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Special Access Program (SAP)

A Special Access Program is a US government security control system that compartments classified projects beyond standard top-secret clearance, and features throughout allegations of hidden UAP-related activity.

United States Department of Defense (DoD) and Intelligence Community · Security classification / compartmentation system

A Special Access Program (SAP) is a compartmented security control system used by the United States Department of Defense (DoD) and intelligence community to restrict information beyond standard top-secret classification. A SAP designation is not itself a higher classification than top secret; it denotes that a project is compartmented, treated as Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), and assigned a codename.¹ SAPs are the mechanism by which the Defense Department conceals most of its most sensitive black-budget classified projects,² and even senior officials holding top-secret clearance are barred from knowing a SAP’s or Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF)-related details unless formally “read into” it.³ A subcategory, the Unacknowledged Special Access Program (USAP), goes further still: its very existence can and must be denied by those aware of it, with its true funding concealed.⁴ Some black-budget SAP projects are compartmented so deeply that revealing their existence to anyone outside the programme is itself a criminal offence for those read in.⁵ Bill Sweetman wrote that an unacknowledged SAP’s existence qualifies as a “core secret” under United States Air Force regulations, defined as information whose compromise would cause unrecoverable failure.⁶ Christopher K. Mellon’s role on the Senate Intelligence Committee staff required him to review top-secret SCI projects inside SAPs, the majority of which remain classified.⁷

SAPs recur throughout allegations linking UFO and UAP material to hidden defence programmes. Ahead of an April 1997 Pentagon meeting, Steven Greer sent the staff of Admiral Thomas Wilson a leaked National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) document listing authentic SAP codenames.⁸ Greer said Wilson was visibly upset to find codenames on that list unknown to him, despite his seniority within Defense Intelligence.⁹ Wilson himself recalled that his visitors at the meeting raised concerns about possible special access programmes dealing with UFOs,¹⁰ and he believed their objective was to solicit his help in gaining access to, or knowledge of, such alleged programmes.¹¹ Wilson stated he never acknowledged that such programmes existed, never suggested he would attempt to gain access to them, and never had knowledge of any.¹² This dispute resurfaced decades later around The Admiral Wilson Memo: in a 2020-06 Tom Wilson denial letter, Wilson said many people the memo named as his contacts were unknown to him, as were the alleged SAP-related conversations.¹³ The memo itself reportedly described Wilson as having been told of “a special projects record group not belonging to usual SAP - a special subset of the unacknowledged/carve-outs/waived programs”,¹⁴ and recorded Eric Davis asking Wilson which SAP compartment and codename the programme was hidden under.¹⁵ Wilson’s June 2020 letter denied the memo’s account of his supposed efforts to gain such access and any meetings with contractors or programme managers.¹⁶

Attempts to obtain formal SAP protection have also featured in the 2009 Harry Reid Special Access Program request for Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP). In June 2009, Senator Harry Reid wrote to the Secretary of Defense requesting that the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP) be granted SAP status.¹⁷ According to a memo on the matter, this request and Reid’s supporting reasoning were addressed to Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn III.¹⁸ Ross Coulthart has speculated that Pentagon UAP briefing slides, potentially connected to the 2004 USS Nimitz UAP encounter, may have prompted Reid’s request.¹⁹ The request for SAP status for the AATIP investigation was rejected.²⁰

More recent whistleblower testimony has extended SAP-related allegations into claims of oversight evasion. David Charles Grusch said that multiple agencies nesting UAP activities within conventional SAP and Controlled Access Program (CAP) structures, without appropriate reporting to oversight authorities, constitutes a problem.²¹ Luis Elizondo said that two damaged M1 Abrams Tank units from Camp New York, Kuwait, were sent to the Yuma Proving Ground for analysis that was classified as a Top Secret SAP, and that he never learned the findings.²² Elizondo also said that he and Jay Stratton told military witnesses they worked for a Special Access Program, encouraging witnesses to describe their encounters so the programme could better conceal them in future.²³ Elizondo said Christopher K. Mellon oversaw all United States Department of Defense (DoD) intelligence activities and Special Access Programs,²⁴ though Mellon himself said that despite years overseeing all SAPs, he had zero visibility into the Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP) topic.²⁵

