Skip to content

Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report

An internal US Navy report documenting the detection and intercept of an Anomalous Aerial Vehicle by the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group in November 2004, compiled from sensor data and aircrew accounts.

Pdf · U.S. Navy · 2004-11-14

The Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report is an internal US Navy document recording the detection and intercept of an Anomalous Aerial Vehicle (AAV) by the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) during November 2004. The strike group — comprising USS Nimitz, USS Princeton, USS Chafee, USS Higgins, and USS Louisville1 — was operating in the SOCAL Operating Area off the Baja Mexico Coast during the period of approximately 2004-11-10 to 2004-11-16 in preparation for deployment to the Arabian Sea.2 The report draws on accounts from radar operators, aircrew, and intelligence personnel, and was compiled in connection with the broader 2004 Nimitz UAP Incident.

USS Princeton, a Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser and the first of its class to carry the upgraded AN/SPY-1B radar system,3 detected multiple AAVs operating in and around the vicinity of the carrier strike group on several occasions during this period.4 The AN/SPY-1 is a multifunctional phased-array radar with a power output of 4 megawatts capable of tracking over 100 targets, designed for long-range volume search, fire-control-quality tracking, and Ballistic Missile Defense.5 AAV contacts were detected on three separate occasions during the week.6 A Senior Chief aboard USS Princeton with 17 years of Aegis fire control experience assessed that the AAV exhibited ballistic missile characteristics in reference to its appearance, velocity, and radar indications.7 The AN/SPY-1 radar was operating in a mode configured for conventional aircraft intercept and never obtained an accurate track on the AAVs; they were dropped by the computer as false targets.8 The report notes that if the radar had been set in ballistic missile tracking mode, it likely would have had the capability to track the AAV.9 USS Princeton was completing the Tailored Ships Training Availability 2004 during the detection period.10 The Composite Training Unit Exercise (COMPTUX) Carrier Strike Group 11 (CSG-11) Training 2004 was also under way, and the USS Princeton Fire Control Officer and his technician initially believed the AAV contacts were part of that exercise.11

USS Nimitz was home to Carrier Air Wing 11 (CVW-11),12 which included Strike Fighter Squadron 41 (VFA-41) flying the F/A-18F, Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 232 (VMFA-232) flying the F/A-18C, Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron 117 (VAW-117) flying the E-2C Hawkeye, Electronic Attack Squadron 135 (VAQ-135), Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron 6 (HS-6), Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 30 (VRC-30) Det 3, Strike Fighter Squadron 14 (VFA-14), and Strike Fighter Squadron 94 (VFA-94).13 The report records that the only participants in the detection and intercept of the AAV were USS Princeton, VAW-117, VMFA-232, and VFA-41.14 During the Nimitz F/A-18F UAP Intercept, 2004-11-14, USS Princeton vectored two F/A-18Fs to intercept the AAV after again detecting it,15 taking control of the aircraft from the E-2C Hawkeye for the duration of the contact and intercept.16 The intercept took place at approximately 31°20’N, 117°10’W, approximately 130 kilometres south of the US/Mexico border and approximately 55 kilometres off the Baja Mexico Coast.17

Commander David Fravor, Commanding Officer of VFA-41, led the first intercept section as pilot of FASTEAGLE 01.18 Lieutenant Alex Dietrich piloted the second F/A-18F, FASTEAGLE 02.19 Fravor’s aircraft carried an APG-73 Radar in Range While Search mode at 150-kilometre scale20 and no forward-looking infrared (FLIR) pod;21 situational awareness to the AAV was initially received via sporadic Link-16 tracks from an off-board sensor the Weapons and Sensors Officer (WSO) assumed was USS Princeton’s AN/SPY-1.22 Fravor’s first visual indication was a Water Disturbance below the AAV, which he described as localised underneath the object, appearing as frothy waves and foam almost as if the water was boiling.23 He described the AAV as shaped like an elongated egg or ‘Tic Tac’, approximately 14 metres in length, with a discernible midline horizontal axis and uniformly white across the entire body.24 The FASTEAGLE 01 WSO described it as ‘solid white, smooth, with no edges’, with no nacelles, pylons, or wings.25 Fravor attempted a helmet lock using the Joint Helmet Mounted Cuing System but was unsuccessful.26 The AAV was observed moving north, south, east, and west while maintaining a consistent altitude, with Fravor noting that the displacements were minor.27 Fravor stated the AAV appeared to recognise them, realigned its axis toward their aircraft, and at that moment the water disturbance ceased,28 after which the AAV ascended quickly at supersonic speed; USS Princeton then reported it had appeared at the flight’s Combat Air Patrol (CAP) point.29 Both Fravor and his WSO confirmed all aircraft systems were fully functional throughout the engagement, with no system malfunctions, no avionics issues, and no radio or communication interference.30

