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DODIG-2023-109 Unclassified Summary: Evaluation of DoD Actions Regarding UAP, 2023-08-15

An unclassified summary published by the Department of Defense Inspector General on 2024-01-24, evaluating the extent to which the DoD and its components took intelligence, counterintelligence, and force protection actions to detect, report, collect, analyse, and identify unidentified anomalous phenomena.

Pdf · U.S. Department of Defense Inspector General · 2024-01-24

DODIG-2023-109 is an evaluation produced by the Department of Defense Inspector General, issued as a classified report dated 2023-08-15 and subsequently released in unclassified summary form on 2024-01-24.1 The underlying classified evaluation2 examined the extent to which the DoD, Military Services, Defence agencies, and Military Department Counterintelligence Organisations took intelligence, counterintelligence, and force protection actions to detect, report, collect, analyse, and identify unidentified anomalous phenomena (UAP).17 The work was conducted between 2021-05 and 2023-06 in accordance with quality standards published by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.30

The report provides a historical overview of DoD UAP activity, characterising the efforts as infrequent and inconclusive over past decades.3 The DoD’s first formal UAP-focused programme, Project Sign 1947, was established in December 1947 by the US Air Force Chief of Staff, during which Air Force personnel investigated 243 reported sightings.45 In 1952, the US Air Force Director of Intelligence initiated Project Blue Book, under which personnel investigated over 12,000 reported UAP sightings between 1952 and 1969.67 Following Project Blue Book Termination 1969, the DoD did not officially examine UAP again until mid-2000, when Congress initiated and funded the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program (AAWSAP) under the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).8 Subsequent attempts to establish coordinated DoD-wide UAP programmes were never fully implemented.9

Congressional attention to UAP intensified in the years preceding the evaluation. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence identified in its FY2021 Intelligence Authorization Act report that the US Government lacked a unified, comprehensive process for collecting and analysing UAP intelligence.10 In response, the DoD established the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force (UAPTF) in 2020-08 to develop standardised reporting requirements.11 The UAPTF and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence jointly issued the congressionally mandated DNI UAP Preliminary Assessment 2021-06 in June 2021, which found UAP reporting data to be largely inconclusive and government-wide consolidation of reports to be inconsistent.1213 In 2021-11, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)) to establish the Airborne Object Identification and Management Synchronization Group (AOIMSG) as the UAPTF’s successor, but the AOIMSG never reached operational capability and was disestablished on 2022-07-15.1415 The FY2022 NDAA UAP Requirements mandated that the DoD establish a central UAP office, leading to the creation of the All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO) on 2022-07-20.16

The evaluation’s principal findings were critical of the DoD’s coordination and policy frameworks. The Inspector General determined that the DoD had not used a coordinated approach to detect, report, collect, analyse, and identify UAP,18 that DoD Components had largely excluded geographic combatant commands from developing UAP policies and procedures,19 and that no comprehensive UAP response plan identifying roles, responsibilities, and coordination procedures had been issued.20 Officials from the Military Services and Military Department Counterintelligence Organisations — comprising Army Counterintelligence, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) — stated they had been waiting for DoD-wide guidance before developing their own.21 Individual service reporting practices varied considerably: the Air Force designated UAP as a Special Interest Item requiring aircrews to document observations within 24 hours using the Marauder UAP Reporting System,22 while Army personnel used the same Air Force system because the Army had not developed its own UAP-specific processes.23 Military Services and counterintelligence organisations had sent some incident reports to AARO, but the DoD did not formally require them to do so.24

The report issued five recommendations. Recommendation 1 called on the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (OUSD(I&S)) to issue a DoD policy integrating UAP roles, responsibilities, and coordination procedures into existing intelligence and force protection frameworks, in coordination with the AARO Director.25 The Under Secretary agreed with the recommendation but noted that the findings largely predated AARO’s establishment.26 Recommendations 2, 3, and 4 called on the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force respectively to issue interim UAP guidance pending DoD-wide policy; the Senate Armed Services Committee had highlighted similar concerns in successive National Defense Authorization Acts. Recommendation 5 called on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to issue UAP guidance to geographic combatant commanders,27 and the Joint Staff J3 responded on the Chairman’s behalf confirming agreement.28 The Joint Staff subsequently issued the required guidance, and Recommendation 5 was resolved and closed.29 Recommendations 1 through 4 remained resolved but open at the time of the unclassified summary’s publication, pending formal policy issuance. The evaluation drew on interviews and data requests across a broad set of organisations including AARO, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Security Agency, as well as non-government subject matter experts on UAP and national security threats.31

