FOIA Response 18-F-0324 is a Freedom of Information Act release dated 2022-08-17, addressing a request submitted by John Greenewald. Stephanie L. Carr said that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSDI), a component of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), located eight pages responsive to parts one and two of the request.1 Carr said Brian C. Kreitlow determined that portions of those eight pages were exempt from release under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), on the grounds that disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.2 Carr said any appeal of the determination had to be postmarked within 90 calendar days of the response.3
The released pages consist largely of memoranda written by Garry Reid, documenting concerns about Luis Elizondo, a former United States Department of Defense (DoD) employee. Reid said Elizondo was assigned to OUSDI from 2008-09-28 to 2017-10-04.4 Reid said Elizondo served as an action officer in Partner Engagement5 before later serving as a branch chief managing classified information supporting the Office of Military Commissions.6 Reid said the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP) was terminated in 20127 and stated that, to the best of his knowledge, Elizondo had no job responsibilities related to it.8 Reid said Elizondo aggrandized his role in AATIP in public statements9 and said he was pursuing options to investigate Elizondo’s possible mishandling of sensitive information.10
Reid’s account describes two resignation letters. He said that on 2017-10-03, Elizondo submitted a letter requesting immediate termination of his employment.11 Luis Elizondo’s first resignation letter (October 3, 2017) set his resignation effective 2017-10-04 as Director, National Programs Special Management Staff, OUSDI, and requested a deferred retirement.12 Reid said Elizondo was cleared out of OUSDI the day after submitting the letter13 and gave no reason for the sudden departure.14 Reid said that on or about 2017-10-04, after Elizondo had already left, a second letter was delivered to the OUSDI Chief of Staff office.15 Luis Elizondo’s second resignation letter (October 4, 2017) is formatted as a Memorandum for Record but uses the salutation “Mr. Secretary”, Reid said.16 Reid said it was hand-delivered by someone other than Elizondo17 and was inconsistent with the first letter, which Elizondo had personally handed to his supervisor.18 Given the uncertain provenance of the second letter, Reid said OUSDI retained a copy but did not forward it to the Secretary of Defense’s office.19 In it, Elizondo cited concerns over anomalous aerospace threats as the basis for his resignation.20
In the second letter, Elizondo stated he had served with America’s finest men and women for over 22 years.21 He stated that despite what he described as overwhelming evidence at both the unclassified and classified levels, certain individuals within the DoD remained staunchly opposed to further research on anomalous aerospace threats.22 He considered the phenomena a potential tactical threat to pilots, sailors and soldiers, and possibly an existential threat to national security.23 He stated there seemed to be a direct correlation between the observed phenomena and US nuclear and military capabilities.24 He stated that accounts from the Navy and other services of unusual anomalous aerial vehicle (AAV) activity, interfering with military weapon platforms and displaying beyond-next-generation capabilities, had to be taken seriously by the DoD.25 He stated his resignation was intended to encourage the Secretary of Defense to ask who else knew about the threats, what their capabilities were, and why more time and effort was not being spent on the issue.26
Reid’s second memorandum states that Elizondo gave three different explanations for his sudden resignation.27 Reid said that on 2017-10-03, Elizondo told his direct supervisor he was resigning because of a fleeting job opportunity requiring his immediate availability.28 In a memorandum dated 2017-10-04, Elizondo cited concerns over DoD inaction on anomalous aerospace threats as his reason for resigning.29 Reid said that in a phone call on 2017-10-06, Elizondo told him the job had been too stressful on his family.30 Separately, in a phone call on 2017-10-05, Reid said Elizondo told him that for many years he had secretly been tasked by the Secretary of Defense as the program manager for investigating UFOs and other aerial threats,31 and in another call told Reid he had been secretly working for the Secretary of Defense.32 Reid said Elizondo told him nobody in OUSDI was cleared for the program he described and would not discuss it further.33 Reid said he discussed the claims with senior officials who would likely have known of such an arrangement but was unable to substantiate them,34 and separately checked with two senior officials with knowledge of special access programs.35 Reid said the three of them collectively assessed that Elizondo’s claims were not credible36 and that the second letter was not worthy of the Secretary of Defense’s personal attention.37 Reid said Elizondo completed all administrative and security-related out-processing, including formal debriefs for all Special Access Programs and Sensitive Compartmented Information, within the 24 hours between his resignation notification and his departure.38 Reid said OUSDI referred the timing and circumstances of the resignation to the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) for immediate counterintelligence review.39 According to Reid, AFOSI’s informal assessment found no wrongdoing, and absent indicators of misconduct it was unable to open a formal investigation.40
The memoranda also address Elizondo’s public statements after leaving the DoD. In Luis Elizondo’s To the Stars Academy YouTube video (October 2017), Elizondo asserted that for nearly the last decade he had run a sensitive Aerospace Threat Identification Program focusing on unidentified aerial technologies,41 and said footage never before released from real US government systems would be provided.42 Following discovery of the video, Reid said he requested an informal review of Elizondo’s conduct by AFOSI,43 which he described as responsible for providing investigative support to OSD, including investigation of assigned personnel.44 Reid said that in late November 2017, AFOSI advised that, absent more tangible indicators of possible misconduct, it did not have enough information to open a case on Elizondo.45 Reid said that on 2017-12-15, based on information contained in a The New York Times (NYT) inquiry, he notified the OUSDI Security Officer that Elizondo may have misused government systems and might intend to release government footage or information he had obtained during his employment.46 In the 2017 unidentified aerial phenomena footage broadcast on national news December 17, Elizondo affirmed his alleged role leading AATIP and said “we are not alone”.47 Reid said that on 2017-12-18, OUSDI located Garry Reid’s classified email chain on video declassification (August 2017), generated by Elizondo, in which he requested assistance from a United States Navy civilian employee to declassify one or more videos.48 Reid said OUSDI staff contacted the Navy civilian upon discovering the email.49 The civilian told them he had informed Elizondo that he was not the declassification release authority,50 and took no further action.51 Reid said the video attached to the August 2017 email was the same footage broadcast on national news on 2017-12-17,52 and that as of the memorandum’s writing, OUSDI had not determined whether the video had been properly declassified, what process was followed, or how it had reached the national media.53 Reid said that on 2017-12-21, he met with AFOSI agents to initiate a formal inquiry into Elizondo’s possible mishandling of classified materials.54 The response file also includes background definitions relevant to Elizondo’s requested deferred retirement: according to the record, deferred retirement under US federal employment rules refers to delayed payment of retirement benefits until certain criteria are met,55 applying to federal employees with at least five years of service who depart before their Minimum Retirement Age, which falls between 55 and 57 years old depending on year of birth.56 Employees with five years of service can elect to collect benefits as early as age 62,57 while those with ten years of service can collect at their Minimum Retirement Age but sacrifice 5% of benefits for each year under age 62.58