A second VFA-41 section, in which Lieutenant Chad Underwood served as WSO, launched following FASTEAGLE and was briefed on what the earlier flight had seen.31 Underwood’s F/A-18F carried an ATFLIR Pod with the FLIR in Lock and Slaved mode and the APG-73 radar in Range While Search at 150-kilometre scale with 4-bar scan and interleave.32 Initial radar tracks placed the AAV approximately 55 to 75 kilometres to the south of Underwood’s aircraft.33 Multiple attempts to transition the APG-73 to Single Target Track mode failed, with no jamming cues detected; Underwood stated it simply appeared as if the radar could not achieve a lock.34 The AAV appeared stationary on the FLIR with no discernible movement other than closure resulting from the aircraft’s own movement.35 Underwood was explicit that he could not confirm the object tracked on FLIR was the same object described by Fravor’s flight, as he never had a visual and only observed the object via FLIR.36 The resulting footage was later released as the Anomalous Aerial Vehicle (AAV) Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) Recording 2004-11. After landing, Underwood refused to surrender his tapes to the Carrier Intelligence Center (CVIC), and copies were instead made with a set turned in to the intelligence section.37

The report’s key assessments state that the AAV was no known aircraft or air vehicle in the inventory of the United States or any foreign nation,38 that it exhibited advanced low observability characteristics at multiple radar bands rendering US radar-based engagement capabilities ineffective,39 and that it possessed advanced aerodynamic performance with no visible control surfaces and no visible means to generate lift.40 The AAV also exhibited advanced propulsion capability, remaining stationary then transitioning to velocities far greater than any known aerial vehicle with little to no visible signature.41 The report notes the AAV possibly demonstrated the ability to cloak or become invisible to the human eye42 and possibly the ability to operate undersea completely undetectable by US sensors,43 though the latter assessment is qualified by USS Louisville’s record: a qualified submarine officer and the former commander of USS Louisville both confirmed there were no unidentified sonar contacts at any time during operations off the coast of California,44 and based on that absence of detection the report assesses it as highly unlikely that an AAV operated below the ocean surface.45 The AAV did not take any offensive action against the carrier strike group,46 and the CSG-11 Director of Operations stated at no time did they consider the AAV a threat to the battle group.47 Following the intercept, David Fravor debriefed with the Carrier Air Wing Intelligence Officer at the Carrier Intelligence Center (CVIC) Debrief;48 the Carrier Air Wing Intelligence Officer completed an email-based Carrier Strike Group 11 (CSG-11) Anomalous Aerial Vehicle (AAV) Mission Report (MISREP) 2004-11 including the FLIR video and transmitted it via secure system to 3rd Fleet Intelligence,49 where it was received and acknowledged but not forwarded further up the chain of command.50 Rear Admiral D.C. Curtis commanded CSG-11 during the incident;51 Peter Daly assumed command of the strike group in 2005-01 with no knowledge of or involvement in the incident.52