  1. The unclassified summary was published on 2024-01-24; the underlying classified evaluation is dated 2023-08-15.
    “Unclassified Summary of Report No. DODIG-2023-109, "Evaluation of the DoD's Actions Regarding Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena," August 15, 2023. JANUARY 24, 2024”
    DODIG-2023-109 Unclassified Summary: Evaluation of DoD Actions Regarding UAP, 2023-08-15 page 1
  2. A classified evaluation formed the basis of the unclassified summary.
    “A classified version of the Evaluation of the DoD's Actions Regarding Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena formed the basis of the unclassified summary.”
    DODIG-2023-109 Unclassified Summary: Evaluation of DoD Actions Regarding UAP, 2023-08-15 page II
  3. The DoD has initiated infrequent and inconclusive efforts over past decades to identify and understand UAP.
    “Over the past decades, the DoD has initiated infrequent and inconclusive efforts to identify and understand the origin, capabilities, and intent of unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP).”
    DODIG-2023-109 Unclassified Summary: Evaluation of DoD Actions Regarding UAP, 2023-08-15 page 1, Historical Background
  4. The US Air Force Chief of Staff established Project Sign in December 1947 to investigate unidentified flying objects.
    “The DoD's first official UAP-focused activities occurred in December 1947, when the U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff established PROJECT SIGN to investigate the first recorded observations of unidentified flying objects.”
    DODIG-2023-109 Unclassified Summary: Evaluation of DoD Actions Regarding UAP, 2023-08-15 page 1, Historical Background
  5. Air Force personnel investigated 243 reported UAP sightings under Project Sign from 1947 to 1949.
    “From 1947 to 1949, Air Force personnel investigated 243 reported UAP sightings.”
    DODIG-2023-109 Unclassified Summary: Evaluation of DoD Actions Regarding UAP, 2023-08-15 page 1, Historical Background
  6. The US Air Force Director of Intelligence initiated Project Blue Book in 1952.
    “In 1952, the U.S. Air Force Director of Intelligence initiated PROJECT BLUE BOOK to investigate unidentified flying objects.”
    DODIG-2023-109 Unclassified Summary: Evaluation of DoD Actions Regarding UAP, 2023-08-15 page 1, Historical Background
  7. Air Force personnel investigated over 12,000 reported UAP sightings under Project Blue Book between 1952 and 1969.
    “Between 1952 and 1969, Air Force personnel investigated over 12,000 reported sightings.”
    DODIG-2023-109 Unclassified Summary: Evaluation of DoD Actions Regarding UAP, 2023-08-15 page 1, Historical Background
  8. The DoD did not officially look at UAP again until mid-2000, when Congress initiated the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program (AAWSAP) under the Defense Intelligence Agency.
    “The DoD did not officially look at UAP again until mid-2000, when select members of Congress initiated and funded a program to study UAP, called the Advanced Aerospace Weapon Systems Applications program, under the direction of the Defense Intelligence Agency.”
    DODIG-2023-109 Unclassified Summary: Evaluation of DoD Actions Regarding UAP, 2023-08-15 page 1, Historical Background
  9. The DoD has attempted to establish several DoD-wide UAP coordination programmes since AAWSAP, but none were ever fully implemented.
    “Since then, the DoD has attempted to establish several programs for coordinating DoD-wide UAP reporting; however, none of the programs were ever fully implemented.”
    DODIG-2023-109 Unclassified Summary: Evaluation of DoD Actions Regarding UAP, 2023-08-15 page 1, Historical Background
  10. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence identified concerns that the US Government lacked a unified process for collecting and analysing UAP intelligence.
    “In the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report on the FY 2021 Intelligence Authorization Act, the Senate Select Committee identified concerns that the U.S. Government did not have a unified, comprehensive process in place for collecting and analyzing intelligence on UAP.”
    DODIG-2023-109 Unclassified Summary: Evaluation of DoD Actions Regarding UAP, 2023-08-15 page 2, Senate Armed Services Committee Fiscal Year Reports
  11. The DoD established the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force in August 2020 to develop standardised reporting requirements for UAP encounters.
    “in August 2020 the DoD established a UAP Task Force (UAPTF) to develop standardized reporting requirements for UAP encounters.”
    DODIG-2023-109 Unclassified Summary: Evaluation of DoD Actions Regarding UAP, 2023-08-15 page 3
  12. The UAPTF and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued the congressionally mandated Preliminary Assessment on UAP in June 2021.
    “In June 2021, the UAPTF and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued the congressionally mandated Preliminary Assessment on UAP”
