handed Fravor's flight to Princeton ('Poison'), which vectored them via BRAA to an unknown contact
    “After they completed their training the E-2C controller handed them off to the USS Princeton callsign 'Poison' where they received vectors via Bearing Range Altitude Aspect (BRAA) to an unknown contact flying into the working area from the south.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:16964-17204
  49. Princeton asked what ordnance they had; they reported two captive training AIM-9M missiles
    “Poison asked what ordnance they had on board. LT {{redacted: ~1 word}} told Poison control that they had two captive training AIM-9Ms (CATM-9) and no other ordnance.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:17211-17367
  50. Fravor's F/A-18F was not carrying a FLIR pod during the intercept
    “Their aircraft was not carrying a Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) pod onboard.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:17532-17602
  51. Fravor's crew received initial situational awareness of the AAV via sporadic Link-16 tracks from an off-board sensor
    “Situational awareness to the object was initially received via sporadic Link-16 tracks (Link-16 is a time division multiple access data-link) via an off-board sensor.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:17948-18107
  52. Fravor's first indication was a visual of a disturbance on the water below the AAV, then he gained visual on the object itself
    “According to CDR Fravor the first indication he had of the unknown contact was a visual of a disturbance on the water below the AAV. As he scanned the area he gained a visual on the object.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:18227-18409
  53. Fravor described the water disturbance as localised beneath the object, not a trail or wake, like frothy waves and foam as if the water was boiling
    “when asked to describe the disturbance on the water he stated that it was localized underneath the object, did not appear as a trail or wake, and looked like frothy waves and foam almost as if the water was boiling.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:18446-18653
  54. Fravor detached Dietrich's F/A-18F, which held at about 6,100 metres, while his own descended to between about 3,700 and 4,900 metres
    “At this point CDR Fravor detached FASTEAGLE02, which held at approximately 20,000 feet, and FASTEAGLE01 descended to between 12-16,000 feet.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:18663-18798
  55. Fravor attempted an unsuccessful 'helmet lock' on the AAV
    “CDR Fravor attempted a "helmet lock" that was unsuccessful.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:18804-18850
  56. Fravor was using the Joint Helmet Mounted Cuing System, which cues sensors to what the pilot looks at and has a recording capability
    “It is important to note that CDR Fravor was using the Joint Helmet Mounted Cuing System which will cue the aircraft sensors such as the radar to 'lock on' to what the pilot is looking at and it also has a recording capability.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:18864-19079
  57. Fravor said the recording capability was rarely used, so he did not think to use it
    “CDR Fravor stated that the helmet's recording capability was rarely used therefore he did not think to use it that day.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:19213-19352
  58. the AAV observed by Fravor was uniformly white across its entire body
    “However, the object was uniformly white across the entire body.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:19856-19914
  59. Fravor said the AAV was 'holding like a Harrier', referencing the AV-8B's hover and V/STOL capability
    “CDR Fravor stated that the object was "holding like a Harrier." (Referring to the AV-8B jet aircraft, which is capable of hovering and Vertical/Short Takeoff and Landing (V/STOL) via thrust vectoring.)”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:19522-19712
  60. Fravor began a descent intending a close aboard pass to visually identify the AAV, from about 3,000 metres and approximately 650km/h
    “They began the decent as they rolled in from about 10,000ft and approximately 350 knots to take the object close aboard.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:20759-20872
  61. Fravor assessed the AAV appeared to recognise his aircraft, realigning its axis toward him
    “the object appeared, according to CDR Fravor: "to recognize us." He assessed this from the fact the object "pointed" (realigned it's axis) in the direction of their aircraft.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:20975-21140
  62. as Fravor's flight completed their manoeuvre, the AAV ascended quickly and pulled a lift vector on and aft of them at supersonic speed
    “As they completed this maneuver, the object ascended quickly and pulled lift vector on and aft of them at a supersonic speed.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:21227-21346
  63. Princeton reported the AAV had flown to Fravor's flight's combat air patrol station, having climbed to approximately 7,300 metres
    “Poison initially reported that the "picture was clean" (no contact) but then stated "you're not going to believe this, its at your CAP" meaning that the AAV had flown to their training CAP, which was located in the southern end of the training area and had climbed to approximately 24,000 feet.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:21455-21744