  1. The strike group comprised USS Nimitz, USS Princeton, USS Chafee, USS Higgins, and USS Louisville
    “The CSG was comprised of the following ships and submarine: USS Nimitz (CVN-68), USS Princeton (CG-59), USS Chafee (DDG-90), USS Higgins (DDG-76), and the USS Louisville (SSN-724).”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 2
  2. The strike group was operating off the western US coast in preparation for deployment to the Arabian Sea
    “During the period of approximately 10-16 November 2004, the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG) was operating off the western coast of the United States in preparation for their deployment to the Arabian Sea.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 1, Executive Summary
  3. USS Princeton was the first Ticonderoga-class cruiser to carry the upgraded AN/SPY-1B radar
    “The Princeton was the first Ticonderoga-class cruiser to carry the upgraded AN/SPY-1B radar system.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 2, USS Princeton section
  4. USS Princeton detected multiple AAVs operating in and around the carrier strike group on several occasions
    “The USS Princeton on several occasions detected multiple Anomalous Aerial Vehicles (AAVs) operating in and around the vicinity of the CSG.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 1, Executive Summary
  5. The AN/SPY-1 is a 4-megawatt phased-array radar capable of tracking over 100 targets, designed for long-range search, fire control, and Ballistic Missile Defense
    “The AN/SPY-1 is an advanced, automatic detect and track, multifunctional phased-array radar. This high-powered (4 MW) radar is able to perform search, track and missile guidance functions simultaneously with a capability of over 100 targets.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 2-3, AN/SPY-1 section
  6. AAVs were detected three separate times during the week
    “They were detected three separate times during the week operating off the western coast of the United States and Mexico.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 3, AAV Detection section
  7. A Senior Chief with 17 years Aegis experience assessed the AAV exhibited ballistic missile characteristics
    “the AAV exhibited Ballistic Missile Characteristics in reference to its appearance, velocity, and indications on the radar. Since the radar was in the mode to handle Air Intercept of conventional aircraft it never obtained an accurate track”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 3, AAV Detection section
  8. The AN/SPY-1 was in conventional aircraft intercept mode and dropped AAV contacts as false targets
    “Since the radar was in the mode to handle Air Intercept of conventional aircraft it never obtained an accurate track of the AAVs and was quickly "dropped" by the radar meaning it was eliminated by the computer to reduce the amount of clutter on the radar, as any other false target is handled.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 3, AAV Detection section
  9. If the AN/SPY-1 had been in ballistic missile tracking mode it likely could have tracked the AAV
    “If the radar were set up in a mode for Ballistic Missile tracking they likely would have had the capability to track the AAV.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 3, AAV Detection section
  10. USS Princeton was completing the Tailored Ships Training Availability during the detection period
    “during the period of approximately 10-16 November 2004 while completing Tailored Ships Training Availability (TSTA) in preparation for their deployment to the Arabian Sea.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 3, AAV Detection section
  11. The Fire Control Officer and his technician initially thought AAV contacts were part of the COMPTUX exercise
    “The Fire Control Officer, {redacted} and his technician, FCSS {redacted} initially thought the contacts were part of the COMPTUX exercise.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 3, AAV Detection section
  12. USS Nimitz was home to Carrier Air Wing 11 (CVW-11)
    “The Nimitz was home to Carrier Air Wing 11 (CVW-11)”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 2
  13. CVW-11 comprised VMFA-232, VFA-14, VFA-41, VFA-94, VAQ-135, VAW-117, HS-6, and VRC-30 Det 3
    “CVW-11 comprised of VMFA-232 (USMC F/A-18C), VFA-14 (F/A-18E), VFA-41 (F/A-18F), VFA-94 (F/A-18C), VAQ-135 (EA-6B), VAW-117 (E-2C), HS-6 (H-60), and VRC-30 Det 3 (C-2A).”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 2
  14. Only USS Princeton, VAW-117, VMFA-232, and VFA-41 participated in the AAV detection and intercept
    “The only participants in the events surrounding the detection and intercept of the AAV are the USS Princeton, VAW-117, VMFA-232, and VFA-41.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 2
  15. USS Princeton vectored two F/A-18Fs to intercept the AAV after again detecting it
    “On 14 November after again detecting the AAV, the USS Princeton took the opportunity of having a flight of two F/A-18Fs returning from a training mission to further investigate the AAV.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 1, Executive Summary