    DODIG-2023-109 Unclassified Summary: Evaluation of DoD Actions Regarding UAP, 2023-08-15 page 3
  13. The Preliminary Assessment stated that UAP reporting data are largely inconclusive and that consolidation of reports across the US Government is inconsistent.
    “which stated that UAP reporting data are largely inconclusive, as well as a consolidation of reports across the U.S. Government is inconsistent.”
    DODIG-2023-109 Unclassified Summary: Evaluation of DoD Actions Regarding UAP, 2023-08-15 page 3
  14. In November 2021, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed OUSD(I&S) to establish the AOIMSG as the successor to the UAPTF.
    “In a November 2021 memorandum, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the OUSD(I&S) to establish the Airborne Object Identification and Management Synchronization Group (AOIMSG) as the successor to the UAPTF to synchronize efforts across the DoD and with other Federal departments and agencies to detect, identify, and characterize objects of interest in special use airspace.”
    DODIG-2023-109 Unclassified Summary: Evaluation of DoD Actions Regarding UAP, 2023-08-15 page 3
  15. The AOIMSG did not reach operational capability and was disestablished on 2022-07-15.
    “The AOIMSG did not reach operational capability and the Deputy Secretary disestablished it on July 15, 2022.”
    DODIG-2023-109 Unclassified Summary: Evaluation of DoD Actions Regarding UAP, 2023-08-15 page 3
  16. The DoD established AARO on 2022-07-20 to implement duties previously assigned to the AOIMSG.
    “On July 20, 2022, the DoD established the All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO) to be that entity.”
    DODIG-2023-109 Unclassified Summary: Evaluation of DoD Actions Regarding UAP, 2023-08-15 page 1, Historical Background
  17. The objective of the evaluation was to determine the extent to which the DoD and its components took actions to detect, report, collect, analyse, and identify UAP.
    “The objective of this evaluation was to determine the extent to which the DoD, Military Services, Defense agencies, and Military Department Counterintelligence Organizations (MDCOs) took intelligence, counterintelligence, and force protection actions to detect, report, collect, analyze, and identify unidentified anomalous phenomena (UAP).”
    DODIG-2023-109 Unclassified Summary: Evaluation of DoD Actions Regarding UAP, 2023-08-15 page 2, Introduction, Objective
  18. The evaluation found that the DoD has not used a coordinated approach to detect, report, collect, analyse, and identify UAP.
    “the DoD has not used a coordinated approach to detect, report, collect, analyze, and identify UAP;”
    DODIG-2023-109 Unclassified Summary: Evaluation of DoD Actions Regarding UAP, 2023-08-15 page 5
  19. DoD Components largely excluded geographic combatant commands in developing UAP policies and procedures.
    “DoD Components have largely excluded geographic combatant commands, which are responsible for detecting, deterring, and preventing threats and attacks against the United States and its territories, possessions, and bases in their respective areas of responsibility, in developing UAP policies and procedures”
    DODIG-2023-109 Unclassified Summary: Evaluation of DoD Actions Regarding UAP, 2023-08-15 page 5
  20. The DoD has not issued a comprehensive UAP response plan identifying roles, responsibilities, requirements, and coordination procedures.
    “The DoD has not issued a comprehensive UAP response plan that identifies roles, responsibilities, requirements, and coordination procedures for detecting, reporting, collecting, analyzing, and identifying UAP incidents.”
    DODIG-2023-109 Unclassified Summary: Evaluation of DoD Actions Regarding UAP, 2023-08-15 page 5, The DoD Has Not Issued a Comprehensive UAP Response Plan
  21. Military Services and MDCOs stated they had been waiting for DoD to issue comprehensive UAP guidance before developing their own.
    “Officials from the Military Services and MDCOs stated that they have been waiting for the DoD to issue comprehensive UAP guidance before developing their own guidance.”
    DODIG-2023-109 Unclassified Summary: Evaluation of DoD Actions Regarding UAP, 2023-08-15 page 5, The DoD Has Not Issued a Comprehensive UAP Response Plan
  22. The Air Force designated UAP as a Special Interest Item requiring aircrews to document and report observations within 24 hours using the Marauder system.
    “an Air Force Remotely Piloted Aircraft and Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Technical Advisor stated that the Air Force designated UAP as a "Special Interest Item," which requires aircrews to document and report UAP observations within 24 hours of engine shutdown and mission completion using the Marauder system.”
    DODIG-2023-109 Unclassified Summary: Evaluation of DoD Actions Regarding UAP, 2023-08-15 page 6, DoD Components Developed Varying Processes to Detect and Report UAP Incidents