Grusch’s later testimony described a broader pattern of concealment. He said he worked on programmes deliberately hidden from Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) oversight staff and briefed only to the White House, kept from United States Congress through a shell game of non-reporting.²⁶ He said officials in the current administration described being briefed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on a classified programme, then hearing a contradictory account of the same programme when briefed elsewhere.²⁷ Grusch said he was told through a back channel that Jake Sullivan’s office instructed the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, serving under Joe Biden, to halt an investigation because it was running into White House classified special access programmes.²⁸ He considered some programmes he was cleared into to defraud the taxpayer, since Congress appropriates funds against a declared set of classified programmes while a carved-out base of technology sits outside that reporting.²⁹ Grusch said he must take care not to identify technologies the federal government does not acknowledge,³⁰ and described a programme protection strategy of relocating movable archives and materials if a holding location is believed exposed.³¹ He also said that moving recovered craft to private corporations keeps funding outside congressional oversight by using non-appropriated dollars,³² and that he named several current and former officials who ran such programmes, providing the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO) with several leads.³³

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)) addressed this landscape directly: its UAP provisions provide protections intended to ensure that no classified military and intelligence programmes, including all Special Access Programs, are compromised or made public.³⁴

References (34)

A SAP designation is not a higher classification than top secret; it means the project is compartmented, deemed SCI, and given a codename.
“A further cloak of secrecy in addition to the highest top-secret security classification, an SAP designation is not actually a higher security classification than top secret. It simply means the project is compartmented, deemed Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), and designated a codename.”
In Plain Sight ch14:10905-11193 View the source record →
SAPs are where the Defense Department hides most of its super-secret black-budget classified projects.
“SAPs are where the US Defence Department hides most of its super-secret black-budget classified projects.”
In Plain Sight ch14:10799-10895 View the source record →
Even senior officials with top-secret clearance are forbidden from knowing SAP or SCI details unless 'read into' the programme.
“Even the most senior military officials with the highest top-secret security clearance are forbidden from knowing the details behind an SAP/SCI codename unless they are *read* into it.”
In Plain Sight ch14:11203-11384 View the source record →
Unacknowledged Special Access Programs (USAPs) are projects whose existence can and must be denied, with true funding hidden.
“There are also USAPs, Unacknowledged Special Access Programs, which means the project's very existence can and must be denied by those who know about it, the true funding hidden.”
In Plain Sight ch14:11389-11587 View the source record →
Some black-budget SAP projects are hidden so deeply that revealing their existence is a crime for anyone read into them.
“Some black-world budget projects are hidden so deep, it is a crime for anyone read into a project to even reveal its existence.11”
In Plain Sight ch14:10669-10796 View the source record →
Bill Sweetman wrote that an unacknowledged SAP's existence is a 'core secret' under US Air Force regulations, defined as information whose compromise causes unrecoverable failure.
“‘An unacknowledged SAP [Special Access Program] – a black program – is a program which is considered so sensitive that the fact of its existence is a “core secret”, defined in USAF regulations as “any item, progress, strategy or element of information the compromise of which would result in unrecoverable failure”,’ Sweetman wrote.”
In Plain Sight ch26:14538-14863 View the source record →
Christopher Mellon's Senate Intelligence Committee role required reviewing top-secret SCI projects inside SAPs, most of which remain classified.
“His role on the Senate Intelligence Committee staff required him to review top-secret Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) projects inside Special Access Programs (SAPs), most of which still remain classified.”
In Plain Sight ch13:9050-9253 View the source record →
Before their April 1997 Pentagon visit, Steven Greer sent Admiral Thomas Wilson's staff a leaked National Reconnaissance Office document listing authentic SAP codenames.
“In advance of their visit, Greer had sent Admiral Wilson's staff a leaked US National Reconnaissance Office document that detailed a series of what turned out to be authentic codenames for highly top-secret so-called Special Access Programs (SAPs).”
In Plain Sight ch14:9972-10214 View the source record →
Steven Greer said Wilson was very upset that some SAP codenames on the list were unknown to him.
“When Admiral Tom Wilson saw the leaked document Greer sent him,12 he was, Greer claims, very upset that there were SAP project codenames on the list that were unknown to him, the second-most powerful man in Defence Intelligence.”