  16. USS Princeton took control of the F/A-18s from the E-2C for the duration of the contact and intercept
    “the USS Princeton took control of the F/A-18s and the E-2C remained Airborne but was no longer involved in the contact or control. The fighters were being controlled by the USS Princeton for the duration of the contact and intercept.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 5, AAV Detection E-2C section
  17. The intercept took place at approximately 31°20'N, 117°10'W, approximately 130 kilometres south of the US/Mexico border and 55 kilometres off the Baja Mexico Coast
    “on 14 November 2004 at approximately N31 20' W117 10' about 70nm south of the U.S./Mexico Border 30 nm off the Baja Mexico Coast”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 5, F/A-18 Airborne Reconnaissance section
  18. David Fravor held the rank of Commander and was Commanding Officer of VFA-41
    “CDR Fravor, Commanding Officer VFA-41, was the pilot of FastEagle 01.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 7, F/A-18F Intercept section
  19. Alex Dietrich held the rank of Lieutenant and piloted FASTEAGLE 02
    “FASTEAGLE 02: Pilot: LT Alex 'Cardiac' Dietrich, USN/WSO: LCDR {redacted}, USN”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 7, F/A-18F Intercept section
  20. Fravor's F/A-18F had an APG-73 radar in Range While Search mode at 150-kilometre scale
    “Their F/A-18F had an APG-73 radar and was set to the following parameters: Range While Search (RWS), Range Gated High, 80NM scale”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 7-8, F/A-18F Intercept section
  21. Fravor's aircraft was not carrying a FLIR pod
    “The flight descended to between 20-24,000 feet and proceeded to the contact. CDR Fravor did not recall any indications via on-board sensor of the object. Their aircraft was not carrying a Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) pod onboard.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 7, F/A-18F Intercept section
  22. Situational awareness was initially received via sporadic Link-16 tracks assumed to be from USS Princeton's AN/SPY-1
    “Situational awareness to the object was initially received via sporadic Link-16 tracks (Link-16 is a time division multiple access data-link) via an off-board sensor. Lt {redacted} assumed that the sensor providing the information was the USS Princeton's SPY-1 radar.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 7, F/A-18F Intercept section
  23. Fravor's first visual indication was a water disturbance he described as localised frothy waves and foam almost as if the water was boiling
    “According to CDR Fravor the first indication he had of the unknown contact was a visual of a disturbance on the water below the AAV... he stated that it was localized underneath the object, did not appear as a trail or wake, and looked like frothy waves and foam almost as if the water was boiling.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 7, F/A-18F Intercept section
  24. Fravor described the AAV as shaped like an elongated egg or Tic Tac, approximately 14 metres in length, with a midline horizontal axis and uniformly white
    “According to CDR Fravor, the object's shape was like an elongated egg or a 'Tic Tac' and had a discernable midline horizontal axis. However, the object was uniformly white across the entire body. It was approximately 46 feet in length.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 8, F/A-18F Intercept section
  25. The FASTEAGLE 01 WSO described the AAV as solid white, smooth, with no edges, and no nacelles, pylons, or wings
    “LT {redacted} described it as "solid white, smooth, with no edges. It was uniformly colored with no nacelles, pylons, or wings." When asked to describe the appearance... he said, "neither, it looked like it had a white candy-coated shell, almost like a white board."”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 8, F/A-18F Intercept section
  26. Fravor attempted a helmet lock using the Joint Helmet Mounted Cuing System but was unsuccessful
    “CDR Fravor attempted a "helmet lock" that was unsuccessful. It is important to note that CDR Fravor was using the Joint Helmet Mounted Cuing System”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 7, F/A-18F Intercept section
  27. The AAV was moving north, south, east, and west while maintaining consistent altitude; Fravor noted the displacements were minor
    “The object was pointed in a north/south orientation and was moving both north & south and east & west, while maintaining a consistent altitude. These displacements, according to CDR Fravor, were minor.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 8, F/A-18F Intercept section
  28. Fravor stated the AAV appeared to recognise them, realigned its axis toward their aircraft, and the water disturbance ceased
    “the object appeared, according to CDR Fravor: "to recognize us." He assessed this from the fact the object "pointed" (realigned it's axis) in the direction of their aircraft. At this time, according to CDR Fravor, the disturbance on the water ceased.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 8, F/A-18F Intercept section