  23. Army personnel use the Air Force's Marauder system because the Army has not developed its own UAP-specific processes.
    “An Army Senior Advisor for Science and Technology and Innovation stated that Army personnel also use the Air Force's Marauder system to document and report UAP observations because the Army has not developed its own UAP-specific processes.”
    DODIG-2023-109 Unclassified Summary: Evaluation of DoD Actions Regarding UAP, 2023-08-15 page 6, DoD Components Developed Varying Processes to Detect and Report UAP Incidents
  24. Military Services and MDCOs have sent some UAP incident reports to AARO, but the DoD does not formally require them to do so.
    “The Military Services and MDCOs have sent some UAP incident reports to AARO, but the DoD does not currently formally require them to do so.”
    DODIG-2023-109 Unclassified Summary: Evaluation of DoD Actions Regarding UAP, 2023-08-15 page 6, DoD Components Developed Varying Processes to Detect and Report UAP Incidents
  25. Recommendation 1 called on the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, in coordination with the AARO Director, to issue a DoD policy integrating UAP roles and responsibilities into existing intelligence and force protection policies.
    “We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, in coordination with the All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office Director, issue a Department of Defense policy to integrate unidentified anomalous phenomena roles, responsibilities, requirements, and coordination procedures into existing intelligence, counterintelligence, and force protection policies and procedures.”
    DODIG-2023-109 Unclassified Summary: Evaluation of DoD Actions Regarding UAP, 2023-08-15 page 7, Recommendation 1
  26. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security agreed with Recommendation 1 but noted the findings largely predate AARO's establishment.
    “The Under Secretary noted that the findings that inform the recommendation appear to be based on observations that largely predate the establishment of AARO [organizationally aligned under the OUSD(I&S)] on July 20, 2022.”
    DODIG-2023-109 Unclassified Summary: Evaluation of DoD Actions Regarding UAP, 2023-08-15 page 7
  27. Recommendation 5 called on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to issue UAP guidance to geographic combatant commanders.
    “We recommend that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issue guidance to the geographic combatant commanders regarding unidentified anomalous phenomena detection, reporting, collection, analysis, and identification within their area of responsibility. At a minimum, the guidance should include tools to help commands determine the threats posed by unidentified anomalous phenomena.”
    DODIG-2023-109 Unclassified Summary: Evaluation of DoD Actions Regarding UAP, 2023-08-15 page 9, Recommendation 5
  28. The Joint Staff issued guidance to geographic combatant commanders on UAP detection, reporting, collection, analysis, and identification.
    “Further, the Joint Staff issued guidance to the geographic combatant commanders on unidentified anomalous phenomena detection, reporting, collection, analysis, and identification within their area of responsibility.”
    DODIG-2023-109 Unclassified Summary: Evaluation of DoD Actions Regarding UAP, 2023-08-15 page 10
  29. Recommendation 5 was resolved and closed.
    “The informal response from the Joint Staff fully addressed the recommendation. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved and closed.”
    DODIG-2023-109 Unclassified Summary: Evaluation of DoD Actions Regarding UAP, 2023-08-15 page 10
  30. The evaluation work was conducted from May 2021 through June 2023.
    “We conducted the work on this evaluation from May 2021 through June 2023 in accordance with the "Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation," published in January 2012 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.”
    DODIG-2023-109 Unclassified Summary: Evaluation of DoD Actions Regarding UAP, 2023-08-15 page 11, Scope and Methodology
  31. Interviews and data requests were made to OUSD(I&S), AARO, Military Services, Military Department Counterintelligence Organisations, and defence intelligence agencies including DIA, NGA, NRO, and NSA.
    “We interviewed senior officials and requested UAP-related data and organizational policies, procedures, and guidance from the following DoD organizations: OUSD(I&S), AARO, Military Services (Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force), Military Service Intelligence Components (Army G2, Navy N2, Air Force A2), MDCOs (Army Counterintelligence, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Office of Special Investigations), Defense intelligence agencies (Defense Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and National Security Agency)”
    DODIG-2023-109 Unclassified Summary: Evaluation of DoD Actions Regarding UAP, 2023-08-15 page 11, Scope and Methodology
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