David Fravor Statement for the House Oversight Committee

The David Fravor Statement for the House Oversight Committee is a written statement submitted in 2023 by David Fravor to the House Oversight Committee as part of the 2023 Fravor House Oversight Committee UAP Testimony. Fravor identified himself as a retired Commander in the US Navy¹ who, in November 2004, had served as Commanding Officer of Strike Fighter Squadron 41 (VFA-41), attached to Carrier Air Wing 11 and stationed aboard USS Nimitz.² He submitted the statement as a first-hand account of the 2004-11-14 Nimitz UAP Intercept and to urge congressional oversight of any related government programmes. At the time of the encounter, the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group was at the beginning of a workup cycle for a combat deployment to the Persian Gulf in support of ground forces in Iraq.³

The statement describes the circumstances on 2004-11-14 in which Fravor’s flight of two F/A-18F (aircraft) — callsign “Blue Air”, controlled by USS Princeton — launched for a routine two-versus-two air-to-air training exercise against adversary aircraft flown by Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 232 (VMFA-232).^{4, 5} Shortly after launch, the Princeton controller suspended training for real-world tasking and directed the flight toward a Combat Air Patrol (CAP) point approximately 64 kilometres south of Nimitz.^{6, 7} Fravor recounted that the Princeton controller had, per the controller’s account, been tracking Anomalous Aerial Vehicle (AAV) contacts on the Aegis combat system for the previous two weeks, with the objects descending from above approximately 24,000 metres to approximately 6,000 metres, staying for hours, and then returning upward.^{8, 9} On approach, Fravor’s flight had nothing on their own aircraft radars and were unaware of what they were about to see.

Upon arriving at approximately 6,000 metres, the Princeton controller called “Merge Plot”, and Fravor reported that all four aircrew observed a Water Disturbance — white water — against otherwise calm seas under clear skies.^{10, 11} Below the disturbance they saw a small white Tic Tac-shaped object with its longitudinal axis oriented north-south, moving abruptly over the water.¹² The object had no rotors, no rotor wash, and no visible flight control surfaces such as wings.¹³ Fravor descended toward the AAV while a second F/A-18F maintained high cover.¹⁴ After completing approximately 90 degrees of a clockwise descent, the object shifted its longitudinal axis to align with Fravor’s aircraft and began climbing in a clockwise turn.¹⁵ When Fravor pulled his nose onto the object at approximately 460 metres, with it just left of his nose, it rapidly accelerated and disappeared from view.¹⁶ At that moment Fravor was at approximately 4,600 metres and the AAV was at approximately 3,700 metres;¹⁷ the wingman aircraft, approximately 2,400 metres above Fravor, also lost visual contact simultaneously.¹⁸ When Fravor turned back to investigate, the water disturbance was gone as well.¹⁹ The Princeton controller subsequently reported via the AN/SPY-1 Aegis radar that the object had reappeared at the CAP point approximately 97 kilometres to the east.²⁰ Fravor assessed that the AAV had covered that distance in less than one minute²¹ and that it performed far beyond his F/A-18F and outside any known aerodynamic principles applicable to objects flying in Earth’s atmosphere.²²

The statement also addresses supporting sensor evidence. After returning to Nimitz, Fravor mentioned the encounter to a crew preparing to launch; that crew subsequently captured the approximately 90-second forward-looking infrared (FLIR) video — later released by the US Government in 2017 and known as the Navy F/A-18F Nimitz Encounter Video — of the AAV.²³ The targeting pod video showed the AAV emitted no infrared plume consistent with a normal propulsion system.²⁴ A radar tape from the encounter, which showed jamming of the APG-73 Radar in Fravor’s aircraft, was not included in the footage released by the government.²⁵ Fravor noted that the ATFLIR Pod was the targeting system involved in capturing the imagery.

Regarding the aftermath of the 2004 incident, Fravor stated that the event was never officially investigated, none of his crew were questioned, and no tapes were collected.²⁶ It was not until 2009 that Jay Stratton contacted Fravor to investigate what his crew had witnessed; Fravor described Stratton as part of an anomalous threat identification programme led by Luis Elizondo out of the Department of Defense.^{27, 28} Years later, fellow pilot Alex Dietrich contacted Fravor asking whether he had been contacted about the incident following 2009, and told him she had been invited to the Pentagon multiple times to discuss the event and to view other UAP videos.^{29, 30} Elizondo contacted Fravor shortly after that conversation in 2016.³¹ Fravor then described how, in the weeks following that contact, Elizondo left the Pentagon and joined Tom DeLonge, Christopher K. Mellon, Steve Justice, and others to form To the Stars Academy of Arts and Science,³² which worked with journalists Leslie Kean, Ralph Blumenthal, and Helene Cooper to publish the 2017 NYT Pentagon UAP Article in The New York Times in December 2017.³³

The final section of the statement addresses the policy context of the 2023 hearing. Fravor attributed the hearing directly to UAP Whistleblower Protection Legislation contained in the FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act.³⁴ He noted that multiple witnesses were coming forward with claimed first-hand knowledge of non-human craft, and stated he expected David Grusch had or would discuss this at the same hearing.³⁵ Fravor expressed concern that there was no congressional oversight of any US Government programmes possessing or working on craft believed to be of non-human origin,³⁶ and argued that even Waived Unacknowledged Special Access Program activities carry some level of oversight from appropriate committee members — and that any work related to UAP Reverse Engineering Legacy Programs should not be exempt.³⁷ He concluded that the AAV he encountered in November 2004 was far superior to anything the US had at the time, has today, or is looking to develop in the next ten or more years,³⁸ and that if the US Government holds such technology, elected officials representing the public must have oversight of those programmes.³⁹