  29. The AAV ascended quickly at supersonic speed; USS Princeton then reported it at the flight's CAP point
    “the object ascended quickly and pulled lift vector on and aft of them at a supersonic speed... Poison initially reported that the "picture was clean" (no contact) but then stated "you're not going to believe this, its at your CAP" meaning that the AAV had flown to their training CAP... and had climbed to approximately 24,000 feet.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 8, F/A-18F Intercept section
  30. All aircraft systems were fully functional throughout the engagement with no malfunctions or communication interference
    “all aircraft systems were functional. That there were no mission computer issues or avionics issues and that there was no radio or communication interference and that they had entry into the Link-16 network.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 9, F/A-18F Intercept section
  31. Chad Underwood's crew spoke with FASTEAGLE flight in the paraloft and were briefed on what the earlier flight had seen
    “The crews spoke with each other in the paraloft, discussed the object and that the flights were scheduled for the same working area. FASTEAGLE flight told LT Underwood's flight what they saw and to try to see and record what they could.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 9, F/A-18F FLIR Tracking section
  32. Underwood's F/A-18F carried an ATFLIR Pod with FLIR in Lock and Slaved mode and APG-73 in Range While Search at 150-kilometre scale
    “The radar was in a standard search mode (RWS/ 80NM/ 4bar/ intr) and the FLIR was in L+S slave (the FLIR would point in direction of an L+S track).”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 9, F/A-18F FLIR Tracking section
  33. Initial radar tracks placed the AAV approximately 55 to 75 kilometres south of Underwood's aircraft
    “According to the radar display, the initial tracks were at approximately 30-40 nm to the south of the aircraft.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 9, F/A-18F FLIR Tracking section
  34. Underwood attempted multiple times to achieve APG-73 Single Target Track lock; the radar could not lock with no jamming cues
    “LT Underwood was controlling the radar and FLIR and attempted multiple times to transition the radar to Single Target Track (STT) mode on the object. The radar could not take a lock... When asked, LT Underwood stated that there were no jamming cues (strobe, champagne bubbles, "any normal EA indications"). It "just appeared as if the radar couldn't hack it."”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 9-10, F/A-18F FLIR Tracking section
  35. The AAV appeared stationary on the FLIR with no discernible movement other than closure from the aircraft's own movement
    “The object, according to the FLIR, appeared stationary (Figure 3). There was no discernable movement from the object with the only closure being a result of the aircraft's movement.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 10, F/A-18F FLIR Tracking section
  36. Underwood could not confirm the FLIR object was the same as that described by Fravor's flight; he never had a visual
    “LT Underwood was clear in that he couldn't confirm that it was the same object as described by FASTEAGLE flight. He never had visual, only seeing the object via the FLIR.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 11, F/A-18F FLIR Tracking section
  37. Underwood refused to surrender his tapes to CVIC; copies were made and a set turned in to intelligence
    “LT Underwood said that the CIVC section attempted to collect his tapes but he refused. They proceeded to their ready room where they debriefed with CDR Fravor and his flight. Copies of the tapes were made with a set being turned into the intelligence section.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 11, F/A-18F FLIR Tracking section
  38. The key assessment was that the AAV was no known aircraft in the inventory of the US or any foreign nation
    “The Anomalous Aerial Vehicle (AAV) was no known aircraft or air vehicle currently in the inventory of the United States or any foreign nation.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 2, Key Assessments
  39. The AAV exhibited advanced low observable characteristics at multiple radar bands rendering US radar engagement capabilities ineffective
    “The AAV exhibited advanced low observable characteristics at multiple radar bands rendering US radar based engagement capabilities ineffective.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 2, Key Assessments
  40. The AAV exhibited advanced aerodynamic performance with no visible control surfaces and no visible means to generate lift
    “The AAV exhibited advanced aerodynamic performance with no visible control surfaces and no visible means to generate lift.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 2, Key Assessments
  41. The AAV remained stationary then transitioned to velocities far greater than any known aerial vehicle with little to no visible signature