In Plain Sight ch14:12137-12352 View the source record →
Thomas Wilson recalled his 1997 visitors raised concerns about possible special access programs dealing with UFOs.
“Wilson recalled ‘my visitors’ concerns about possible “special access programs” dealing with that subject.”
In Plain Sight ch14:22310-22408 View the source record →
Wilson believed the visitors' objective was to solicit his assistance in gaining access to or knowledge of the alleged programmes.
“I believe, as some reports suggest, that Dr Mitchell’s team’s objective was to solicit my assistance in achieving access or knowledge of such programs.”
In Plain Sight ch14:22417-22559 View the source record →
Wilson stated he never acknowledged such programmes existed, never suggested he would seek access, and never had knowledge of them.
“I most certainly did not acknowledge or even suggest that such programs existed nor that I would attempt to gain access if they did. In fact, I did neither then, nor since then, ever have knowledge of such programs.”
In Plain Sight ch14:22570-22777 View the source record →
In June 2009, Harry Reid wrote to the Secretary of Defense requesting SAP status for AATIP.
“To add spice to the mystery, in June 2009, then Senator Harry Reid wrote to the US Secretary of Defense requesting the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP) be given the status of a Special Access Program (SAP).”
In Plain Sight ch17:17145-17397 View the source record →
According to the memo, Reid's reasoning and request were addressed to Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn III.
“The memo outlined Senator Reid’s request and reasoning to get the AATIP a “Special Access Program” or SAP status, and was written to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, William Lynn III.”
Pentagon Reinforces Mr. Luis Elizondo Had "No Responsibilities" on AATIP; Senator Harry Reid's 2009 Memo Changes Nothing - The Black Vault char:2546-2725 View the source record →
Ross Coulthart speculates that Pentagon UAP briefing slides may have prompted Reid's SAP request.
“Perhaps it was these slides that prompted Senator Harry Reid to ask the Department of Defence for Special Access Program protection for the investigation – because what the slides said was momentous.”
In Plain Sight ch25:17854-18043 View the source record →
The SAP status request for the AATIP investigation was rejected.
“It was a strong sell but the Senator's request for Special Access Program status for the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program investigation was rejected.”
In Plain Sight ch17:19003-19159 View the source record →
In a June 2020 letter, Wilson said many named contacts were unknown to him, as were the alleged SAP conversations.
“Many of the people (Oke Shannon, Mike Crawford, Linda, Rich, Doug) he characterises in the memo as people I interacted with are completely unknown to me, as are the conversations I purportedly had on Special Access Programs related to UFOs with senior officials in the Department of Defense.”
In Plain Sight ch26:11888-12171 View the source record →
According to the memo, Wilson was told of a special projects record group not belonging to usual SAP - a subset of unacknowledged/carve-out/waived programmes.
“‘They told me of a special projects record group not belonging to usual SAP – a special subset of the unacknowledged/carve-outs/waived programs,’ Wilson reportedly said in the memo.”
In Plain Sight ch26:13817-13992 View the source record →
According to the memo, Eric Davis asked Wilson which SAP compartment and codename the programme was hidden under.
“Davis then asked Wilson a series of questions, such as which Special Access Program compartment he found the Program hidden in and under which codename.”
In Plain Sight ch26:13998-14141 View the source record →
In his June 2020 letter, Wilson said the memo's accounts of his efforts to gain SAP access were false and that no such meetings occurred.
“‘The Dr Eric Davis memo contains somewhat detailed accounts of alleged efforts by me to get access to Special Access Programs . . . and of meetings I supposedly had with various contractors or Special Access Program managers/overseers. I participated in no such meetings on these subjects. I never formally or informally requested any such access, was never denied such access and was never threatened to have my career “derailed” if I persisted,’ he told me.”
In Plain Sight ch26:7043-7525 View the source record →
The UAP provisions of the FY2023 NDAA provide protections ensuring no classified programmes, including all SAPs, are compromised or made public.
“The UAP laws also provide protections to ensure that no classified military and intelligence programs, including all special access programs (SAPs) are compromised or made public.”
In Plain Sight ch30:15610-15782 View the source record →
David Grusch said multiple agencies nesting UAP activities in conventional SAP/CAP programmes without appropriate oversight reporting is a problem.
““When you have multiple agencies nesting UAP activities in conventional SAP/CAP programs, both as recipients of exploitation-related insights and for operational reasons, without appropriate reporting to various oversight authorities, you have a problem,” Grusch said, referencing the highly secret Special Access Programs and Controlled Access Programs.”
Intelligence Officials Say U.S. Has Retrieved Craft of Non-Human Origin char:13757-14101 View the source record →