  64. Fravor's flight found nothing on the surface or subsurface, with no indications of the previous water disturbance
    “CDR Fravor stated that nothing was seen on the surface or subsurface and that there were no indications of the previous disturbance.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:21857-21977
  65. an F/A-18F pilot who flew alongside Fravor said all aircraft systems were functional with no interference and entry into the Link-16 network
    “LT {{redacted: ~1 word}} when asked, said that all aircraft systems were functional. That there were no mission computer issues or avionics issues and that there was no radio or communication interference and that they had entry into the Link-16 network.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:22261-22531
  66. Fravor's flight met Chad Underwood's flight in the paraloft aboard Nimitz and passed on what they had seen
    “The flight met up with LT {{redacted: ~2 words}} and LT Chad Underwood's flight in the paraloft and passed what they had seen.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:22669-22790
  67. an F/A-18F pilot noted sailors in CVIC had donned tin-foil caps and wanted to know about the 'UFO flight'
    “LT {{redacted: ~1 word}} noted that the sailors in CIVC had donned tin-foil caps and wanted to know about the "UFO flight."”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:22826-22941
  68. Chad Underwood was a member of VFA-41 and the Weapon System Operator flying with another lieutenant
    “Lt Underwood was a member of VFA-41 and was the Weapons and Sensors Officer (WSO) flying with LT {{redacted: ~2 words}}.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:23293-23405
  69. Underwood's crew flew the second VFA-41 F/A-18F section airborne on 2004-11-14
    “They were a part of the second F/A-18F section airborne that day from VFA-41.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:23414-23488
  70. Fravor's crew told Underwood's crew what they had seen and asked them to try to see and record what they could
    “FASTEAGLE flight told LT Underwood's flight what they saw and to try to see and record what they could.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:23679-23776
  71. Underwood said it was a clear day with no clouds and a discernible blue horizon during his FLIR tracking
    “According to LT Underwood it was a clear day. There were no clouds and there was a discernable blue horizon.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:23956-24056
  72. Fravor described the AAV's shape as an elongated egg or 'Tic Tac' with a discernable midline horizontal axis
    “According to CDR Fravor, the object's shape was like an elongated egg or a 'Tic Tac' and had a discernable midline horizontal axis.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:19724-19850
  73. the FLIR tracking event occurred at approximately 15:00 local time
    “The time was approximately 1500L.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:24065-24092
  74. initial radar tracks of the object were approximately 55-74km to the south of the aircraft
    “Initial awareness of an object came via the radar. According to the radar display, the initial tracks were at approximately 30-40 nm to the south of the aircraft.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:24591-24744
  75. Underwood attempted multiple times to lock the radar in Single Target Track mode but it could not take a lock
    “LT Underwood was controlling the radar and FLIR and attempted multiple times to transition the radar to Single Target Track (STT) mode on the object. The radar could not take a lock, the b-sweep would raster around the hit, build an initial aspect vector (which never stabilized) and then would drop and continue normal RWS b-sweep.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:24754-25080
  76. Underwood said there were no jamming cues or normal electronic-attack indications on his radar
    “When asked, LT Underwood stated that there were no jamming cues (strobe, champagne bubbles, "any normal EA indications"). It "just appeared as if the radar couldn't hack it."”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:25087-25257
  77. Underwood estimated the AAV to be co-altitude or a few thousand feet below, between approximately 4,600 and 6,100 metres
    “According to LT Underwood, "the target was best guess co-altitude or a few thousand feet below," estimating the object to be between 15-20 thousand feet.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:25528-25702
  78. the AAV appeared stationary on the FLIR display, with no discernible movement other than closure from the aircraft's own movement
    “The object, according to the FLIR, appeared stationary (Figure 3). There was no discernable movement from the object with the only closure being a result of the aircraft's movement.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:25708-25880
  79. as Underwood watched, the object moved out of the FLIR field of view and he made no attempt to slew the FLIR, losing situational awareness
    “As LT Underwood watched the object it began to move out of FLIR field of view to the left. LT Underwood made no attempt to slew the FLIR and subsequently lost situational awareness to the object.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:25890-26078