    “The AAV exhibited advanced propulsion capability by demonstrating the ability to remain stationary with little to no variation in altitude transitioning to horizontal and/or vertical velocities far greater than any known aerial vehicle with little to no visible signature.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 2, Key Assessments
  42. The AAV possibly demonstrated the ability to cloak or become invisible to the human eye
    “The AAV possibly demonstrated the ability to 'cloak' or become invisible to the human eye or human observation.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 2, Key Assessments
  43. The AAV possibly demonstrated a highly advanced capability to operate undersea completely undetectable by US sensors
    “The AAV possibly demonstrated a highly advanced capability to operate undersea completely undetectable by our most advanced sensors.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 2, Key Assessments
  44. A submarine officer and the former commander of USS Louisville both confirmed no unidentified sonar contacts during operations off California
    “According to former LT {redacted} now a civilian working for the US Navy, who was a qualified Submarine Officer onboard the Louisville in November 2004 during the AAV activity there were no unidentified sonar contacts in the vicinity of the aerial sightings or at anytime during the operations off the coast of California.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 12, USS Louisville section
  45. Based on the absence of sonar contacts it was assessed as highly unlikely that an AAV operated below the ocean surface
    “Based on the lack of detection of any unidentified sonar contacts it is highly unlikely that an AAV operated below the surface of the ocean”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 12, USS Louisville section
  46. The AAV did not take any offensive action against the carrier strike group
    “The AAV did not take any offensive action against the CSG”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 1, Executive Summary
  47. The CSG-11 Director of Operations stated at no time did they consider the AAV a threat to the battle group
    “He also stated that at no time did they consider the AAV a threat to the battle group.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 13, Commander Carrier Strike Group 11 section
  48. Fravor debriefed with the Carrier Air Wing Intelligence Officer at CVIC after the intercept
    “On 14 November following the intercept of the AAV, CDR Fravor reported to CVIC to debrief with Intelligence. He discussed the entire mission and AAV contact with LCDR {redacted} the Carrier Air Wing Intelligence Officer.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 12-13, Leadership and Reporting section
  49. The Carrier Air Wing Intelligence Officer sent an email-based MISREP including the FLIR video to 3rd Fleet Intelligence via secure system
    “LCDR {redacted} completed an email based MISREP. It was submitted via email because the F/A-18s were on a training mission. The email-based report including the FLIR video was sent via a secure system to CAPT {redacted} at 3rd Fleet Intelligence, their higher echelon command.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 13, Leadership and Reporting section
  50. The MISREP was received and acknowledged by 3rd Fleet Intelligence but not forwarded further up the chain of command
    “CAPT {redacted} confirmed that the MISREP was received via email on or about 14 November 2004. Since this MISREP was completed during training and preparation for deployment it was read and acknowledged by 3rd Fleet N2 but was not forwarded to anyone up the chain of command.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 13, 3rd Fleet Intelligence section
  51. Rear Admiral D.C. Curtis commanded CSG-11 during the AAV intercept in November 2004
    “The commander of the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group during the intercept was Rear Admiral D.C. Curtis”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 13, Commander Carrier Strike Group 11 section
  52. Peter Daly assumed command of CSG-11 in January 2005 with no knowledge of or involvement in the incident
    “Admiral Peter Daly assumed command of the CSG in January 2005 after the intercept and had no knowledge or involvement in this incident.”
    Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG-11) AAV Incident Report page 13, Commander Carrier Strike Group 11 section
View the facts breakdown in the workbench →

Every claim and entity extracted from this record, each citing the original wording, in the review workbench.

Language

30 languages covering 77% of the world's literate population

English English English (US) English (US) Spanish Español Portuguese Português Indonesian Bahasa Indonesia French Français Swahili Kiswahili Vietnamese Tiếng Việt Turkish Türkçe German Deutsch Italian Italiano Uzbek Oʻzbekcha Polish Polski Tagalog Tagalog
Mandarin 中文 Traditional Chinese 繁體中文 Japanese 日本語 Korean 한국어
Arabic العربية Urdu اردو Persian فارسی
Russian Русский Ukrainian Українська
Hindi हिन्दी Bengali বাংলা Thai ไทย Burmese မြန်မာ Telugu తెలుగు Marathi मराठी Tamil தமிழ்