The two damaged M1 Abrams tanks were sent for analysis classified as a Top Secret SAP, and Elizondo never learned the findings.
“the two tanks were immediately taken to the port, loaded aboard a transport ship, and shipped to the Yuma Proving Ground in Arizona for analysis. I never did learn the findings. The powers that be classified the analysis a “Top Secret SAP.””
Imminent: Inside the Pentagon's Hunt for UFOs ch10:16960-17195 View the source record →
Jay Stratton and Elizondo told military witnesses they worked for a Special Access Program to encourage them to describe encounters.
“we work for a Special Access Program, and it's very likely you came across one of our technologies. We do our best to hide these things, but sometimes people who are observant, such as yourself, see one. We would really appreciate it if you could tell us exactly what you saw, so if it *is* one of ours, we can hide it better in the future.”
Imminent: Inside the Pentagon's Hunt for UFOs ch17:8352-8685 View the source record →
Christopher Mellon oversaw all Department of Defense intelligence activities and Special Access Programs.
“He oversaw all Department of Defense intelligence activities and Special Access Programs (SAPs).”
Imminent: Inside the Pentagon's Hunt for UFOs ch26:915-1005 View the source record →
Mellon said he had spent years overseeing all SAPs but had zero visibility into the UAP topic.
“He had spent years having oversight of all the SAPs for the DoD and he admitted to us that he had zero visibility into the UAP topic.”
Imminent: Inside the Pentagon's Hunt for UFOs ch26:5297-5424 View the source record →
Grusch said he worked on programmes purposely hidden from ODNI oversight staff and briefed only to the White House, kept from Congress through a shell game of non-reporting.
“when I was uh back in the intelligence community there were sensitive programs i worked on that we purposely hid from the director of national intelligence oversight staff um stuff we only briefed the white house and you know kept it away from congress through a unique shell game of not reporting programs”
David Grusch: The Whistleblower Who Told Congress We're Not Alone 00:08:09.3-00:08:28.2
Grusch said officials described being briefed by the CIA on a classified programme, then hearing a different account of the same programme at another agency.
“i've had sensitive meetings with senior officials of this administration and they've also encountered that where They're briefed by one thing, by CIA, in their one hat at the White House. And then when they go to another agency and sit in a briefing for that same program, they're telling another cabinet member a totally different story about what this classified program is doing.”
David Grusch: The Whistleblower Who Told Congress We're Not Alone 00:08:29.8-00:08:51.1
Grusch was told via back channel that Jake Sullivan's office instructed the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community to stop an investigation running into White House classified special access programs.
“back channeled to me unofficially is uh Jake Sullivan and White House General Counsel Office basically told Tom Monheim who was the inspector general for the intelligence community under Biden and his staff to stop and and they realized they were bumping into White House uh classified programs something called special access programs”
David Grusch: The Whistleblower Who Told Congress We're Not Alone 00:27:04.0-00:27:22.1
Grusch considered some programmes he was cleared into defrauded the taxpayer, as Congress appropriates funds against declared programmes while a carved-out technology base sits outside that reporting.
“there was a lot of programs uh that once again i thought we were defrauding the american taxpayer because you have a certain smorgasbord of classified programs reported to congress and then congress authorizes and appropriates funds the funds said programs, but then you have this carved out base of technology that is sequestered”
David Grusch: The Whistleblower Who Told Congress We're Not Alone 00:41:49.3-00:42:10.4
Grusch said he must be careful not to identify technologies the federal government does not acknowledge.
“And I have to be careful not to infer certain technologies that are unacknowledged by the federal governments.”
David Grusch: The Whistleblower Who Told Congress We're Not Alone 00:42:16.2-00:42:21.4
A programme protection strategy exists to relocate movable archives and materials if a holding location is believed exposed.
“um there is a program protection strategy unfortunately to move movable archives and materials if they feel like the location has been burned or exposed”
David Grusch: The Whistleblower Who Told Congress We're Not Alone 00:44:31.5-00:44:40.5
Moving recovered craft to private corporations keeps funding outside congressional oversight, using non-appropriated dollars.
“And also keeping the funding outside of congressional oversight. So if you're using non-appropriated dollars and you're using a corporation whose net profits are be”
David Grusch: The Whistleblower Who Told Congress We're Not Alone 00:48:25.4-00:48:35.6
Grusch named several officials who ran such programmes and gave AARO several leads.
“I named several current former government officials that ran these programs. on behalf of the government and provided them several leads”
David Grusch: The Whistleblower Who Told Congress We're Not Alone 00:49:13.3-00:49:20.8

Special Access Program (SAP)

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