  80. the AAV appeared solid white, smooth, with no edges, uniformly coloured with no nacelles, pylons, or wings
    “solid white, smooth, with no edges. It was uniformly colored with no nacelles, pylons, or wings.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:20002-20092
  81. Underwood could not confirm the object he tracked on FLIR was the same object David Fravor's flight described, as he never had visual contact
    “LT Underwood was clear in that he couldn't confirm that it was the same object as described by FASTEAGLE flight. He never had visual, only seeing the object via the FLIR.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:26420-26585
  82. Underwood said CVIC personnel attempted to collect his tapes but he refused
    “LT Underwood said that the CIVC section attempted to collect his tapes but he refused.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:26800-26878
  83. copies were made of the FLIR tapes, with a set turned into the intelligence section
    “Copies of the tapes were made with a set being turned into the intelligence section.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:26975-27051
  84. Underwood was not asked to sign any non-disclosure agreement and is uncertain how far up the chain the reporting went
    “LT Underwood was not asked to sign any non-disclosure agreement and he is uncertain how far up the chain the reporting went past his commanding officer.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:27060-27204
  85. USS Louisville is a Los Angeles-class nuclear fast attack submarine
    “The USS Louisville USS Louisville (SSN-724) is a Los Angeles-class nuclear fast attack submarine.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:27418-27505
  86. a former Louisville submarine officer said there were no unidentified sonar contacts in the vicinity of the aerial sightings
    “According to former LT {{redacted: ~3 words}} now a civilian working for the US Navy, who was a qualified Submarine Officer onboard the Louisville in November 2004 during the AAV activity there were no unidentified sonar contacts in the vicinity of the aerial sightings or at anytime during the operations off the coast of California.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:27716-28039
  87. the report assessed it highly unlikely the AAV operated below the surface, based on the lack of unidentified sonar contacts, though possibly cloaked given water disturbance with no visible craft
    “Based on the lack of detection of any unidentified sonar contacts it is highly unlikely that an AAV operated below the surface of the ocean; it is possible that the AAV demonstrated the ability to be cloaked or invisible to the human eye based on pilot reporting of the water disturbance with no visible craft.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:28678-28982
  88. the Carrier Air Wing Intelligence Officer said he and colleagues initially did not take Fravor's report seriously, but had no reason to question it given his experience and standing
    “He also stated that they "didn't take it seriously" at first; however, they had absolutely no reason to question the report from a very experienced and well-respected F/A-18 squadron commanding officer.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:30013-30207
  89. the report was reported to the Commander of CVW-11, a highly experienced aviator who did not take it very seriously
    “He reported it to the Commander of the Air Wing, CAPT {{redacted: ~2 words}} also a highly experienced aviator but he did not take it very serious.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:30351-30490
  90. an email-based mission report was submitted, including the FLIR video, via secure system to Third Fleet Intelligence (N2)
    “The email-based report including the FLIR video was sent via a secure system to CAPT {{redacted: ~2 words}} at 3rd Fleet Intelligence, their higher echelon command.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:30634-30790
  91. the deputy N2 of Third Fleet Intelligence said the mission report was read and acknowledged but not forwarded up the chain of command
    “Since this MISREP was completed during training and preparation for deployment it was read and acknowledged by 3rd Fleet N2 but was not forwarded to anyone up the chain of command.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:31784-31956
  92. the commander of CSG-11 during the intercept was Rear Admiral D.C. Curtis, now a Vice Admiral commanding Naval Surface Forces
    “The commander of the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group during the intercept was Rear Admiral D.C. Curtis now a Vice Admiral (VADM) and is commander of Naval Surface Forces and the Pacific Fleet's Naval Surface Force.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:32278-32482
  93. the Director of Operations (N3) for CSG-11 confirmed there was no other official report or statement from the CSG besides the mission report
    “Capt {{redacted}} was the Director of Operations (N3) for CSG-11 at the time of the intercept. Capt {{redacted}} confirmed that other than the MISREP there was no other official report or statement from the CSG.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report char:32927-33134
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